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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to analyse military and civilian loss from violence during 
contemporary armed conflict in order to facilitate understanding of the evolution of war and 
its impact on human behaviour. It comprises four chapters; the first two concentrate on the 
2003 Iraq War whilst the last two are focused upon global armed conflict during the recent 
past. Chapter 1 explores how and to what extent military deaths during the Iraq war affect 
US domestic opinion, proxied by various poll questions concerning war-related issues. 
Having addressed irregular frequencies of poll data that restrict time series application, this 
chapter renders a fresh perspective on casualty-opinion research, suggesting that 
cumulative military casualties prior to the poll did not have an immediate effect on poll 
respondents’ opinion regarding the continuation of military actions in Iraq. Instead, 
respondents are influenced by marginal casualty information from the previous time period, 
implying a slow adjustment in forming opinion through the Error Correction Mechanism 
(ECM). Chapter 2 presents a comparative analysis to gauge any different standards between 
the US Department of Defense and the media in counting violent civilian deaths during the 
Iraq war. In spite of substantial discrepancies during the initial period of the war, non-
parametric tests corroborate that the US military authority and media reports had a non-
differential approach towards counting violent civilian deaths during the war period across 
the spatial and spatiotemporal dimensions. However, the conspicuously conservative count 
by the US military authority during the initial stage of the war may have hindered the US 
forces’ ability to predict and prepare for the subsequent escalation of violence that brought 
about large-scale human loss as well as the prolongation of the war which lasted more than 
7 years. Chapter 3 analyses to what extent warring actors intentionally used lethal force 
against civilians, through the employment of a Civilian Targeting Index (CTI), a newly 
invented measure to indicate the intensity of civilian targeting for each actor. Building upon 
Chapter 3, Chapter 4 further examines factors that lead to warring actors targeting civilians 
as opposed to engaging in battle with war combatants. A dynamic panel approach shows 
that an increase in the degree of civilian targeting in the previous year further intensified 
civilian targeting in the current year for the actors involved in prolonged armed conflict. 
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Introduction 
The analysis of armed conflict has involved a multiplicity of approaches since conflict and 
its aftermath has affected human lives across many dimensions throughout history. 
Assessing human loss from violence, however, has been one of the dominant approaches to 
understanding the nature of armed conflict as it proxies the intensity of violence and its 
evolution. Since human loss is one of the most immediate and salient costs of armed 
conflict, it has been of direct interest to many parties that have a stake in conflict, including 
sovereign states, armed groups, academic scholars in different disciplines, and 
humanitarian organisations (Fischhoff et al. 2007). In addition, human loss itself has been a 
major contributing factor of public war support, thereby affecting policymaking with 
respect to state military strategies, as observed during the Vietnam War (Gelpi et al.2006).   
This thesis which broadly locates itself in the field of conflict economics comprises 
of two parts, each containing two essays that focus their analysis upon military and civilian 
fatalities during contemporary armed conflict in order to further our understanding of war 
as well as to enhance human protection from violence. The thesis’ contribution is three-fold; 
firstly, using the 2003 Iraq war data, chapter 1 provides a fresh perspective on casualty-
opinion research, suggesting that military casualty information unconventionally affects 
poll respondents when they are asked their support for the continuation of military 
operations. Secondly, chapter 2 presents a comparative study on violent civilian deaths 
during the Iraq war, and concludes that the US military authority may not have counted war 
deaths comprehensively during the initial stage of the war, resulting in the US forces’ 
inability to predict the subsequent scale of war escalation. Thirdly, chapters 3 and 4 provide 
an analysis from a different perspective by examining behavioural patterns of warring 
actors in order to determine which factors contribute towards actors employing lethal 
behaviour to target civilians as opposed to armed combatants. 
Part I. Military and Civilian Fatalities during the 2003 Iraq War 
The first two chapters analyse the nature of military and civilian fatalities during the 2003 
Iraq War. The Iraq War is arguably the major political phenomenon in recent decades. 
14 
 
Although not everyone regards the war as either a ‘terrible mistake’1 or an ‘illegal’ 
intervention,2 it is rarely considered as a success in terms of its prolonged duration and the 
considerable human cost it involved. 
The Iraq war was initiated on 20 March 2003 when the US, allied with the UK, 
invaded the country with the purpose to prevent Saddam Hussein’s development of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Without support from the UN Security Council, 
and in spite of strong disagreement with France, Germany and Russia, the US nevertheless 
rapidly took control of Baghdad, and the UK of Basrah, culminating in George Bush’s 
declaration of the victory in major combats on 1 May, just 42 days after the onset of the war. 
However, one violent incident which involved mutilation of four US civilians working as 
Blackwater contractors by Iraqis in Falluja at the end of March 2004 ignited wider 
insurgency against the US forces. In April, organised insurgent groups, one of which was 
led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, took control of the Sunni Muslim city of Falluja. During the 
same month, the Al-Mahdi Army, led by a Shia Cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, launched battles 
to take control of Najaf, a holy city for Shia Muslims. Furthermore, security in Iraq had 
rapidly declined as witnessed by a series of kidnappings of both foreign and Iraqi nationals 
between 2004 and 2005. In particular, the release of the video clip in April 2004 that 
showed the beheading of the US national Nick Berg, who had been taken hostage by an 
insurgent group, was a shock to US citizen. Although the US handed sovereignty back to 
Iraqis in June 2004, insurgencies against coalition forces increased, threatening the peace 
and stability in the daily lives of Iraqis. Sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia 
Muslims was also initiated by a bomb attack on a holy shrine for Shia Muslims in Samarra 
that brought about hundreds of violent deaths.3 The escalation of violence consequently 
prevented the early exit of the US forces and led to the additional dispatch of more than 
20,000 US troops in 2007. Since this surge, violent incidents conspicuously declined,4 with 
                                                           
1
 Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008). 
2
 Hans Blix, former UN Inspector, at the Iraq War Inquiry in July 2010. BBC News 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-10770239). 
3
 BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14546763). 
4
 General David Petraeus Report to the US Congress in September 2007. BBC News 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6986461.stm).  
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the last US combat brigade leaving Iraq in August 2010, thus officially ending a seven-and-
a half years military operation. 
The sequence of major events stated above during the Iraq war inevitably involved a 
significant number of military and civilian deaths. Chapter 1 and 2 analyse the nature of 
these war deaths to examine the war evolution or its impact on public support. Chapter 1 
examines how and to what extent war deaths affect US domestic public opinion, proxied by 
25 different poll questions concerning attitudes to the US military operations in Iraq. Whilst 
previous research on the casualty-opinion nexus has focussed on poll questions, which 
entail retrospective assessment such as beliefs on the justification of war or presidential job 
approval, this study centres upon questions that concern poll respondents’ prospective 
judgement on the practical feasibility of war: Should US troops stay or withdraw? Having 
addressed irregular frequencies of poll data that restrict time series application, this study 
renders a fresh prospective on casualty-opinion research, suggesting that military casualty 
information unconventionally affects poll respondents when they are asked this 
Stay/Withdraw question. Specifically, cumulative military casualties prior to the poll did 
not have an immediate effect on poll respondents’ opinion over the continuation of military 
actions in Iraq. Instead, respondents are influenced by marginal casualty information from 
the previous time period, implying a slow adjustment in forming opinion from the Error 
Correction Mechanism (ECM). However, general war support, presidential job approval 
ratings and public conviction on war success captured in various poll question types were 
severely aggravated as military casualties accumulated, conforming to conventional 
wisdom. This difference in attitudes of poll respondents implies, on the one hand that 
cumulative casualties immediately affect poll respondents’ retrospective evaluations since 
they deem war incurring a large number of death tolls unjustifiable. On the other hand, 
mounting casualties have no direct effect on opinion regarding the prolongation of military 
actions since poll respondents are presumably more cautious in their prospective judgement. 
Chapter 2 is a comparative analysis of the Pentagon archive and media-based 
records on war-related deaths during the 2003 Iraq War. The chapter provides a rare 
opportunity to gauge any differences between the US military authority and media reports 
16 
 
in acknowledging civilian loss in armed conflict. Non-parametric equality tests substantiate 
that violent civilian deaths recorded in the Pentagon and the media-based dataset are 
consistent along the spatial and spatiotemporal dimensions. This could provide some degree 
of assurance that the number of deaths recorded in both datasets is not totally arbitrary 
although neither may be a true count of the civilian death toll during the war. However, the 
US military authority and the media reports show a substantial difference in counting 
civilian deaths during the initial stage of the war. The civilian death toll recorded by the US 
military authority is 29% of the lower bound of the media reports in 2004, and 41% in 2005. 
The official figures of the US military authority, however, exceeded or were almost 
identical with those reported by media during the rest of the war period. The systematic and 
outstanding difference during the initial stage of the war may suggest either that media 
reports may have inflated the number of violent civilian deaths or that the US military 
authority may have undercounted them. Although there is no concrete evidence to ascertain 
who is closest to the truth, the chapter finds the US military authority’s undercount is 
partially supported by the evolution of the intensity of violence during the subsequent 
period of the war. Furthermore, the chapter also discovers that US military authority and 
media exhibit substantial disagreement in counting violent deaths which occurred during 
the major military offensives against insurgents and anti-coalition forces in the city of 
Falluja, Najaf and Samarra in 2004. In particular, given the Iraqi government’s official 
figures on violent civilian deaths, which include women and children, occurring in Falluja, 
the Pentagon appears to have been less mindful in distinguishing civilian loss from 
insurgent deaths during the all-out assaults in the city.  
Part II. Civilian Targeting in Armed Conflict 
Chapter 3 and 4 examine civilian loss from intentional attacks by warring actors, both 
sovereign states and organised armed groups, in contemporary armed conflict. Civilian 
targeting in any armed conflict is prohibited by the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, and 
by subsequent Associated Protocols I and II (Hicks and Spagat 2008, International 
Committee of the Red Cross 2010). Nevertheless, civilian targeting has been widely carried 
out in contemporary warfare as the alternative war strategy to battling combatants 
17 
 
(Arreguín-Toft 2001). According to the data compiled by the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP), almost 700,000 civilians, defined as non-combatants, were killed due to 
intentional and direct attacks by sovereign states or formally organised non-state groups in 
armed conflicts during 1989 and 2010.5 Chapter 3 and 4 describe the degrees to which 
warring actors intentionally employed lethal behavior on civilians as opposed to engaging 
in battle with enemies. The chapters each make use of the Civilian Targeting Index (CTI), a 
newly invented measure for the intentional targeting of civilians. An actor’s CTI value is 
defined as the proportion of civilian deaths resulted from warring actors’ intentional and 
direct attacks among the total number of fatalities associated with the actor during armed 
conflict. A CTI of 100 therefore indicates the worst outcome, meaning that an actor 
absolutely employed lethal force to target civilians. In contrast, a CTI value of 0 implies 
that an actor refrained from targeting civilians and absolutely employed its lethal force on 
armed combatants in battles. By providing each actor’s CTI value, the chapters introduce 
new information on relationships between fatalities that involved civilian targets and 
fatalities that involved armed combatants. 
Chapter 3 presents CTI values of 226 formally organised actors participating in 
armed conflict during 2002-2007. Whilst approximately 60% of the actors refrained from 
killing civilians in intentional, direct targeting (CTI=0), 11% used civilian targeting as their 
sole form of lethal behaviour in armed conflict (CTI=100). The chapter also attempts to 
find the determinants to explain why warring actors intentionally target civilian in armed 
conflict. With the control of other variables, a panel and cross-sectional data analysis 
concludes that the scale of conflict was not correlated with the intensity of civilian targeting. 
However, there was an inverse correlation between the intensity of civilian targeting and 
the scale of conflict when only actors who carried out some degree of civilian targeting are 
taken into account (CTI>0). This implies that once actors have crossed the line to target 
civilians (CTI>0), actors involved in larger scales of armed conflict are found to 
concentrate less lethal force on civilians and more on armed combatants. Conversely, those 
                                                           
5
 The figure does not involve civilian deaths that occurred during battles as the UCDP separately compiles 
battle deaths.  
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that engaged in lower scales of armed conflict concentrated more lethal force on civilian 
targeting and less on armed combatants. 
Finally, chapter 4 further explores behavioural patterns of warring actors in the 
intentional targeting of civilians in the context of global conflict using updated datasets 
documented by the same source and method from chapter 3. The datasets available in 
chapter 3 contains 226 actors who were involved in armed conflict at least one year 
between 2002 and 2007 whilst the updated datasets used for chapter 4 contain 536 actors 
during the 1989-2010 time period. In these updated datasets, the number of actors doubles 
and the maximum duration of conflict is approximately quadruple. The descriptive statistics 
of the updated datasets illustrate almost identical proportions of the actors distributed at the 
extremes with the datasets used in chapter 3; 63% of the actors refrained from targeting 
civilians while they were involved in armed conflict (CTI=0) whereas 10% used civilian 
targeting as their sole form of lethal force (CTI=100). Furthermore, chapter 4 adopts a 
dynamic panel approach to examine how and to what extent warring actors involved in 
prolonged armed conflict adjust their civilian targeting behaviour over time. A dynamic 
panel data analysis with the actors engaged in a uniquely long duration of armed conflict 
that covers 20 years or more shows warring actors who carried out some degree of civilian 
targeting in the previous year tend to increase their concentration on civilian targeting as 
opposed to battling with enemies in the current year. This suggests that warring actors, 
either sovereign states or armed groups, involved in longer-term conflict should be 
scrutinised more intensely by international civil society to prevent further unnecessary 
violence on civilians. 
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Chapter 1 
US Military Casualties in Iraq and Public Opinion                        
-With CBS-NYT, ABC-WP and Fox News Polls- 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Following the initiation of military action in Iraq in 2003, US society was inundated with 
reports on hostilities and its concomitant national casualties for a considerable period of 
time.6 Combat in Iraq was the most covered story on the prime evening news programmes 
of the three US major television networks7 between 2003 and 2007 with the exception of 
2005 when Hurricane Katrina took over.8 The airtime given to the combat stories was 
overwhelming too. For instance, the three TV networks assigned 1,157 minutes in total to 
cover hostilities in Iraq in 2007. This is nearly 5 times as many minutes of airtime as the 
second most covered story: the Virginia Tech massacre. Furthermore, the annual average 
number of fatalities of US military members under the hostile circumstances9 exceeded 700 
between 2004 and 2007 due to the insurgency in Iraq,10 and the number of days when 
hostile casualties occurred amounted to 250 days a year during this period.11 It appears that 
Americans have been exposed to national casualty information approximately 5 days a 
week over this time. 
Considering the intensive media coverage on military operations and its casualties, 
the accumulation of deaths is conjectured to accelerate American’s war-weariness and to 
have an adverse effect on presidential job approval ratings (Eichenberg 2005). This 
conventional wisdom, however, that wartime national casualties play a crucial role in 
                                                           
6
 Unless stated otherwise, the term ‘casualties’ refers to ‘fatalities’.  
7
 ABC World News, CBS Evening News and NBC Nightly News. 
8
 Tyndall Report Review (www.tyndallreport.com). Combat in Iraq was the second most covered story by a 
narrow margin in 2005.  
9
 Hostile casualties comprehend killed in action, died of wounds, died while missing in action and died while 
captured (US Department of Defense). 
10
 713 deaths in 2004, 673 in 2005, 704 in 2006 and 764 in 2007. 
11
 246 days in 2004, 264 in 2005, 269 in 2006 and 251 in 2007. 
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forming domestic opinion towards war and political leaders is a common speculation that 
still necessitates theoretical and empirical examination (Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2006). 
Indeed, the re-election of George W. Bush in November 2004, when the total number of 
hostile deaths of US forces in Iraq reached 850 and was precipitously increasing, is not 
elucidated by this conventionally accepted opinion-casualty nexus. 
While ample studies have attempted to test the conventional wisdom, scholars differ 
over the magnitude and the direction of the casualty effect on public opinion. The seminal 
and oft-quoted research on the casualty-opinion link is Mueller (1971) that argues public 
support dropped in proportion to the number of casualties during the Korean and the 
Vietnam Wars. Formally, the overall casualty effect has shown that whenever American 
military casualties increased by 10 times (i.e., from 100 to 1,000 or from 1,000 to 10,000), 
support for both wars decreased by about 15 percentage points, suggesting a strong and 
direct link between casualty and opinion. 
The noteworthy point in Mueller is that it takes the ‘log of cumulative casualties’ as 
an explanatory variable for opinion towards the two wars. The natural logarithm of the total 
number of casualties that have occurred at the time of the opinion survey serves well 
Mueller’s hypothesis that increasing casualties result in decreased public support since war 
support tend to precipitously decline in the earlier phase of wars and slow down toward the 
end. The log of cumulative casualties becomes the dominant measure of wartime human 
cost in the relevant literature thereafter. Yet, although taking logs could be a potential 
solution to address nonstationarity of casualty data, further treatment is necessary in case 
time series data contain stochastic trends as is often the case. 
Nonstationarity of the dependent variable and at least one independent variable in 
regressions could produce biased results. Log of cumulative casualties are apt to 
monotonically increase during a conflict while domestic support for the conflict decreases 
over time since support tends to be high at first owing to the rally effect12 and eventually 
diminish as the initial fever disappears, even without reference to mounting casualties. Thus, 
                                                           
12
 The rally ‘round the flag effect. Political terminology devised by Mueller (1971, 1973) to explain a 
phenomenon that a war tends to enjoy comparatively high domestic support in the beginning. 
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time itself is likely to generate spurious correlation (Yule 1926, Granger and Newbold 1974) 
between the log of cumulative casualties and opinion. Indeed, numerous time series 
contemporaneously trend upward or downward, and thus yield strong correlation. For 
instance, although nominal income and sunspots are not causally connected by construction, 
Plosser and Schwert (1978) find that the correlation coefficient between the log of nominal 
income in the US and the log of accumulated sunspots from 1897 to 1958 was 0.91, 
indicating a strong positive correlation between the two time series.13 As Plosser and 
Schwert argues, regression analysis without redressing nonstationarity of time series 
trending upward for discrete reasons, could lead to a biased conclusion. 
Building upon Mueller’s work, Gartner and Segura (1998) attempt to control for 
nonstationarity by including a simple time trend in their regression models. Moreover, they 
also extend Mueller’s bivariate model with the addition of a marginal casualty measure. 
With the same data perused in Mueller (1971), Gartner and Segura find that marginal 
casualties are more efficacious in capturing the effect of key events or salient exogenous 
shocks in war than monotonically increasing logged cumulative casualties. They also 
develop additional models to test their hypothesis that marginal casualties are the better 
predictor of opinion in periods of escalating hostilities, and cumulative casualties are better 
in periods of de-escalation. 
Although marginal casualties are more reflexive of events or shocks in which 
opinion is shaped, Gartner and Segura do not take account of the likelihood of 
multicollinearity between the log of cumulative casualties and marginal casualties, defining 
the latter as the number of deaths incurred 120 days prior to the date of the opinion survey. 
Marginal casualties for 120 days, a third of a year, are likely to be highly correlated with 
cumulative casualties and its logarithm transformation as well, thereby engendering high 
multicollinearity, leading to the inflation of standard errors and less precise estimates. 
Furthermore, inclusion of a time trend could eliminate spurious correlation risk only if the 
data follows a trend-stationary process. In reality, many economic time series are not 
stationary even after the removal of a time trend since they contain a stochastic trend. 
                                                           
13
 Correlation coefficients are between -1 and 1. If the correlation coefficient between two variables is 1, it 
indicates the two series are perfectly and positively correlated. 
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Larson (1996) also builds upon Mueller’s work but it goes a step further with its 
findings that the public shows casualty tolerance when the perceived benefits incurred from 
war outweigh the costs. Given the casualty data from 6 conflicts that the US had been 
involved with over the last 55 years between World War II and the military operations in 
Somalia in 1993, Larson found that the rate of decline of domestic support as a function of 
casualties varies considerably for each war or operation. In short, the public was willing to 
accept comparatively higher level of national casualties when US interests and principles 
were at stake (i.e. World War II), whereas support was drained by even a small number of 
casualties in case that US interests and principles are less compelling (i.e. military 
operations in Somalia). Despite the absence of thorough empirical efforts, Larson’s 
contribution to the research of the casualty-opinion link remains important for its import of 
a cost-benefit framework in understanding the mechanism that casualties affect public 
support towards war. Larson assumes that the public (and political leaders) is economically 
rational enough to compute the costs and the benefits accrued from military action, and is 
willing to tolerate comparably high casualties in case that the perceived benefits exceed the 
costs. This cost-benefit analysis, a prevailing theoretical framework in research on the 
casualty-opinion nexus, will be dealt with in detail in the next section. 
In the 21st century, research on the casualty-opinion link has evolved to show that 
the public evinces casualty tolerance when it sees favoured factors. Given the public 
surveys on the use of military forces concerning the 22 political episodes that the US had 
been associated with between 1981 and 2005, Eichenberg (2005) argues that a successful 
military intervention boosts public support regardless of the level of casualties. Furthermore, 
Eichenberg attempts to understand how differently poll respondents react to question 
wordings containing military and civilian casualties. In particular, mentioning military 
casualties in a question reduces support for the use of military force by about 8 percent, 
whereas mentioning civilian casualties abate support by 9.75 percent, signalling that the 
public might respond more sensitively to wartime civilian deaths than military casualties in 
forming its opinion towards war. Furthermore, Eichenberg argues that public opinion is 
considerably influenced by expected fatalities before war, and is subject to the possibility of 
success of war once it is initiated. 
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Similar to Eichenberg (2005), Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2006) hypothesise that 
military casualties have little effect on popular support for the US president when the public 
is fairly confident of victory. To test this hypothesis, they divide the initial 20 months of the 
Iraq war into three periods; the major combat (March and April 2003), the insurgency (May 
2003 to June 2004) and the post sovereignty phase (June to November 2004), and examine 
the relations between the log of total US military casualties and the overall presidential job 
approval ratings in each phase.14 Contrary to the conventional wisdom that increasing 
casualties depress war support, the impact of military casualties on presidential overall job 
approval ratings was slightly positive during the major combat phase when the US-led 
coalition swept the main cities in Iraq. On the other hand, casualties were negatively 
associated with approval ratings during the insurgency phase when the forecasting of 
success was loomed amongst US public. Furthermore, the casualty impact was not 
statistically significant during the post sovereignty phase. These shifts of casualty effects 
back Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler’s hypothesis that the public manifests casualty tolerance 
when it sees preferred factors in war such as a strong likelihood of victory while casualties 
erode support when public confidence is undermined. 
Most recent studies on the opinion-casualty link rigorously employ dynamic models 
to accommodate time series data. Voeten and Brewer (2006) attempt time series analysis 
with error correction models to capture the long-term equilibrium relationship between 
casualties and opinion during the recent Iraq War. Voeten and Brewer find that cumulative 
casualties have not affected war support or presidential approval ratings for the incumbent 
president, although a lagged casualty measure is negatively associated with war support and 
popular ratings. Consistently with Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2006), however, Voeten and 
Brewer’s model fits the hypothesis that casualties have differential effects during the 
various periods of the war. It also builds on Larson (1996) with its findings that disaccord 
in elite toward the war leads to a decrease in war support amongst the public. On the other 
hand, Echenberg and Stoll (2006) find that presidential approval ratings had significantly 
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 The poll question of interest for Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2005) is the presidential overall job approval 
ratings, instead of the job approval ratings on a specific issue such as the handling of the Iraq War or the 
campaign against terrorism. The correlation coefficient between overall presidential approval and approval of 
the president’s handling of Iraq is .95. 
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been damaged by cumulative military casualties over the war period between March 2003 
and January 2006. It is also noticeable that macro-economic indicators such as disposable 
income and consumer confidence substantially affected popular support during the pre-war 
period (February 2001 to March 2003) but had little impact since the war broke out, 
suggesting that Americans had been heedless of economic performances during the war in 
Iraq in assessing president’s overall accomplishment. 
Finally, Geys (2010) brings another perspective for the research on casualty-opinion 
link, by including the US Department of Defense budget as a proxy for the changes in 
government’s war-related expenditure between 1948 and 2008, as well as macroeconomic 
indices such as GDP growth and the unemployment rate in its model to calibrate how the 
public embraces economic cost of war when it forms opinion towards its leaders (e.g. 
approval ratings) during the Korean, Vietnam and Afghanistan/Iraq War. Inclusion of the 
financial cost of warfare makes the casualty variable statistically insignificant for the 
Korean and Afghanistan/Iraq War although its effect remains still significant for the 
Vietnam War. 
While both the magnitude and the direction of the casualty effect on opinion 
towards war are still contentious as seen in the previous works, this chapter draws upon and 
expands these works by contemplating the casualty-opinion link using the data from the 
war in Iraq, arguably the most significant conflict in the recent decade. It has never been 
attempted to examine the casualty-opinion nexus with the entire period of the Iraq War 
since the conflict has recently finished when the last US combat troops left Iraq in August 
2010, officially ending the seven-and-a half years military operation.15 It appears, therefore, 
to be the pertinent time to evaluate the human cost of the war, as measured in combat 
deaths, and its impact, if any, on public opinion during the war as a whole. Whereas 
previous works concentrate on specific categories of poll questions such as ‘right/wrong’, 
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 In this chapter, the war period is defined between 20 March 2003 and 19 August 2010 when the last 
‘combat’ troops left Iraq, ending Operation Iraqi Freedom. The remaining US service personnel for an advise-
and-assist role left the country in 18 December 2011, ending Operation New Dawn that started from 
September 2010.  
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‘worth’ or ‘approve’ types16 that require respondents’ retrospective evaluation on the war 
and the president, attention of this chapter is paid on the question type that requires poll 
respondents’ prospective judgement on the practical feasibility of war: Should the troops 
stay or withdraw? Overall, this chapter subsumes 25 different questions tipping public 
opinion towards the discrete war issues to examine how differently the public responds to 
the wide range of war issues. To my knowledge, no other work has attempted to embrace 
various poll questions to explore public’s potential distinctive attitude to the different war-
relevant subjects. In so doing, this chapter demonstrates that poll respondents remarkably 
differ in attitude towards retrospective and prospective questions, which most of scholarly 
works do not reckon the distinction between the two. Furthermore, the early studies on the 
casualty-opinion link including Mueller (1971) and Garter and Segura (1998) did not 
consider statistical problems such as irregular time intervals between poll observations that 
render time-series analysis ineffectual. By addressing the statistical issues, this chapter 
attempts to offer more comprehensive empirical examination of how and to what extent US 
military casualties during the Iraq war have impacted on public opinion towards the 
different types of question.  
The rest of the chapter is outlined as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical 
framework and the testing strategies. The data analysis is presented in section 3, the 
empirical results are discussed in section 4 and then section 5 concludes.  
 
1.2. Theoretical Background and Testing Strategies 
1.2.1. Theoretical Background 
Since Larson (1996) introduced the idea of using cost-benefit analysis to aid understanding 
of public casualty tolerance and aversion in recent past US military operations, this 
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 An example of the ‘right/wrong’ type question is “Looking back, do you think the United States did the 
right thing in taking military action against Iraq, or should the U.S. have stayed out”? (CBS-NYT survey), the 
‘worth’ type is “All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, 
do you think the war with Iraq was worth fighting, or not”? (ABC-WP survey), and the ‘approve’ type is “Do 
you approve or disapprove of the job George W. Bush is doing handling the situation with Iraq”? (Fox News 
survey). 
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microeconomic tool has been a broadly accepted theoretical framework in casualty-opinion 
research. Given this behavioural economic tool, an individual poll respondent is assumed to 
make a decision in the manner of a rational consumer who seeks profit maximisation on the 
basis of cost-benefit analysis. A consumer purchases a good if the benefits outweigh the 
costs otherwise he will not buy it. By the same token, a poll respondent is assumed to 
compute the perceived costs and benefits of wars, and eventually articulates an opinion 
through polling surveys based on the calculation.  
More formally, the basic decision rule for casualty tolerance within a cost-benefit 
framework is: 
 , 1(1 + 
) −  , 1(1 + 
),,  > 0 
where Bi,t  and Ci,t  is benefits and costs of ith individual in a society at time t, and d denotes 
the discount rate. Assuming that social preferences are the aggregated preferences of all 
individuals, social benefit is the sum of all individuals’ benefits and social cost is the sum 
of all individuals’ costs (Little and Mirrlees 1974, OECD 2006). The discount factor, 
1/(1 + 
), is included to net out the effect of inflation in such a way that the present value 
of a unit of benefit or cost has a higher weight than the future value of the same unit of 
benefit and cost. Under the circumstances of ∑ ,(1 + 
), > ∑ ,(1 + 
),  where 
the beneficiaries from military intervention could pay the inflation-adjusted aggregated 
costs to the losers in the society and still enjoy benefits, ∑ ,(1 + 
), − ∑ ,(1 +,

)−, the potential Pareto allocation is achieved. Cost-benefit analysis is nothing but an 
attempt to calculate ∑ ,,  and ∑ ,,  as precisely as possible. Although it is hard to 
believe that poll respondents make complicated cost-benefit calculations in assessing 
military operations due to imperfect information and non-monetary externalities, this 
chapter sticks to the cost-benefit appraisal to approach the casualty-opinion link since it is 
obvious that poll respondents absorb some of the war news via the media and other sources, 
and this information influence their evaluating military operations (Geys 2010). 
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Benefits from war or military intervention may be comparatively elusive and 
sometimes hard to quantify whereas costs such as human victimisation and infrastructure 
damage are rather tangible. Moreover, benefits of war have conspicuously varied across 
time and space. For instance, the perceived benefits of the World War II from the Allied 
Powers’ side were securing their order and stability from the threat of the Axis Powers. 
Similarly, principal policy objectives at stake of the Korean and Vietnam Wars from the US 
perspective were ensuring the security and hindering the spread of Communism although 
these perceived benefits were less convincing than those of the World War II (Larson 1996). 
On the other hand, small size conflicts including the Falklands War or the Invasion of 
Kuwait tend to involve disputes over territorial control or natural resources. Furthermore, 
perceived benefits could change in the course of war as observed in the 2003 Iraq War or 
the UN Operation in Somalia in 1993. Initially, the vast benefits of eliminating the 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq garnered the high levels of public support, 
and then the US foreign policy objects shifted to the War against Terrorism and building 
security in Iraq after the WMD threat was revealed to be a nothing but an intelligence 
fallacy. In Somalia, the perceived benefits changed to bringing peace and reconciliation 
amongst warring factions after the initial benefits of protecting Somali lives from violence 
were achieved with the UN operations (Larson 1996). In addition, post-war foreign aid and 
investment with a purpose of reconstruction may be also considered as benefits from war. 
Given the assumption that the benefits of war such as territory, economic power or 
certain government policy is exogenous (Bennett and Stam 1996), the next query of interest 
is how the public measure the costs of war. War costs undoubtedly include spending on 
military operations, current and future costs of medical care for the wounded soldiers, 
macroeconomic damage and many other features (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008). The important 
assumption of this chapter, however, is that combat casualties are the core cost of the war. 
Although combat casualties are not the only cost, they are the most salient and visible one 
since nothing can surpass shocks from deaths of family members, friends or neighbours 
from battlegrounds (Gartner, Segura and Wilkening 1997, Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008). Due 
to this reason, most previous studies on the casualty-opinion link explicitly or implicitly 
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assume that casualties are the key costs of war as far as public opinion formation is 
concerned. 
This assumption, however, leads to the following question:  how is human sacrifice 
in war valued? Cost-benefit analysis has roots in pricing, and prices are usually formed in 
markets but some of the most important features in war such as human costs might not have 
a market price (Arrow et al. 1996). Moreover, it could be rather elusive or immoral to 
measure the human sacrifice in war. Despite that human cost is immeasurable, the 
Department of Defense (DoD)’s compensation scheme could be a proxy for human cost in 
Iraq. The DoD is paying 500,000 dollars for a military member’s death, with 100,000 
dollars of death benefit and 400,000 of life insurance although Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) 
recalculate this amount to 7.2 million dollars according to the “value of statistical life 
(VSL)” that the US government and insurance companies broadly applied in determining 
compensation for human loss. Poll respondents are unlikely to identify all tangible and 
intangible costs of war but it is expected that they still do ends-means calculus based on 
information they absorbed. 
1.2.2. Testing Strategies 
With the assumptions in the previous subsection, this chapter attempts to test the 
conventional wisdom that the accumulation of military casualties induces a decrease in 
support towards war. In particular, this chapter extends the regression models coined by the 
previous scholarly works by adding the US unemployment rate and various control 
variables to look at the overarching effect of wartime casualties on public preferences over 
the war-relevant issues captured in the 25 different poll questions17 during the US invasion 
of Iraq between March 2003 and August 2010. 
The unemployment rate, out of other major macro-economic indices, is included in 
the regression model for the two prime reasons. Firstly, it corresponds to monthly time 
series data used in this chapter. Unlike other economic indices such as the GDP (quarterly 
released) or federal fund rate (announced 8 times a year), the unemployment rate, as well as 
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 Twenty-three in twenty-five questions are of use in regression analysis. See Table 1-1.  
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the inflation rate, is made public on a monthly basis. Secondly, while the US monthly 
inflation rate had changed rather stably between -2 and 4 percent during the war period,18 
the unemployment rate had fluctuated over the same period, better reflecting the change in 
economy to political and economic events including the War in Iraq and the financial crisis 
initiated in 2008. For instance, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate soared up to 10.1 
percent in October 2009, hitting double digits for the first time since the early 1980s 
recession.19 Inclusion of unemployment in the regression model is expected to net out the 
negative effect in the labour market on formation of poll respondents’ opinion towards the 
war. The basic time series regression model is given by,  
 =  +  !" + #$%&' !" + ()'*+"' 
+,- + .. (1.1) 
The dependent variable, Rt, is the percentage of American poll respondents 
signifying either a positive or negative opinion concerning the war in Iraq, depending on 
the type of question asked at time t.20 The first independent variable, cumulative casualtyt, 
is the natural logarithm of cumulative casualties that have occurred at the time of opinion 
surveys. Thus, the coefficient of cumulative casualties, , captures the effect of hostile 
deaths of US military members on each opinion towards the war. Marginal casualtyt 
denotes US military casualties occurred for 7 days prior to the date of the poll.21 
Unemploymentt, a proxy of the overall economic outcomes, is coded as 1 if the most 
recently released US unemployment rate prior to the polls decreased compare to that of the 
previous month, 0 otherwise. Finally, - is a set of controlling regressors that apprehend a 
time trend to eliminate a time effect as well as binary variables to capture political 
circumstances under which poll respondents might face as of the date of opinion surveys. 
The binary variables are discretionally used in consideration of the characteristics of time 
series data of each question. 
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 Inflation measured by the consumer price index. US Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/) 
19
 US Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/). 
20
 The positive and negative responses are separately regressed. 
21
 Although some take a longer duration for marginal casualty such as 120 days (Gartner and Segura 1998), 
and 3 months (Gey 2010), I take 7 days in consideration of multicollinearity between cumulative and 
marginal casualty.  Furthermore, marginal casualties for 7 days are stationary in most of the 25 poll 
questions.  
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Although the regression results estimated with the original poll data is presented in 
this chapter, there are several econometric concerns to be aware of in using the original poll 
data. Firstly, time series data for each poll question has not a regular interval since the polls 
had not been systematically commissioned during the war.22 This is mainly because that 
opinion surveys relevant to war issues had been frequently carried out until mid-2007 but 
sparsely conducted since then as the US political interest rapidly shifted to the presidential 
election, the war in Afghanistan or the economic meltdown. Statistical methods for time 
series, therefore, may not be applicable for the original poll data with irregular frequency. 
Secondly, the original data could be nonstationary by nature, following a unit root process 
(I(1)). For instance, the presidential approval ratings, depicted by ‘approval’ type poll 
questions,23 had consistently decreased during the Bush administration. This trend may be 
stochastic, not deterministic that can be easily addressed with an inclusion of a time dummy 
in the regression model. Without converting the data into stationary series (I(0)), the 
estimates will be biased due to spurious regression. Finally, many of the poll questions have 
small samples, impeding asymptotic time series analysis. As seen in the next section, 17 in 
25 questions have less than 30 observations during the sample period. 
In order to mitigate these concerns, the poll data is newly constructed with the 
following procedure. Firstly, similar poll questions are aggregated regardless of institutions 
that conducted opinion surveys. Secondly, when aggregating similar questions, the time 
intervals of poll observations are adjusted to make them have a regular frequency. When 
more than one poll observation is available in a month, I take the average value while I 
linearly interpolate for missing observations (Geys 2010). If the dependent and all 
explanatory variables in modified time series data are stationary, I test them with the model 
(1.1) with the inclusion of an autoregressive term (Rt-1) as an explanatory variable. If they 
are nonstationary but have common stochastic trend (cointegrated), I employ an Error 
Correction Model (ECM). 
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 For instance, ‘right/wrong’ type question of CBS-NYT (Q1 in Table 1-1) had been asked 68 times during 
the war period which lasted for 90 months; it was asked more than one time in some months, but was skipped 
in other months. 
23
 The examples of the ‘approve’ type questions are question 9-10, 20-21 and 24-25 in Table 1-1. 
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Although the variables follow a unit root process (I(1)), their linear combination 
could render I(0) variables with cointegrated parameters (Engle and Granger 1987). This 
error correction mechanism is easily extended from the first-order autoregressive 
distributed lag model (ADL) below.24 
ttttt YXXY ναααα ++++= −− 131210
 
 
where vt is white noise. If Yt and Xt are nonstationary but have a long-run equilibrium in a 
way of Y=λ+ρX , where λ and ρ are cointegrated parameters, the equation above can be 
reformulated to give 
ttttt XYXY νλραα +−−−+∆=∆ −− ))(1( 1131  
 
where ∆ signifies the first difference operator. Whilst 1α  captures the immediate effect of a 
change in Xt on a change in Yt , the error correction term ))(1( 113 λρα −−− −− tt XY  shows the 
speed to restore the equilibrium. For instance, if the error correction term is non zero, it 
means the model is out of equilibrium, and there must be a movement back to the 
equilibrium relationship given that 13 <α . In this chapter, I use a simple form of the 
single equation error correction model (Voten and Brewer 2006, Eichenberg and Stoll 2006) 
as below. 
∆ =  + 01 + 2∆ !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!"1 
                   +()'*+"' + ,- + .. (1.2) 
Model (1.2) states that the first difference of the percentage of poll respondents for 
each aggregated question (∆Rt) depends on the previous poll response (Rt-1), the first 
difference of cumulative casualty as the logarithm form (∆Cumulative Casualtyt),  one lag 
of cumulative casualty (Cumulative Casualtyt-1), unemployment and a group of controlling 
regressors (-). This error correction mechanism allows us to estimate contemporaneous 
changes in cumulative casualties and the speed in returning to re-equilibrium after the 
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 Hendry (1995), Kennedy (2008). 
33 
 
deviation from the long-run equilibrium. The marginal casualty measure is excluded from 
the error correction model since it may be redundant in the presence of the first difference 
of the cumulative casualty measure. 
 
1.3. Data Analysis 
The data for this chapter are largely classified into two categories: the US poll data and the 
casualty data from the initiation of the Iraq War in 20 March 2003 up to 19 August 2010 
when the last US combat brigade left Iraq, ending Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
1.3.1. Public Opinion Data 
As a proxy for public opinion, poll data collected from three survey organisations tied to 
the leading US media; CBS-New York Times, ABC-Washington Post, and Fox News, is 
used for this chapter.25 26 The first two polling institutions are the combination of the US 
major TV networks and newspapers that are thought to be rather liberal by conservative 
parties, whereas Fox News is deemed to have a conservative bias by liberal parties, in 
favour of the Bush administration in going to the war. Interestingly, all three polling 
institutions, CBS-NYT, ABC-WP and Fox News, have the same question concerning the 
public’s preferences in approving the president’s handling of the Iraq situation, leaving a 
room for a comparative analysis between the polling surveys commissioned by media 
institutions which have somehow opposite inclinations.  
Amongst the polls commissioned by the three polling institutions during the war 
period, I performed a search using the following keywords: Iraq, war, troop, military, and 
terrorism. Given the numerous poll questions obtained from this search, only the questions 
that satisfied the following five thresholds remain as part of the analysis of this chapter. 
Firstly, the polls are commissioned nationwide. Secondly, respondents are randomly or 
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 From time to time, CBS and ABC independently conducted the polls without being associated with NYT or 
WP. 
26
 The polls were conducted via telephone interviews, and the time window of a single poll is usually within a 
week. The sampling error is plus or minus 3 percentage points in most poll surveys. 
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quasi-randomly selected adults or voters.27 A nationwide random sample ensures that 
opinion surveys are extrapolated in order to give a measure of public opinion. Thirdly, the 
poll question taps generalised support for the war or relevant issues to the invasion of Iraq. 
Fourthly, the poll questions are main, not the sub-questions. Finally, the questions are 
recursively asked during the sample period without much variation in wording.28 The final 
requirement is to eliminate the ambiguity incurred by a frame effect from different 
wordings or question structures. From this filtering process, the 25 different poll questions 
were selected for the analysis; 14 questions from CBS-NYT surveys, 9 from the ABC-WP, 
and 2 from Fox News as shown in Table 1-1. These three media polling outlets committed 
fairly considerable number of opinion surveys concerning various war issues during the 
military operation in Iraq, and repeatedly asked the same questions that allows independent 
analysis for each question.   
From the top of Table 1-1, the ‘right/wrong’ and the ‘worth’ type questions (Q1-3 
and 15-16) ask of respondents if they think the Iraq war is the right decision or worth 
doing.29 These two retrospective question types are of principal interest in most previous 
scholarly works on the casualty-opinion relations since they are regarded as directly related 
to public support towards the war, tapping generalised preferences of the public (Mueller 
1971). 
The ‘stay/withdraw’ type questions (Q4-8 and 17-18) are still highly relevant to 
public war support, questioning whether respondents want the troops to be stationed in Iraq 
or to be withdrawn. Furthermore, while the ‘right/wrong’ or the ‘worth’ type questions are 
somehow relevant to the justification or the moral aspects of the war that require the 
retrospective evaluation, the ‘stay/withdraw’ type is straightforward questions that asks 
respondents’ prospective judgement on the continuance of military actions. 
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 There are cases that a certain number of a specific group of people (i.e. aged more than 65 or African 
American) is included in the samples, but these groups are weighted to reflect the proper proportion of the 
population. 
28
 There is variation in wording in some poll questions but this is a small change, such as the ‘US’ becoming 
the ‘United States’ or ‘George Bush’ becoming ‘G.W. Bush’.  
29
 The classification of the poll question types follows the method of Dr. Andrew Hossack, principal analyst 
in Defence Science and Technology Laboratory of the UK Ministry of Defence. 
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The ‘approve’ types (Q9-10, 20-21 and 24-25) draws political attention in particular 
by signifying the approval ratings of the president’s handling of the Iraqi situation or the 
campaign against terrorism. In addition, the casualty type (Q19) might also attract political 
interests since it offers a direct measure of public tolerance against the accumulation of 
military casualties by questioning respondents on whether the total number of military 
deaths up to the date of the poll is acceptable or not. 
The ‘success to date’ (Q11-12 and 22-23) and the ‘expected success’ type (Q13) 
questions are comparatively less relevant to generalised war support. Specifically, the 
‘success to date’ type questions query how respondents think of the process of 
reconstructing Iraq since the collapse of the Saddam Hussein government or whether they 
think that the US is safer from terrorism as a result of the military intervention in Iraq. The 
‘expected success’ type asks about the prospect of the war, inferring public consensus on 
the outlook of the military action. 
Finally, the ‘reinforce’ type (Q14) focuses on respondents’ preferences towards the 
then president Bush’s plan in the beginning of 2007 to send more than 20,000 troops to Iraq 
to redress the severe insurgency in the country. This ‘surge’ plan engendered a huge debate 
on its effect in the US society. 
Given the above 25 questions, I categorised each choice in the responses into 
positive and negative answers. The positive (+) and negative (-) signs in the ‘choices in 
response’ column in Table 1-1 indicate that the answer is labelled as a positive or negative 
response respectively. Tagging the signs is skipped when it is not straightforward to 
categorise the choices into the positive or negative responses (i.e. Q6 and 8). The trends of 
positive and negative responses for all 25 questions over time are presented in Figure 1-1. 
As seen in Figure 1-1, some questions (i.e. Q1, 9, 10 and 12) had been asked over 
the whole period of the war, with most of them for a certain period of time only. 
Furthermore, positive responses, illustrated with triangle shapes, appear to decrease over 
time for most questions while negative responses, hollow circles, tend to increase. For 
instance, the first plot in Figure 1-1 displays that the proportion of poll respondents 
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signifying that the US did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq (i.e. positive 
response) was 64 percent at the beginning of the war but it gradually decreased to end up 
with 37 percent at the last poll commissioned in 2010. On the other hand, the proportion of 
respondents exhibiting that the US should have stayed out (i.e. negative response) has 
increased over time, from 28 to 59 percent.30 Whilst many of the questions display a 
moderate increase or decrease over time, the ‘approve’ type questions spanning the two 
administrations that experienced the Iraq war (Q9, 10 and 20) show a steady decrease in 
presidential approval ratings under the Bush administration and a sudden increase with the 
outset of the Obama’s in the beginning of 2009. The ‘right/wrong’ and ‘worth’ type 
questions spanning the two governments (Q1 and 15), however, are not seemingly affected 
by the change in regime, implying that poll respondents’ belief on the justification of the 
war had been neither aggravated nor improved by the administrative shift. Whilst the 
‘approve’ type questions show a dramatic change due to the shift in administration in 2009, 
the ‘success to date’ type questions (Q12 and 23) display a conspicuous change in poll 
respondents’ retrospective judgment on the US efforts to bring stability and order in 2007, 
indicating that respondents might be affected by the surge that led a rapid decrease in daily 
military casualties in mid-2007. Finally, the ‘stay/withdraw’ type questions give ambiguous 
information; the ABC-WP poll questions (Q17-18) show a steep decline in opinion in 
favour of troop stationing but one cannot find a common trend in the CBS-NYT polls (Q4-
8). 
One other noteworthy point in Figure 1-1 is that each question has not been asked 
with a regular time interval. For instance, question 3 was often asked at the beginning, and 
then rarely commissioned since 2007. In addition, the ‘approve’ type questions (Q9, 10 and 
20-21 and 24-25) were scarcely or never asked in 2008 when the presidential election was 
held. As discussed in section 1.2, I firstly carry out separate regressions for each question 
without modifying the original poll data shown in Figure 1-1, then I aggregate similar 
questions and adjust poll observations since time series methods such as a nonstationarity 
or cointegration test have been limited to the data with a regular time intervals (Seong, Ahn 
and Zadrozny 2007). 
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 The descriptive statistics of poll responses for each question are presented in Table 1-A-2 in appendix. 
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1.3.2. Casualty Data 
The US military casualty data for this chapter is obtained from the US Department of 
Defense website.31 In particular, the chapter utilises hostile deaths instead of total deaths 
since daily news reports mainly cover hostile deaths in battle, comprising killed in action, 
died of wounds, died while missing in action and died while captured, than non-hostile 
deaths such as died in accident, illness, homicide or self-inflicted. Hostile deaths and total 
deaths (sum of hostile and non-hostile deaths) reached 3483 and 4408 respectively at the 
end of the war (August 2010).32 
Figure 1-2 illustrates cumulative and marginal hostile deaths having substantially 
different tendencies over the war period. The dotted line displays the time-series of 
cumulative military casualties as a common logarithm plot and the solid line shows 
marginal casualties defined here as incurred over the preceding 7 days. While the log of 
cumulative casualties monotonously increase over the war period, marginal casualties 
fluctuate until mid-2007 and have steeply decreased since then, helped by the surge that 
brought about an additional dispatch of more than 20,000 troops in Iraq during the first half 
of the year. The arrows in Figure 1-2 indicate the months corresponding to the critical 
events such as the transfer of Iraqi sovereignty, an announcement of the surge plan, and 
armed attacks that caused a large number of military or civilian casualties during the war 
period. As shown in the descriptions for the events, the two major battles between the US 
forces and anti-coalition forces in Falluja in April and November 2004 brought about a 
considerable number of military fatalities.  
 
1.4. Regression Analysis 
Given the models illustrated in section 1.2.2, this section first presents OLS regression 
results obtained from separate regressions for each question without concerning 
nonstationarity or irregular time intervals of poll data, then shows time series analysis after 
                                                           
31
  Casualty Analysis System (http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/casualty/castop.htm). 
32
  The correlation coefficient between cumulative hostile deaths and cumulative total deaths over the whole 
war period is .9997. The correlation coefficient of daily hostile deaths and daily total deaths is .9043.  
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addressing these econometrics issues. The OLS results of the first experiment are displayed 
in Table 1-2.  
Table 1-2 only presents the results for the positive responses.33 The first three 
columns of Table 1-2 contain the media institutions that had commissioned the polls chosen 
for this chapter, question numbers and question types for each question. The explanatory 
variables including the two casualty variables are presented in the first row in Table 1-2. 
Specifically, cumulative and marginal casualty indicate the natural logarithm of the total 
number of hostile military deaths that have occurred at the time of the polls and marginal 
casualties for 7 days prior to the polls respectively. Time is the number of days between the 
start of the war and the date of the polls to net out the possible time effect. Unemployment 
is coded as 1 if the most recently released US unemployment rate prior to the poll 
decreased compared to that of the previous month, 0 otherwise. Administration, coded as 1 
if a poll was commissioned during the Obama administration, 0 otherwise, is to capture the 
effect of the change in administration on opinion towards the war.34 Period is  used for 
several questions to isolate certain periods that may be systematically different from other 
periods of the war such as the surge (Q4) or the initial stage of the war (Q1 and 7) when 
war support was high due to the rally effect.  The rest of the table exhibits the coefficients 
of the explanatory variables when the dependent variable is percentage of positive 
responses. I mainly attempt to interpret the coefficients of the two casualty variables, and 
cope with the rest of the explanatory variables in the regression results with the data fitted 
for time series analysis later in this section. 
Cumulative Casualties Do Matter 
Looking at the primary variables of interest in Table 1-2, we see the coefficients for the two 
casualty measures. One of the noteworthy points is that many of the coefficients on 
cumulative casualties are significant at the 5% level whereas marginal casualty is 
significant only for question 12 and 19. For instance, cumulative casualty in question 1 
(‘right/wrong’ type of CBS-NYT polls) implies that, holding all other variables constant, 
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  The regression results for the negative responses, as presented in Table 1-A-1 in appendix, are symmetric 
with those for the positive responses. 
34
  0 is for the G.W. Bush administration. 
39 
 
every time American military casualties increased by a factor of 10 (i.e., from 100 to 1,000 
or from 1,000 to 10,000) the proportion of poll participants who responded that the war was 
the right decision has dropped by 10.23 percentage points. The marginal casualty measure, 
however, is not statistically significant although it is also negative. Furthermore, the 
estimated effect of cumulative casualties in the ‘worth’ type questions of CBS-NYT and 
NBC-WP polls (Q2-3 and 15-16) indicates that whenever American casualties increased by 
10 times, the proportion of respondents signifying that the war was worth doing remarkably 
dropped, by between 7-16 percentage points. The effect of cumulative casualties in the 
‘right/wrong’, and the ‘worth’ type questions are not substantially different from the 
Mueller’s findings that the percentage support towards the Korean and the Vietnam Wars 
dropped by about 15 percentage points as casualties increased by 10 times (Mueller 
1971).35 The effect of cumulative casualties is still strong and direct in many of the 
questions.  
Figure 1-3 visually shows the estimated effect of cumulative casualties presented in 
Table 1-2.36 The estimated effect of cumulative casualties for each question is indicated by 
the figures next to the square shapes of the bar graphs. The triangles and the circles above 
and below the squares represent the upper and the lower limits of the 95% confidence 
intervals for the estimates. The hollow squares in the right side of the figure imply that the 
estimates for the questions (Q4-5, 11, 17, 24-25) are not statistically significant at the 5% 
level. 
Looking at the significant estimates (solid squares) first, we see expected negative 
signs suggesting a negative association between cumulative casualties and positive 
responses for each poll question. As stated, the ‘right/wrong’ and the ‘worth’ type questions 
(Q1-3 and 15-16) that tap the generalised support towards the war were significantly 
aggravated as military casualties accumulated. Moreover, the estimates for the ‘approve’ 
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  Mueller pools the ‘right/wrong’ and the ‘worth’ type questions in regression analysis. Also, the log of 
cumulative casualties is used as a sole explanatory variable in the Mueller’s model whilst marginal casualties, 
a time trend, and other political and economic explanatory variables are contained in the model specification 
for this chapter.  
36
 Question 7, 13, 14, 18 and 22 are not presented since the estimates for these questions are too large to be 
shown in the figure. The coefficients for these questions are not statistically significant as shown in Table 1-2. 
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type questions of CBS-NYT and ABC-WP (Q9-10 and 20-21) may be interpreted as 
follows: controlling for other factors, the presidential approval ratings on handling the Iraqi 
situation or the campaign against terrorism decreased by about 14-16 percentage points 
whenever US military casualties increased by 10 times. In addition, the coefficient for the 
‘success to date’ type question of CBS-NYT (Q12) implies a negative association between 
cumulative casualties and positive view on the outcome of the war. Finally, the estimate for 
the ‘casualty’ type question (Q19) is the greatest in magnitude amongst the questions with 
significant estimates.37 38 39  
Interestingly, all the questions with significant coefficients ask of respondents’ 
retrospective assessment, requiring them to evaluate the justification of the war 
(‘right/wrong’ and ‘worth’ types; Q1-3 and 15-16), president’s accomplishment in the war 
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 Estimated effects of cumulative casualties in some questions are greater in magnitude than those of other 
questions. For instance, the estimate of the ‘casualty’ type question (Q19) is the greatest (-33.33) amongst the 
questions with significant estimates as presented in Table 1-2. Furthermore, the estimates of the ‘approve’ and 
‘success to date’ type questions of CBS-NYT polls (Q9-10 and Q12) are greater in magnitude than those for 
other CBS-NYT poll questions such as the ‘right/wrong’ and ‘worth’ types (Q1-3) by about 5-10 percentage 
points. It may suggest that respondents are more susceptible to certain types of questions. It is, however, not 
necessarily true that the estimates are significantly different across the question types as indicated by the 
overlapping confidence intervals. The confidence interval at the 95% level of the ‘casualty’ type question is (-
49.54 and -17.11), which is largely overlapped with that of other questions with significant estimates. For 
example, the confidence intervals of the two ‘approve’ type questions of ABC-WP polls (Q15-16) are (-19.82, 
-9.31) and (-24.32, -6.46) respectively. Moreover, the confidence intervals for the two ‘worth’ type questions 
of ABC-WP polls (Q15-16) are (-21.96, -10.37) and (-22.75, -5.64). The confidence intervals for the CBS-
NYT poll questions with significant estimates (Q1-3, Q9-10 and Q12) are also overlapped with those of the 
‘casualty’ type question except Question 2; 95% CI of Q1 (-18.21, -2.25), Q2 (-12.97, -2.33), Q3 (-18.04, -
2.23), Q9 (-21.18, -10.53), Q10 (-26.54, -8.64), Q12 (-27.21, -5.63). These overlapping confidence intervals 
for each question imply that the estimates are not significantly different from each other although each of 
them is significantly different from zero. 
38
 The negative casualty effect on public support towards the 2003 Iraq War is also observed in the UK 
although it is less straightforward compared to that in the US. Given the 179 UK hostile deaths during the war 
and the data of the opinion surveys committed by three different polling organisations, a Populus poll 
question that asks the justification of the war shows a statistically significant effect of cumulative British 
military fatalities on war support at the 1 percent level. Another poll question from the YouGov opinion 
surveys produces a significant estimate of cumulative fatalities at the 10 percent level whereas the ICM 
surveys render an insignificant estimate. The detailed regression results and the question wording are 
presented in Table 1-A-4 in appendix. 
39
 The negative casualty effect on war support is rather elusive when it comes to small size military operations. 
During the US military intervention in Somalia in 1993, the approval ratings for then-President Clinton was 
slightly higher than 50 percent in June but plummeted to about 30 percent in October, just after the Battle of 
Mogadishu which resulted in 18 deaths of US soldiers (Baum 2004). The casualty-opinion link, however, 
cannot be quantified due to the limited number of opinion surveys that hinders a thorough empirical analysis. 
Furthermore, the link is reversed in other small size military operations undertaken by the US forces in 
Panama and Lebanon between the late 1980s and early 1990s as public support had slightly increased with the 
accumulation of military casualties (Larson 1996). 
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and anti-terrorism campaign (‘approve’ type; Q9-10 and 20-21), or the level of military 
casualties up to the date of the poll surveys (‘casualty’ type; Q19). Furthermore, the 
‘success to date’ type 2 of CBS-NYT polls (Q12) also queries respondents’ retrospective 
evaluation on the US efforts to re-establish security and order in Iraq. 
Continuation of Military Operations and Casualties 
When looking at the questions with insignificant coefficients on the casualty variables in 
Table 1-2 and Figure 1-3, we find that neither the cumulative nor the marginal casualty 
measure is statistically significant in affecting poll respondents’ opinion on the continuation 
of military stationing, proxied by the ‘stay/withdraw’ type questions (Q4-5, 7 and 17-18). 
This may be due to the small sample size varying between 15 and 26, otherwise it may be 
interpreted that poll respondents take no account of casualty information in shaping their 
opinion on whether the US military forces should keep staying in or leave Iraq. 
To test this hypothesis, firstly I select similar questions categorised under the same 
type. Secondly, I aggregate poll responses of the selected questions within each type to give 
the following 6 categories: Worth Type, Approve Type I and II, Stay/Withdraw Type, 
Success to Date Type, and Right/Wrong Type.40 41 The aggregated positive responses for 
each type are displayed in Figure 1-4.42 Positive responses for the questions categorised 
under Worth Type (Q2, 3, 15 and 16) consistently decrease over time as displayed in the 
first plot of Figure 1-4. Approve Type I and II also show declining trends until the 
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 Worth Type comprises question 2, 3, 15 and 16, Approve Type 1 question 9, 20 and 24, Approve Type II 
question 10 and 21, Stay/Withdraw Type question 4-5, 7 and 17-18, and finally Success to Date Type 
question 12 and 23. The selected questions under each type have different wordings but contain similar 
concern. The questions under Worth Type ask poll respondents whether they think the war contributed to the 
long-term security of the US (Q16), was worth fighting (Q15), or was worth the loss of American life and 
other costs (Q2-3). Approve Type is divided with two categories. The first question type is for the presidential 
job approval ratings on the situation with Iraq (Q9, 20 and 24) whilst the second on the campaign against 
terrorism (Q10 and 21). The questions under Stay/Withdraw Type ask poll respondents whether US troops 
should leave or stay in Iraq (Q4-5 and 17-18), or should have a time table for the withdrawal (Q7). Question 6 
and 8 are excluded due to the ambiguity in categorising the choices into positive and negative responses. The 
questions under Success to Date Type ask whether US efforts to bring stability and order to Iraq are going 
well or badly (Q12), or the US is making significant progress toward restoring order in Iraq (Q23). 
41
 Positive and negative responses are aggregated separately. 
42
 Plots for negative responses are presented in Figure 1-A-1 in appendix. I also include Right/Wrong Type in 
the aggregated analysis since it has comparatively large observation (68) although it has only one question in 
it.   
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inauguration of Barack Obama in February 2009, indicating presidential job approval 
ratings on the Iraq situations (Approve Type I), and on the campaign against terrorism 
(Approve Type II) surged up with the change in administration from Bush to Obama. 
Aggregated positive responses for Stay/Withdraw Type appear to have diminishing patterns 
while the range in variation for each question is similar during the overlapping periods. The 
responses for the two questions included in Success to Date Type (Q12 and 23) exhibit 
almost identical tendency over the war period. Finally, Right/Wrong Type containing only 
one question (Q1) shows poll respondents who think the Iraq War was right decision has 
steeply decreased in the initial stage of the war, then slowly declined towards the end. 
While aggregating the similar questions under each type, I attempt to redress the 
problems that the original data retains such as irregular time intervals as well as a stochastic 
trend. To obtain a time series data with a monthly frequency, as described in section 1.2.2, I 
take the average value of poll responses if more than one poll observation is available in a 
month while I linearly interpolate for missing months.43  
With this monthly data fitted for time series analysis,44 I test stationarity of all 
variables for each question type.45 If the dependent variable and all explanatory variables 
are stationary, I regress them with a simple dynamic model containing a lagged dependent 
variable as stated in section 1.2.2 whilst I employ an error correction mechanism if they are 
nonstationary but cointegrated with order one assuming that there is a long-term 
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 The number of missing months is presented in Table 1-A-3 in appendix. 
44
 For the time series analysis, I excluded some of the polls commissioned at the last stage of the war to 
minimise the modification of the original data. As shown in Figure 1-4, questions concerning the war issues 
were not frequently asked since late 2008. Thus, if the sample period of the time series analysis with the 
modified data is spanned to include this later period of the war, there would be more missing values and 
subsequently, more observations would have to be created by linear interpolation, making the modified time 
series data further away from the original data. Specifically, the two poll observations are excluded from 
Right/Wrong Type. These observations were commissioned during the twenty two month period between 
November 2008 and August 2010. Also, the three poll observations are excluded from Worth Type. They 
were commissioned during the eighteen month period between March 2009 and August 2010. Furthermore, 
the three poll observations, which were commissioned during the eleven month period between October 2009 
and August 2010, are excluded from Success to Date Type. For Approve Type I and II, I only use the poll 
observations obtained during the Bush administration. The questions on the presidential approval ratings were 
scarcely asked in 2008 when the presidential election was held. Therefore, if the sample period includes the 
Obama administration, there would be more missing values, and subsequently, it requires creating more 
observations causing further modification of the original data. 
45
 Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests and Phillips-Perron tests are used in detecting unit root. 
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relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Specifically, all variables of 
Right/Wrong, Worth and Approve Type are stationary, so tested with a dynamic model in 
which the current value of the dependent variable (positive or negative responses) is a 
function of a past value of the dependent variable itself, the current value of independent 
variables (cumulative and marginal casualties) and other control variables. On the other 
hand, Stay/Withdraw and Success to Date Type adopt the error correction model in which a 
contemporaneous change in the dependent variable (∆Yt)  is a function of a past value of 
the dependent variable (Yt-1), the first difference of the explanatory variable (∆Xt), the past 
value of the explanatory variable (Xt-1), and a group of controlling regressors. The 
regression results with the aggregated data fit to time-series analysis are presented in Table 
1-3. 
The first column of Table 1-3 includes the list of the independent variables. 
Cumulative and marginal casualty are the same as the previous regressions with the 
original data presented in Table 1-2. The other forms of the casualty measure such as the 
first difference and the lagged value of cumulative casualties, and the lagged dependent 
variable are newly introduced for the dynamic model and the error correction model. 
Unemployment, as in the previous regressions with the original data, is coded as 1 if the 
most recently released US unemployment rate prior to the poll decreased compared to that 
of the previous month, 0 otherwise. The rest of the variables are period dummies 
discretionally applied to each question in consideration of the structure of the time series 
data or characteristics of each questions type. For instance, sovereignty, coded as 1 if a poll 
was commissioned after 28 June 2004 when the US transferred sovereignty to Iraqis, 0 
otherwise, is included for Worth Type to identify whether the transfer of sovereignty 
reinforced justification of the war.46 Furthermore, insurgency and withdrawal are used for 
Stay/Withdraw Type to figure out whether support for the continuation of military 
operation has been changed in accordance with a change in public confidence of victory.47 
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 A regression without sovereignty does not change statistical significance of estimated effects of cumulative 
casualty and other explanatory variables at the 5% level of significance. 
47
 These period dummies are also similarly used in Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2005). A Regression without 
insurgency and withdrawal does not change statistical significance of estimated effect of cumulative casualty 
and other explanatory variables at the 5% level of significance. 
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Insurgency is coded as 1 if a poll was commissioned between April 2004 and August 2007 
when prospects for victory were loomed because of severe insurgency such as sectarian 
movements, kidnaps, and ambush attacks against the coalition forces, 0 otherwise.48 
Withdrawal is coded as 1 if a poll was carried out between September 2007 and August 
2010 when the US military operation officially ended in Iraq without a consensus of victory, 
0 otherwise.49 Moreover, surge and president are used for Success to Date Type to identify 
how and to what extent a dramatic decrease of military casualties after the surge that 
brought about an additional dispatch of more than 20,000 troops in Iraq during the first half 
of 2007, and a change in president from Bush to Obama affect poll respondents’ 
retrospective assessment on US efforts to bring stability to Iraq.50 Surge is coded as 1 if a 
poll was commissioned between July 2007 and October 2008 when military casualties 
steadily decreased as shown in Figure 1-2, 0 otherwise.51 Finally president is coded as 1 if a 
poll was commissioned after Barak Obama was elected as the US president in November 
2008, 0 otherwise. 
When looking at the question types tested with a simple dynamic model 
(Right/Wrong, Worth, and Approve Type I and II), cumulative casualty has a strong and 
direct effect on poll responses, suggesting the accumulation of military deaths severely 
exacerbates war support or presidential approval ratings. Specifically, cumulative casualty 
has a negative effect on positive responses, and a positive effect on negative responses for 
these question types. Furthermore, the estimated effects of cumulative casualties are 
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 I set the starting point of the insurgency phase at April 2004, just after four US civilians having worked as 
Blackwater contractors, were killed and mutilated by Iraqis in Falluja, at the end of March 2004. The video 
clip showing the cheering Iraqi crowd over the bodies gave a shock to America, warning of the possibility of 
an Iraqi uprising against US forces. Indeed, Shia militias led by Muqtada al-Sadr seized Falluja in April, 
fighting against the coalition forces. Since then, Iraqis have been threatened by insurgency and sectarian 
violence, and suffered large death tolls. Military casualties, however, fell rapidly from September 2007 due to 
the surge effect. 
49
 The starting point of the withdrawal phase is September 2007 when Gen. David Petraeus, the then-top US 
military commander in Iraq, testified that the objective of the surge in Iraq was largely being met in the 
Congress. The US started the first major withdrawal in November 2007.  
50
 Cumulative casualty in a regression without surge and president is marginally significant at the 10 percent 
level of significance. As seen in the plot in Figure 1-4, the time-series for the Success to Date Type contains 
structural changes that may require dummy variable to address nonstationarity caused from breaks (Stock and 
Watson 2007).  
51
 Surge is differently coded with the ones in the previous regressions with the original data presented in Table 
1-2. Surge, used for the ‘stay/withdraw’ type question (Q4) is coded as 1 if a poll commissioned between 
January and April 2007 when the debate on the surge effect was growing in the US.  
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symmetric between positive and negative responses in general. The lagged dependent 
variable is also statistically significant, implying that poll respondents are partially affected 
by the poll responses in the previous month. On the other hand, marginal casualty is not 
statistically significant in any question type, similarly to the regression results with the 
original data presented in Table 1-2. Moreover, unemployment is also not significant except 
in the positive responses of Approve Type II. This implies that poll respondents are not 
strongly influenced by the level of unemployment in shaping their opinion towards the 
various war-relevant issues. They may filter economic circumstances when asked war-
relevant poll questions since there are, in general, economically-specialised questions in the 
same polls.52 Moreover, sovereignty in Worth Type indicates that poll responses that the 
war was worth fighting (positive responses) were about 7 percentage points higher in 
average after the US and its allies’ Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) handed over 
Iraqi sovereignty to the country than those during the pre-sovereignty period.53 It may 
imply that the transfer significantly reinforced justification of the war.  
The last two question types, Success to Date and Stay/Withdraw Type, are tested 
with the error correction models that take the first difference of dependent variable as an 
explanatory variable. Looking at the positive responses first, both the change in cumulative 
casualties (Cumulative casualty), and its lagged value negatively and significantly affect 
opinion that the war is going well (Success to Date Type) whilst only the lagged value 
affects poll responses that the US troops should keep staying in Iraq (Stay/Withdraw Type). 
The regression results with negative responses provide the same but symmetric 
implications. These findings from Stay/Withdraw Type may be interpreted as follows: 
cumulative casualties do not have an immediate effect on opinion in favour of continuation 
of military operations, but casualty information in the previous month is taken into account 
for current judgements on withdrawal. This is contrary to the findings that poll respondents 
sensitively react to the contemporaneous accumulation of military deaths in retrospective 
assessment, captured in Right/Wrong, Worth, Approve and Success to Date Type. Together, 
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 Such questions are “Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling the economy?” 
in CBS-NYT polls or “Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bush is handling the economy?” in ABC-
WP surveys. 
53
 Iraqi sovereignty was handed over to the Iraqi Interim Government in 28 June 2004. 
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this suggests that poll respondents retract their support for the war or the president as 
military casualties grow, implying that incurring a large number of deaths cannot be 
justifiable. On the other hand, poll respondents shape opinion apart from the contemporary 
casualty information in judging whether the military action should be ceased or proceed. 
Yet, there is still a long-term equilibrium relationship between cumulative casualties and 
opinion on withdrawal, given the significant coefficient on lagged cumulative casualties in 
Stay/Withdraw Type. One of the possible explanations for respondents’ attitudes towards 
Stay/Withdraw Type question is that they are likely to be more cautious in prospective 
judgement since the withdrawal of the troops from Iraq could bring severe instability to the 
country. Indeed, insurgency in Stay/Withdraw Type suggests that poll responses that the 
troops should stay in Iraq are about 7 percentage points higher during the period that 
insurgency was acute than that of the initial period of the war when a victorious mood was 
prevailing in the US. Furthermore, withdrawal indicates that the poll responses were even 
higher (by approximately 9 percentage points) when the US prepared the pullout than the 
initial stage of the war. It may imply that the number of respondents who do not want the 
withdrawal in the midst of uncertainty were higher in spite of American loss and financial 
costs in Iraq. Looking at the other explanatory variables in Stay/Withdraw and Success to 
Date Type, marginal casualty and unemployment are consistently insignificant. The period 
dummies, however, are powerful in explaining opinion. For instance, surge in Success to 
Date Type is statistically significant, suggesting that positive view on the outcome of the 
war had substantially been high since the surge in the first half of 2007 that brought a rapid 
decrease in military fatalities as shown in Figure 1-2. Moreover, president also indicates 
that Obama’s win in the presidential election at the end of 2008 raised the proportion of 
positive responses, and dropped negative responses on the outcome of the war. 
Liberal or Conservative Bias across Media Institutions 
Another hypothesis to be tested is that poll respondents for the three media institution might 
express different attitudes towards same questions. Approve Type I and II are the rare 
categories that include almost same questions in them. Approve Type I, asked by all three 
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polling institutions examined in this chapter,54 query the same question concerning the 
public’s preferences in approving the president’s handling of the Iraq situation,55 leaving a 
room for a comparative analysis between the polling surveys commissioned by media 
institutions which have somehow opposite inclinations.56 Furthermore, Approve Type II, 
asked by both CBS-NYT and ABC-WP, contains almost identical questions on the 
presidential approval ratings on the campaign against terrorism.57  
I plotted positive and negative poll responses for Approve Type I and II again in 
Figure 1-5 for comparison. Poll responses of each media institutions for the two question 
types are entwined, making it hard to see any differences. In the first plot, however, 
positive responses for the CBS-NYT polls, illustrated with triangle shapes, look slightly 
lower compared to those for the ABC-WP or Fox News polls commissioned in a similar 
time period. To examine this difference is statistically significant, I carry out regressions 
with the original data using model (1.1) in section 1.2.2. In the analysis of media bias, two 
dummies are newly included; (i) ABC-WP, coded as 1 if a poll was commissioned by ABC-
WP, 0 otherwise; (ii) Fox, coded as 1 if commissioned by Fox News, 0 otherwise. Yet, the 
irrelevant variables including marginal casualty and unemployment are excluded from the 
regression.        
Table 1-4 present the OLS regression results. Looking at the primary variables of 
interest, we see that ABC-WP is not significant in Approve Type I, implying that there is no 
meaningful difference between the CBS-NYT and ABC-WP polls on the presidential job 
approval ratings in relation to the war. Instead, poll respondents for Fox News shows more 
unsparing attitude towards the president as fox is interpreted that the presidential approval 
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 CBS-NYT, ABC-WP and Fox News. 
55
 Question 9 (CBS-NYT) is “Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling the 
situation with Iraq?”. Question 20 (ABC-WP) is “Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bush is handling 
the situation with Iraq?”. Question 24 (Fox News) is “Do you approve or disapprove of the job George W. 
Bush is doing handling the situation with Iraq?”. The choices in response are; 1. Approve 2. Disapprove 3. 
Don’t know or NA. 
56
 CBS CBS-NYT and ABC-WP are regarded to be rather liberal by conservative parties, whereas Fox News 
is thought to have a conservative bias by liberal parties, in favour of the Bush administration in going to the 
war. 
57
 Q21 (CBS-NYT): Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling the campaign 
against terrorism? Q25 (ABC-WP): Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bush is handling the US 
campaign against terrorism? (Choices: 1. Approve 2. Disapprove 3. Don’t know or NA). 
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ratings in the Fox News polls are 3.43 percentage points higher than those of the CBS-NYT 
polls while disapproval ratings are 4.63 percentage points lower. In Approve Type II, ABC-
WP indicates the proportion of positive responses for the ABC-WP polls are slightly higher 
than that of the CBS-NYT polls whilst the proportion of negative responses are lower than 
that of CBS-NYT. It implies that respondents for ABC-WP polls have more positive 
attitude in evaluating president’s achievement on campaign against terrorism. It is a hasty 
conclusion that respondents for the Fox News polls are less parsimonious in favour of the 
president than those for CBS-NYT polls since even a small variation in question wordings 
or sampling techniques could substantially change poll responses. Moreover, it makes the 
regression results less reliable that questions categorised under each type had not been 
asked at the exact same points in time. Nonetheless, the results should not be taken with 
small regard. Especially, the magnitude of fox in Approve Type I is not trifling, leading to 
the presumption that there may be a significant difference in poll respondents’ attitude 
towards the president achievement in handling the Iraq War across polling institutions that 
have polar policy preferences.   
 
1.5. Conclusion 
This chapter sought to examine how and to what extent different measures of war casualties 
affect domestic opinion, as proxied by 25 different poll questions concerning the 2003 Iraq 
War. The principal findings of the regression analysis are as follows. 
Firstly, the empirical investigation suggests that the poll respondents reacted more 
sensitively to the cumulative casualty information rather than marginal casualties during the 
recent week prior to the poll, confirming that the Mueller model (1971) fits better even after 
addressing econometrics concerns for nonstationarity of time series variables and irregular 
time intervals of poll observations. These results reconcile with the conventional wisdom 
that increasing national casualties result in decreasing domestic support. Secondly and more 
importantly, the empirical results suggest that the respondents were not affected by 
contemporaneous casualty information in forming their opinion over military withdrawal; 
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arguably the most directly and substantially connected issue with the continuance of US 
military operations in Iraq. Given the estimates obtained from the error correction 
mechanism, the effect of casualties is less direct in affecting opinion throughout the process 
of returning to re-equilibrium after a deviation of the long-run equilibrium. Whilst the 
respondents rather enthusiastically responded to national casualty information when they 
were asked ‘worth’ or ‘right/wrong’ type questions that require retrospective evaluation, the 
conventional wisdom was not applicable when they were required the prospective 
judgement on whether they wanted the military forces to keep staying or to withdraw. It 
implies that the respondents showed different attitudes while responding to national 
casualty information. They retracted their support for the war as military casualties grew 
since the accumulation of death toll makes the war unjustifiable. Poll respondents, however, 
shaped their opinion on the continuation of the military operation without reference to the 
contemporary death toll. Yet, the long-run equilibrium relationship still exists between the 
accumulation of casualties and poll respondents’ opinion towards the withdrawal matter. 
The political implications of these findings are straightforward; political rhetoric for 
the justification of war will be quickly washed out as military casualties grow. Along with 
this, public conviction on success in war will be severely aggravated in the vortex of 
mounting casualties. This casualty based approach, however, should be reconsidered in 
decision making on the military forces’ stationing/withdrawal. While general support for 
war is aggravated as lump-sum casualties are increasing, public consensus towards the 
continuation of military operations is shaped without reference to the contemporary 
accumulation of death tolls. Thus, it appears that although Americans believe the war in 
Iraq is not justifiable in consideration of its unexpectedly tremendous human costs, they 
deem the withdrawal of the troops should be approached on the basis of other issues, 
including, for example, the level of security in Iraq. Finding the detailed reasons to explain 
this differential attitude will be left for future research. 
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Table 1-1: Poll Question Types and Choices in Response 
Q* Question Type Questions Choices in response N* Poll period 
CBS-NYT Polls 
1 Right/Wrong  Looking back, do you think the United States did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq, or 
should the U.S. have stayed out? 
1. Right (+) 
2. Stay out (-) 
3. Don’t know/NA 
68 Dec 2003- Aug 2010 
2 Worth 1 Do you think removing Saddam Hussein from power is worth the potential loss of American life and 
other costs of attacking Iraq, or not? 
1. Worth (+) 
2. Not worth (-) 
3. Don’t know/NA 
22 Mar 2003- Sep 2007 
3 Worth 2 Do you think the result of the war with Iraq was worth the loss of American life and other costs of 
attacking Iraq, or not? 
1. Worth (+) 
2. Not worth (-) 
3. Don’t know/NA 
29 Sep 2003- Aug 2010 
4 Stay/Withdraw 1 
From what you have seen or heard about the situation in Iraq, what should the United States do now- 
should the U.S. increase the number of U.S. troops in Iraq, keep the same number of U.S. troops in Iraq 
as there are now, or decrease the number of U.S. troops in Iraq, or remove all its troops from Iraq? 
1. Increase (+) 
2. Keep same (+) 
3. Decrease (-) 
4. Remove all troops (-) 
5. Don’t know/NA 
26 
26 
26 
21 
26 
Aug 2003- 
Sept 2007 
5 Stay/Withdraw 2 
Should U.S. troops stay in Iraq as long as it takes to make sure Iraq is a stable democracy, even if that 
takes a long time, or should U.S. troops turn over control to Iraqis as soon as possible, even if Iraq is not 
completely stable? 
1. Stay as long as it takes 
(+) 
2. Leave  (or Turn over 
control) ASAS (-) 
3. Don’t know/NA 
17 Nov 2003- Jun 2006 
6 Stay/Withdraw 3 How long do you think the United States troops will have to remain in Iraq--for less than a year, one to two years, two to five years, or will U.S. troops have to stay in Iraq for longer than five years? 
1. Less than a year  
2. One to two years 
3. Two to five years 
4. More than five years  
5. Don’t know/NA 
11 Jul 2003- Feb 2007 
7 Stay/Withdraw 4 Do you think the United States should or should not set a time-table for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq? 
1. Timetable (-) 
2. No timetable (+) 
3. Don’t know/NA 
15 Jul 2005- Sep 2007 
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Table 1-1 continued 
8 Stay/Withdraw 5 
From what you know about the U.S. involvement in Iraq, how much longer would you be willing to 
have large numbers of U.S. troops remain in Iraq -- less than a year, one to two years, two to five years 
or longer than five years? 
1. Less than a year  
2. One to two years 
3. Two to five years 
4. As long as it takes  
5. More than 5 years  
6. Should leave now  
7. Don’t know/NA 
7 Sep 2007-May 2008 
9 Approve 1 Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush (or Barack Obama) is handling the situation 
with Iraq? 
1. Approve (+) 
2. Disapprove (-) 
3. Don’t know/NA 
90 Mar 2003-Aug 2010 
10 Approve 2 Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush (or Barack Obama) is handling the campaign 
against terrorism? 
1. Approve (+) 
2. Disapprove (-) 
3. Don’t know/NA 
74 May 2003- Aug 2010 
11 Success to Date 1 As a result of the U.S. military action against Iraq, do you think the threat of terrorism against the United States has increased, decreased, or stayed about the same? 
1. Increased (-) 
2. Decreased (+) 
3. Stayed  same 
4. Don’t know/NA 
15 May 2003- Oct 2006 
12 Success to Date 2 How would you say things are going for the U.S. in its efforts to bring stability and order to Iraq? Would you say things are going very well, somewhat well, somewhat badly, or very badly? 
1. Very well (+) 
2. Somewhat well (+) 
3. Somewhat badly (-) 
4. Very badly (-) 
5. Don’t know/NA 
85 May 2003- Aug 2010 
13 Expected Success 
Regardless of whether you think taking military action in Iraq was the right thing to do, would you say 
that the U.S. is very likely to succeed in Iraq, somewhat likely to succeed, not very likely to succeed, or 
not at all likely to succeed in Iraq? 
1. Very (+) 
2. Somewhat (+) 
3. Not very (-) 
4. Not at all (-) 
5. Don’t know/NA 
15 Jul 2005- Sep 2007 
14 Reinforce 
As you may know, the U.S. is sending more than 20,000 additional troops to Iraq. From what you have 
heard or read, would you say this troop increase is making the situation in Iraq better, making it worse, 
or is it having no impact on the situation in Iraq so far? 
1. Better (+) 
2. Worse (-) 
3. No impact  (-) 
4. Don’t know/NA 
16 Apr 2007- Sep 2008 
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Table 1-1 continued 
ABC-WP Polls 
15 Worth 1 All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war with Iraq was worth fighting, or not? 
1. Worth (+) 
2. Not worth (-) 
3. Don’t know/NA 
67 Apr 2003- Jul 2009 
16 Worth 2 Do you think the war with Iraq did or did not contribute to the long-term security of the United States? 
1. Contributed  (+) 
2. Not contributed (-) 
3. Don’t know/NA 
32 Jul 2003- Dec 2007 
17 Stay/Withdraw 1 
Do you think the US should keep its military forces in Iraq until civil order is restored there, even if that 
means continued U.S. military casualties; or do you think the US should withdraw its military forces 
from Iraq in order to avoid further U.S. military casualties, even if that means civil order is not restored 
there? 
1. Keep troops (+) 
2. Withdraw (-) 
3. Don’t know/NA 
21 Jul 2003- Jun 2008 
18 Stay/Withdraw 2 Do you think the number of U.S. military forces in Iraq should be increased, decreased, or kept about 
the same? 
1. Increased (+) 
2. Decreased (-) 
3. Keep same (+) 
4. Don’t know/NA 
15 Mar 2005-Oct 2007 
19 Casualty  Again thinking about the goals versus the costs of the war, so far in your opinion has there been an 
acceptable or unacceptable number of U.S. military casualties in Iraq? 
1. Acceptable (+) 
2. Unacceptable (-) 
3. Don’t know/NA 
23 Apr 2003- Dec 2006 
20 Approve 1 Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bush (or Obama) is handling the situation with Iraq (and Saddam Hussein)?** 
1. Approve (+) 
2. Disapprove (-) 
3. Don’t know/NA 
55 Mar 2003- Apr 2009 
21 Approve 2 Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bush (or Obama) is handling the US campaign against terrorism? 
1. Approve (+) 
2. Disapprove (-) 
3. Don’t know/NA 
42 Apr 2003- Dec 2007 
22 Success to Date 1 Do you think the United has gotten bogged down in Iraq, or do you think the United States is making good progress in Iraq? 
1. Bogged down (-) 
2. Good progress (+) 
3. Don’t know/NA 
10 Apr 2004-Jun 2005 
23 Success to Date 2 Do you think the United States is or is not making significant progress toward restoring civil order in Iraq? 
1. Significant (+) 
2. Not significant (-) 
3. Don’t know/NA 
21 Jun 2004- Dec 2008 
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Table 1-1 continued 
Fox News Polls 
24 Approve 1 Do you approve or disapprove of the job George W. Bush (or Barack Obama) is doing handling the 
situation with Iraq? 
1. Approve (+) 
2. Disapprove (-) 
3. Don’t know/NA 
14 Mar 2003- Jun 2006 
25 Approve 2 Do you support or oppose the United States taking military action to disarm Iraq and remove Iraqi President Saddam Hussein? Is that strongly support/oppose or only somewhat support/oppose? 
1. Strong support (+) 
2. Somewhat support (+) 
3. Somewhat oppose (-) 
4. Strong oppose (-) 
5. Don’t know/NA 
11 Mar 2003- Sep 2006 
* Q: Question Number, N: Number of observations 
** The words in parenthesis were included in the question only in March 2003.        
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Table 1-2: Casualty Effects on Positive Opinion towards the 2003 Iraq War  
 Q Question Type Cumulative Casualty (Log) 
Marginal 
Casualty 
Time 
(Days) Unemployment Administration Period Dummies Constant N 
Adjusted 
R2  
C 
B 
S 
| 
N
Y 
T 
1 Right/Wrong Type -10.23* (3.99) 
-.02 
(.04) 
-.002 
(.002) 
.56 
(.73)  
6.40** 
(1.76) 
79.02** 
(10.63) 68 .83 
2 Worth Type 1 -7.65** (2.53) 
.01 
(.08) 
-.01 
(.004)    
74.47** 
(5.02) 22 .86 
3 Worth Type 2 -10.13* (3.83) 
-.05 
(.08) 
-.002 
(.002) 
.82 
(1.29)   
65.37** 
*8.97) 29 .74 
4 Stay/Withdraw Type 1 
-11.15 
(7.94) 
.06 
(.12) 
-.01 
(.007) 
.76 
(1.95)  
6.56** 
(2.20) 
83.60** 
(18.44) 26 .76 
5 Stay/Withdraw Type 2 
-9.89 
(23.15) 
-.0003 
(.26) 
.003 
(.02) 
-1.19 
(3.20)   
75.69 
(54.55) 17 -.18 
7 
Stay/Withdraw Type 
4 
-63.00 
(95.42) 
.08 
(.09) 
.03 
(.04) 
-1.36 
(1.13)  
5.46** 
(1.74) 
210.70 
(265.45) 15 .64 
9 Approve Type 1 -15.86** (2.68) 
-.03 
(.07) 
-.01** 
(.003) 
1.85 
(1.20) 
36.08** 
(3.20)  
94.05** 
(6.34) 90 .87 
10 Approve Type 2 -17.59** (4.49) 
-.07 
(.05) 
-.004 
(.003) 
-.99 
(.92) 
15.36** 
(3.42)  
110.82** 
(10.90) 74 .79 
11 Success to Date Type 1 
2.95 
(6.14) 
.24 
(.19) 
-.01 
(.007) 
1.58 
(1.62)   
10.91 
(13.56) 15 .18 
12 Success to Date Type 2 
-16.42** 
(5.42) 
-.44** 
(.08) 
.001 
(.004) 
-.77 
(1.53) 
17.48** 
(3.15)  
97.07** 
(12.99) 85 .68 
13 Expected Success Type 
43.77 
(183.94) 
-.04 
(.13) 
-.05 
(.08) 
-1.19 
(2.29)   
-30.84 
(508.35) 15 .71 
14 Reinforce Type -131.99 (164.27) 
-.52 
(.31) 
.05* 
(.02) 
1.84 
(2.90)   
-131.99 
(415.01) 16 .78 
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Table 1-2 continued 
 Q Question Type Cumulative Casualty (Log) 
Marginal 
Casualty 
Time 
(Days) Unemployment Administration Period Dummies Constant N 
Adjusted 
R2  
A 
B 
C 
| 
W
P 
15 Worth Type 1 -16.17** (.2.90) 
-.06 
(.04) 
-.001 
(.002) 
1.29 
(.80)   
94.40** 
(7.13) 67 .90 
16 Worth Type 2 -14.20** (4.17) 
-.02 
(.05) 
.001 
(.003) 
2.07* 
(.90)   
93.15** 
(9.98) 32 .77 
17 Stay/Withdraw Type 1 -7.67 (5.59) 
.07 
(.08) 
-.01* 
(.004) 
.43 
(1.50)   
84.35** 
(12.55) 21 .89 
18 Stay/Withdraw Type 2 -80.65 (97.28) 
.09 
(.12) 
.02 
(.04) 
2.12 
(2.52)   
287.49 
(267.93) 15 .65 
19 Casualty Type -33.33** (7.72) 
.21* 
(.09) 
.01 
(.01) 
-2.22 
(1.96)   
115.39** 
(16.20) 23 .84 
20 Approve Type 1 -14.57** (2.62) 
.001 
(.06) 
-.004 
(.002) 
-.09 
(1.28) 
42.33** 
(1.92)  
88.91** 
(6.53) 55 .84 
21 Approve Type 2 -15.39** (4.41) 
.02 
(.07) 
-.004 
(.004) 
-.13 
(1.08)   
104.39** 
(10.23) 42 .84 
22 Success to Date Type 1 112.43 (119.03) 
.27 
(.29) 
-.10 
(.11) 
.45 
(3.35)   
-237.03 
(287.30) 10 -.47 
23 Success to Date Type 2 -32.71 (29.76) 
-.35 
(.19) 
.009 
(.01) 
-1.42 
(3.80)   
-145.68 
(80.23) 21 .26 
F 
O
X 
24 Approve Type 1 -20.33 (10.75) 
.01 
(.14) 
.0001 
(.01) 
-3.03 
(3.38)   
105.18** 
(22.57) 14 .77 
25 Approve Type 2 -9.03 (7.09) 
.12 
(.12) 
-.009 
(.009) 
-2.66 
(2.59)   
3.94 
(13.13) 11 .82 
Note: ** p<.01,  *p<.0.05.Standard errors in parentheses .Since Breusch-Pagan and White tests detected heteroskedasticity in Q9, 15 and 20, standard errors in these questions were 
corrected to be robust to the unknown form of heteroskedasticity. 
In Q2, ‘unemployment’ is dropped due to high multicollinearity with ‘cumulative casualty’ (ρ=.509, p<.05). 
Q6 and 8 are excluded from regression due to the ambiguity of categorisation of the choices into positive and negative responses. 
In Q1 and 7, the ‘period’ dummy is coded as 1 if a poll commissioned during the first year of the war, 0 otherwise. 
In Q4, the ‘period’ dummy is coded as 1 if a poll commissioned between January and April 2007, 0 otherwise. This is to capture a surge effect accompanied with the announcement of 
the then president Bush to dispatch additional troops to Iraq. 
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Table 1-3: Dynamic Effect of Casualties on Public Opinion 
Dependent Variables Positive Responses (Rt) ∆Positive Responses (∆Rt) Negative Responses (Rt) ∆Negative Responses (∆Rt) 
Question Type Right/Wrong Worth Approve I Approve II Stay/ Withdraw 
Success to 
Date Right/Wrong Worth Approve I Approve II 
Stay/ 
Withdraw 
Success to 
Date 
Cumulative Casualty 
(Log10) 
-10.44** 
(2.63) 
-16.72** 
(3.33) 
-9.36** 
(3.07) 
-8.99** 
(3.07)   
10.42** 
(2.77) 
16.33** 
(3.22) 
8.38* 
(3.14) 
12.60** 
(3.22)   
Marginal Casualty -.02 (.04) 
-.02 
(.04) 
-.07 
(.05) 
-.004 
(.04)   
.01 
(.04) 
.03 
(.04) 
.06 
(.05) 
-.01 
(.05)   
∆ Cumulative 
Casualty (Log10)     
-8.81 
(38.00) 
-88.56* 
(39.04)     
21.65 
(34.37) 
98.26* 
(40.82) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable (Rt-1) 
.33** 
(.13) 
.31** 
(.11) 
.56** 
(.11) 
.57** 
(.12) 
-.66** 
(.13) 
-.37** 
(.09) 
.33* 
(.13) 
.35** 
(.11) 
.61** 
(.11) 
.40** 
(.13) 
-.63** 
(.13) 
-.41** 
(.09) 
Lagged Cumulative 
Casualties (Log10)     
-18.62** 
(5.00) 
-9.13** 
(3.11)     
18.16** 
(4.88) 
10.55** 
(3.28) 
Unemployment .48 (.70) 
-1.23 
(.88) 
-.44 
(.86) 
-1.73* 
(.79) 
-.81 
(1.11) 
-.61 
(1.08) 
-.58 
(.74) 
.50 
(.72) 
.58 
(.88) 
.87 
(.87) 
.11 
(.99) 
.29 
(1.13) 
Sovereignty  7.09** (2.31)      
-5.54** 
(1.89)     
Insurgency     6.75** (2.95)      
-5.53* 
(2.65)  
Withdrawal     9.67** (4.00)      
-7.66* 
(3.60)  
Surge      3.47* (1.67)      
-4.44* 
(1.73) 
President      9.60* (2.88)      
-12.51** 
(3.26) 
Constant 62.92** (13.66) 
83.63** 
(15.00) 
46.21** 
(13.70) 
50.53** 
(15.66) 
82.72** 
(18.72) 
45.11** 
(12.96) 
.65 
(4.60) 
-16.98** 
(6.26) 
-3.82 
(4.27) 
-13.68** 
(4.89) 
-21.13* 
(9.99) 
-11.33 
(8.15) 
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Table 1-3 continued 
Dependent Variables Positive Responses (Rt) ∆Positive Responses (∆Rt) Negative Responses (Rt) ∆Negative Responses (∆Rt) 
Question Type Right/Wrong Worth Approve I Approve II Stay/ Withdraw 
Success to 
Date Right/Wrong Worth Approve I Approve II 
Stay/ 
Withdraw 
Success to 
Date 
Adjusted R2 .77 .81 .91 .92 .31 .20 .77 .89 .91 .89 .25 .23 
N 58 71 61 56 59 76 58 71 61 56 59 76 
Sample Period Dec 2003-Oct 2008 
Mar 2003-
Feb 2009 
Mar 2003- 
Apr 2008 
Apr 2003- 
Dec 2007 
Jul 2003- 
Jun 2008 
May 2003- 
Sep 2009 
Dec 2003- 
Oct 2008 
Mar 2003-
Feb 2009 
Mar 2003-
Apr 2008 
Apr 2003- 
Dec 2007 
Jul 2003- 
Jun 2008 
May 2003-
Sep 2009 
Note: ** p<.01,  *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses. Breusch-Godfrey tests suggest the residuals of all specifications do not contain serial correlation 
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Table 1-4: Liberal and Conservative Bias across the Media 
Question Type Approve Type1 (Q9, Q20, Q24) 
Approve Type 2 
(Q10, Q21) 
Dependent Variable Positive Response Negative Response Positive Response Negative Response 
Cumulative Casualties 
(Log10) 
-15.67** 
(2.39) 
15.15** 
(2.53) 
-14.70** 
(4.00) 
15.73** 
(3.23) 
ABC-WP 1.59 (1.19) 
1.85 
(1.19) 
1.67* 
(.71) 
2.90** 
(.69) 
Confidence 
Interval (95%) -.76 to 3.94 -.52 to 4.21 .26 to 3.09 1.53 to 4.27 
Fox 3.43* (1.65) 
-4.63** 
(1.63)   
Confidence 
Interval (95%) .17 to 6.69 -7.86 to -1.40   
Time 
(Days) 
-.007 
(.004) 
.01* 
(.004) 
-.005 
(.003) 
.004 
(.002) 
Constant 91.74 (4.92) 
3.07 
(5.22) 
101.75** 
(9.89) 
-11.18* 
(7.82) 
Adj. R2 .79 .81 (.82) .83 
N 109 106 
Sample Period58 Mar 2003-Jun 2006 May 2003-Dec 2007 
Note: ** p<.01,  *p<.0.0.5. Standard errors in parentheses.  
^ Standard Errors are robust to heteroskedasticity for Approve Type I and positive responses in Approve Type II. 
 
 
 
                                                           
58
 The sample period for each question type is the overlapping period when the questions were contemporarily 
commissioned. For instance, question 9, 20 and 24 in Approve Type I had been asked between March 2003 
and August 2010, March 2003 and April 2009, and March 2003 and June 2006 respectively. The sample 
period of Approve Type I, therefore, is between March 2003 and June 2006, when the time periods of the 
three questions are overlapped each other.  
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Figure 1-1: Positive and Negative Responses for Poll Questions during the 2003 Iraq War  
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Figure 1-2: Cumulative Casualties Vs. Marginal Casualties during the 2003 Iraq War 
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Figure 1-3: Estimated Effects of Cumulative Casualties on War Support 
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Figure 1-4: Aggregated Positive Responses for Selected Questions Types 
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Figure 1-5: Poll Responses towards Similar Questions 
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Appendix 1 
Table 1-A-1: Casualty Effects on Negative Opinion towards the 2003 Iraq War  
 Q Question Type Cumulative Casualty (Log) 
Marginal 
Casualty 
Time 
(Days) Unemployment President Period Constant N 
Adjusted 
R2 
C 
B 
S 
| 
N
Y 
T 
1 Right/Wrong Type 10.70* (4.21) 
.02 
(.04) 
.002 
(.002) 
-.63 
(.76)  
-6.92** 
(1.85) 
14.54 
(11.21) 68 .82 
2 Worth Type 1 5.84* (2.46) 
-.025 
(.08) 
.01* 
(.004)    
20.54** 
(4.87) 22 .87 
3 Worth Type 2 15.00** (4.07) 
.03 
(.09) 
-.0002 
(.003) 
-.89 
(1.38)   
15.69 
(9.53) 29 .75 
4 Stay/Withdraw Type 1 11.83 (8.84) 
-.05 
(.14) 
.01 
(.01) 
-1.42 
(2.17)  
-6.69* 
(2.45) 
8.22 
(20.56) 26 .74 
5 Stay/Withdraw Type 2 17.06 (4.43) 
-.004 
(.28) 
-.007 
(.02) 
2.51 
(3.38)   
-1.33 
(57.57) 17 -.06 
7 Stay/Withdraw Type 4 53.32 (119.28) 
-.02 
(.11) 
-.02 
(.05) 
.92 
(1.42)  
-6.55* 
(2.18) 
-86.53 
(331.83) 15 .55 
9 Approve Type 1 15.16** (2.89) 
.06 
(.07) 
.01** 
(.003) 
2.13 
(1.23) 
-47.4** 
(3.34)  
1.27 
(6.81) 90 .88 
10 Approve Type 2 9.41* (5.73) 
.09 
(.05) 
.01** 
(.004) 
1.16 
(.89) 
-28.4** 
(4.66)  
1.57 
(13.96) 74 .83 
11 Success to Date Type 1 
27.98* 
(12.09) 
-.33 
(.37) 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.88 
(3.18)   
-27.15 
(26.67) 15 .28 
12 Success to Date Type 2 
20.02** 
(5.50) 
.44** 
(.09) 
-.004 
(.004) 
.90 
(1.55) 
-19.68** 
(3.19)  
-8.20 
(13.18) 85 .72 
13 Expected Success 
Type 
-17.87 
(172.45) 
.03 
(.12) 
.03 
(.08) 
1.39 
(2.15)   
59.30 
(476.61) 15 .71 
14 Reinforce Type 61.33 (206.21) 
.40 
(.40) 
-.05 
(.02) 
.37 
(3.64)   
-72.09 
(694.13) 16 .75 
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Table 1-A-1 continued  
 Q Question Type Cumulative Casualty (Log) 
Marginal 
Casualty 
Time 
(Days) Unemployment President Period Constant N 
Adjusted 
R2 
A 
B 
C 
| 
W
P 
15 Worth Type 1 19.55** (2.79) 
.05 
(.04) 
-.001 
(.002) 
-1.67* 
(.81)   
-5.03 
(6.76) 67 .91 
16 Worth Type 2 17.48** (3.95) 
.01 
(.05) 
-.004 
(.003) 
-2.09* 
(.85)   
-3.80 
(9.44) 32 .80 
17 Stay/Withdraw Type 1 10.85 (5.65) 
-.06 
(.08) 
.007 
(.004) 
-.78 
(1.51)   
5.88 
(12.70) 21 .89 
18 Stay/Withdraw Type 2 113.03 (85.16) 
-.11 
(.11) 
-.03 
(.04) 
-2.16 
(2.21)   
-279.17 
(234.55) 15 .71 
19 Casualty Type 35.53** (8.63) 
-.01 
(.21) 
-.02 
(.01) 
.30 
(2.41)  
-10.24 
(7.76) 
-22.76 
(18.38) 23 .85 
20 Approve Type 1 15.38** (3.12) 
.01 
(.08) 
.005 
(.003) 
.57 
(1.32) 
-49.9** 
(2.26)  
6.19 
(7.54) 55 .86 
21 Approve Type 2 17.22** (4.39) 
-.03 
(.07) 
.003 
(.004) 
-.44 
(1.07)   
-10.93 
(10.20) 42 .85 
22 Success to Date Type 1 
-198.63 
(121.82) 
-.31 
(.30) 
.18 
(.11) 
-.75 
(3.43)   
-536.03 
(294.04) 10 -.17 
23 Success to Date Type 2 
39.69 
(31.56) 
.33 
(.20) 
-.01 
(.01) 
.76 
(4.03)   
-65.12 
(85.09) 21 .23 
F 
O
X 
24 Approve Type 1 23.78* (10.11) 
.05 
(.13) 
-.0007 
(.01) 
2.94 
(3.18)   
-21.14 
(21.25) 14 .83 
25 Approve Type 2 9.28 (5.97) 
-.08 
(.10) 
.008 
(.008) 
1.67 
(2.18)   
3.94 
(13.13) 11 .85 
Note:  ** p<.01,  *p<.0.05. Standard errors in parentheses .Since Breusch-Pagan and White tests detected heteroskedasticity in Q9, 15 and 20, standard errors were corrected to be 
robust to heteroskedasticity. 
In Q2, the ‘unemployment’ dummy is dropped due to high multicollinearity. The correlation coefficient between ‘cumulative casualty’ and ‘unemployment’ is .509 (p<.05). 
Q6 and 8 are excluded from regression due to the ambiguity of categorisation of the choices into positive and negative responses. 
In Q1 and 7, the ‘period’ dummy is coded as 1 if a poll commissioned during the first year of the war, 0 otherwise. 
In Q4, the ‘period’ dummy is coded as 1 if a poll commissioned between January and April 2007, 0 otherwise. This is to capture a surge effect accompanied with the announcement of 
the then president Bush to dispatch additional troops to Iraq. 
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Table 1-A-2: Descriptive Statistics of Poll Questions 
 
 Q Question Type 
Mean Confidence Interval (95%) Standard Error Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
N Positive 
Response 
Negative 
Response 
Positive 
Response 
Negative 
Response 
Positive 
Response 
Negative 
Response 
Positive 
Response 
Negative 
Response 
Positive 
Response 
Negative 
Response 
Positive 
Response 
Negative 
Response 
C
B
S 
| 
N
Y
T 
1 Right/Wrong 44.99 49.78 43.40 to 46.57 48.14 to 51.42 0.79 0.82 6.53 6.77 35 28 64 61 68 
2 Worth 1 52.27 39.68 47.19 to 57.35 34.50 to 44.86 2.44 2.49 11.46 11.68 30 22 68 64 22 
3 Worth 2 34.86 57.97 32.42 to 37.30 55.34 to 60.59 1.19 1.28 6.42 6.89 20 47 44 72 29 
4 Stay/Withdraw 1 38.69 54.77 35.07 to 42.31 50.94 to 58.59 1.76 1.86 8.97 9.46 27 31 63 68 26 
5 Stay/Withdraw 2 48.24 45.41 45.39 to 51.08 42.23 to 48.60 1.34 1.50 5.54 6.20 38 35 56 59 17 
6 Stay/Withdraw 3 24.18 9.45 20.55 to 27.81 6.97 to 11.94 1.63 1.11 5.40 3.70 12 5 31 16 11 
7 Stay/Withdraw 4 37.67 58.33 35.76 to 39.57 56.19 to 60.47 0.89 1.00 3.44 3.87 32 52 43 64 15 
8 Stay/Withdraw 5 13.29 49.71 9.84 to 16.73 46.39 to 53.04 1.41 1.36 3.73 3.59 10 45 21 55 7 
9 Approve 1 41.77 51.88 38.72 to 44.82 48.51 to 55.25 1.54 1.69 14.56 16.08 21 17 79 75 90 
10 Approve 2 51.73 40.28 49.83 to 53.63 38.22 to 42.35 0.95 1.04 8.21 8.91 39 16 79 54 74 
11 Success to Date 1 16.07 37.80 14.17 to 17.97 33.82 to 41.78 0.89 1.85 3.43 7.18 9 25 21 48 15 
12 Success to Date 2 43.88 53.04 41.47 to 46.29 50.40 to 55.67 1.21 1.32 11.17 12.22 22 24 72 77 85 
13 Expected Success 53.07 44.40 48.91 to 57.22 40.55 to 48.25 1.94 1.80 7.51 6.96 42 35 64 55 15 
14 Reinforce 33.63 57.19 28.33 to 38.92 50.96 to 63.41 2.48 2.92 9.94 11.68 17 40 50 76 16 
A
B
C 
15 Worth 1 44.22 53.58 42.12 to 46.33 51.34 to 55.83 1.05 1.12 8.63 9.20 33 27 70 66 67 
16 Worth 2 52.00 45.28 50.21 to 53.79 43.45 to 47.11 0.88 0.90 4.98 5.08 44 34 63 53 32 
67 
 
| 
W
P 
17 Stay/Withdraw 1 53.05 44.24 48.35 to 57.74 39.57 to 48.91 2.25 2.24 10.32 10.26 39 26 72 59 21 
18 Stay/Withdraw 2 45.87 51.13 42.34 to 49.39 47.73 to 54.54 1.64 1.59 6.37 6.15 36 38 60 60 15 
19 Casualty 36.17 60.61 31.15 to 41.20 55.04 to 66.18 2.42 2.69 11.63 12.88 21 28 66 77 23 
20 Approve 44.22 54.09 41.12 to 47.32 50.69 to 57.49 1.55 1.70 11.48 12.58 29 21 75 70 55 
21 Approve 2 54.98 42.60 52.28 to 57.68 39.85 to 45.34 1.34 1.36 8.66 8.80 40 19 79 57 42 
22 Success to Date 1 37.50 59.50 35.11 to 39.89 56.76 to 62.24 1.06 1.21 3.34 3.84 33 54 43 65 10 
23 Success to Date 2 44.67 51.90 41.36 to 47.98 48.47 to 55.34 1.59 1.65 7.27 7.54 31 37 60 66 21 
F 
O 
X 
24 Approve 1 54.21 38.93 47.40 to 61.02 31.47 to 46.39 3.15 3.45 11.79 12.92 37 19 75 58 14 
25 Approve 2 65.73 29.45 59.60 to 71.86 23.81 to 35.10 2.75 2.53 9.12 8.41 51 16 81 44 11 
 
Table 1-A-3: Modified Data for Time Series Analysis in Comparison with the Original Data 
 
Right/Wrong Type Worth Type Approve Type I Approve Type II Stay/Withdraw Type Success to Date Type 
Original 
Data 
Modified 
Data 
Original 
Data 
Modified 
Data 
Original 
Data 
Modified 
Data 
Original 
Data 
Modified 
Data 
Original 
Data 
Modified 
Data 
Original 
Data 
Modified 
Data 
Number of observation 68 59 150 72 159 62 116 57 94 60 106 77 
Number of months with 
more than 2 polls  14  40  43  37  28  33 
Number of months without 
polls  10  11  3  6  17  13 
Sample period  Dec 2003-Aug 2010 
Dec 2003- 
Oct 2008 
Mar 2003-
Aug 2010 
Mar 2003- 
Feb 2009 
Mar 2003-
Aug 2010 
Mar 2003- 
Apr 2008 
Apr 2003-
Aug 2010 
Apr 2003- 
Dec 2007 
Jul 2003-
Jun 2008 
Jul 2003- 
Jun 2008 
May 2003-
Aug 2010 
May2003 -
Sep 2009 
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Table 1-A-4: Casualty Effects on Public Opinion towards the 2003 Iraq War in the UK59 60 
 Positive Responses Negative Responses 
Polling Institution Populus  YouGov ICM Research Populus  YouGov ICM Research 
Question Type61 Right/Wrong  Right/Wrong  Right/Wrong  Right/Wrong  Right/Wrong  Right/Wrong  
Cumulative Casualty 
(Log) 
-106.78** 
(17.29) 
-37.02 
(19.30) 
83.04 
(59.69) 
87.87** 
(22.28) 
31.31 
(15.68) 
-142.53 
(81.91) 
Marginal Casualty .58 (.28) 
-.44 
(.32) 
.29 
(.95) 
-.90* 
(.33) 
.28 
(.22) 
.69 
(1.14) 
Time 
(Days) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.005 
(.009) 
-.05 
(.03) 
-.01 
(.01) 
.003 
(.007) 
.07 
(.04) 
Unemployment 2.91 (2.58) 
-.69 
(1.95) 
5.38 
(3.28) 
1.42 
(2.24) 
-2.56 
(1.78) 
-2.08 
(4.09) 
Constant 219.53** (25.21) 
112.56** 
(29.64) 
-84.05 
(94.26) 
-100.92* 
(33.60) 
-9.69 
(23.78) 
271.16 
(129.86) 
N 17 38 12 17 38 12 
Adjusted R2 .91 .84 .63 .84 .79 .35 
Sample Period Apr 2003 
-Feb 2006 
Mar 2003 
-Jun 2007 
Jan 2004 
-Jul 2006 
Apr 2003 
-Feb 2006 
Mar 2003 
-Jun 2007 
Jan 2004 
-Jul 2006 
Note: ** p<.01,  *p<.05 
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected to be robust to heteroskedasticity.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
59
 The poll and casualty data are obtained from the UK Polling Report (http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/iraq) and 
the BBC archive (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10637526) respectively. 
60
 The dependent and independent variables are constructed with the same manner of the US data analysis 
presented in Table 1-2. In particular, cumulative and marginal casualty indicate the natural logarithm of the 
total number of UK hostile military deaths that have occurred at the time of the poll surveys and marginal 
casualties for 7 days prior to the polls respectively. Time is the number of days between the start of the war 
and the date of the polls to net out the possible time effect. Unemployment is coded as 1 if the most recently 
released UK unemployment rate prior to the poll decreased compared to that of the previous quarter, 0 
otherwise. 
61
 The poll questions are as follows; (1) Populus: Thinking about the build-up to the war in Iraq and 
everything that has happened since, was taking military action the right thing to do, or the wrong thing to do?; 
(2) YouGov: Do you think the United States and Britain were right or wrong to take military action against 
Iraq?; (3) ICM Research: From what you have seen or heard, do you think the war against Iraq to remove 
Saddam Hussein was justified or unjustified? 
69 
 
Figure 1-A-1: Aggregated Negative Responses for Selected Questions Types 
  
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Q2
Q3
Q15
Q16
Worth Type% 
0
20
40
60
80
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Q9
Approve Type I
0
20
40
60
80
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Q10
Q21
Approve Type II
0
20
40
60
80
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Q4
Q5
Q7
Q17
Q18
Stay/Withdraw Type
0
20
40
60
80
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Q12
Q23
Success to Date Type
0
20
40
60
80
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Right/Wrong Type (Q1)
70 
 
Chapter 2 
Two Perspectives on Iraqi Civilian Deaths 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The exact number of civilian deaths from the violence during the 2003 Iraq War and its 
aftermath that had lasted for about 8 years will never be known. There have been efforts, 
however, to estimate human losses by ministries of the Iraqi government in cooperation 
with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)62 and the World Health 
Organization (WHO),63 by researchers in medical and nursing schools in the US and Iraq,64 
65
 and by a UK polling firm.66 The majority of these estimates depend upon cluster sample 
surveys to extrapolate the total number of violent civilian deaths. Furthermore, 
governmental as well as nongovernmental sources have released the collective number of 
violent civilian deaths at different time intervals during the war.67 Amongst these attempts, 
two records have been distinguished due to their consistency and comprehensibility to 
document Iraqi civilian deaths from violence across all 18 Iraqi governorates during the 
war period. The first has been extracted from the Iraq War Logs – the archive of the US 
Department of Defense (DoD), which were leaked by WikiLeaks in October 2010. The 
second is a dataset created by Iraq Body Count (IBC), an NGO based in the UK, which has 
compiled violent civilian deaths on the basis of media reports since the beginning of the 
war.68 Although neither the Pentagon nor the IBC dataset is the list of the true number of 
war deaths, examining the two could not only provide the intensity of war and its evolution 
over time, but also a clue about the probable behavioural differences between the US 
military authority and media coverage in counting violent civilian deaths. .  
                                                           
62
 Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (2005a). 
63
 Iraq Family Health Survey Study Group (2008). 
64
 Robert et al. (2004). 
65
 Burnham et al. (2006). 
66
 Opinion Research Business (2007). 
67
 Congressional Research Service (2008, 2010). 
68
 IBC also depends on the figures released by morgues, hospitals, governmental and nongovernmental 
organisations but its main source is international and local news media. Iraq Body Count Methods. 
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An analysis of violent civilian deaths facilitates understanding of conflicts, since 
human loss is one of the most immediate costs of conflicts (Fischhoff, Atran and Fischhoff 
2007, Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008). In addition, it could ensure that further attention should be 
paid towards enhancing civilian protection from violence (Sloboda et al. 2011). The 
number of violent civilian deaths which have occurred in conflicts has been of direct 
interest to social scientists in war studies. Civilian deaths during the 2003 Iraq war in 
particular, arguably one of the major political phenomena in recent decades, have been 
researched due to the geopolitical significance of the war. For instance, Wallsten and Kosec 
(2005) calculate the direct economic cost of Iraqi civilian deaths during the initial two years 
of the war using the IBC dataset to find that the cost incurred from war deaths outstrips the 
estimated cost accrued from avoided murders by the Saddam Hussein administration by 
about 25 percent.69 Iyengar and Monten (2008) also use the civilian death toll recorded in 
the IBC dataset to find that uncertainty in the US political landscape regarding the war 
engagement increased the magnitude of insurgency in Iraq. In addition, Condra et al. (2010) 
are interested in the effect of civilian casualties as a possible factor underlying escalation of 
insurgent violence. By examining violent civilian deaths that occurred during the Iraq and 
Afghanistan war, they discover the level of violence amongst counterinsurgent forces 
results in resentment in the locals, leading to an increase in future violence. Finally, 
Alvarez-Ramirez et al. (2010) use civilian and military casualties as a means to understand 
the relations between regime types and war evolution. They find that violent war deaths 
showed discrete behavioural patterns in each stage of the five regimes established in Iraq 
between 2003 and 2010.  
Researchers involved in the IBC project have also generated in-depth analysis with 
the dataset. Hicks et al. (2011a) categorise agents responsible for violent civilian deaths 
during the Iraq war into three groups; coalition forces, anti-coalition forces and unknown 
perpetrators. The descriptive statistics provided by the authors show that deaths attributed 
to coalition forces are not trivial, implying that the military authority should have been 
                                                           
69
 The lower bound of the cost accrued from Iraqi fatalities between March 2003 and August 2005 is 52 
billion dollars in 2005 values whilst that from avoided murders by the Saddam Hussein administration during 
the same period is estimated to be 65 billion dollars.  
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more cautious in performing its operations. The authors discover that 12% of Iraqi civilian 
deaths from violence during the initial five years of the war were killed by coalition forces 
whilst 74% by unknown perpetrators. The coalition forces, however, are more likely to be 
accountable for the deaths of women and children compared to anti-coalition forces. The 
proportion of women and children amongst all civilian deaths caused by coalition forces 
was 51% whilst those by anti-coalition forces 10%. Hicks et al. (2011b) subsequently 
performed a more comprehensive analysis on the effects of suicide bombings.  
Even though the principal characteristics of war evolution and violent civilian 
deaths have been intensively researched using the IBC dataset, war deaths using the 
Pentagon dataset have yet to be scrupulously examined in the scholarly literature. The 
Pentagon dataset includes almost 400,000 classified documents used by officers in the US 
Department of Defense and in the US Forces’ military operations in Iraq.70 The 
unprecedented, huge-scale material in relation to the war evoked a sensation in the 
international society and a strong condemnation by the US government when it was 
released by WikiLeaks in 2010. Especially, the dataset irrefutably contradicts the US 
official stand that they do not count Iraqi deaths.71 The details of violent deaths contained in 
the dataset substantiates that the US military authority had been consistently and 
comprehensively recording not only civilian deaths but insurgents and Iraqi security forces 
killed by armed violence during the war with the exact location and the time of the violent 
events. To this effect, despite of the lack of given information on the methods in counting 
violent deaths and in distinguishing civilians from combatants, the Pentagon dataset gives a 
rare opportunity to infer US military authority’s attitude towards violent deaths during the 
war period. Furthermore, the availability of the official record enables a comparative 
analysis with the existing dataset on Iraqi civilian deaths compiled based on media reports. 
This comparative study has rarely been conducted for the Iraq War or any other armed 
conflict. This chapter therefore aims to gauge any differences between the US military 
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  New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/world/middleeast/23box.html).  
71
 “We don’t do body counts” by General Tommy Franks in a news conference in 2002, who was in charge of 
the 2003 Iraq War. BBC News (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3672298.stm). “We don’t do 
body counts on other people” by the then US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in an interview with Fox 
News in 2003 (http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,101956,00.html).  
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authority and the media in acknowledging human losses from violence during the war using 
the two dataset from the public and private sources. In the absence of guidelines on how the 
US military authority drafted the dataset, this chapter further attempts to reason out the 
methods and principles of the authority towards counting violent deaths by conducting the 
comparative study with the IBC dataset across the spatial, temporal, and spatiotemporal 
dimensions. Given the conventional wisdom that war deaths provided by governmental 
sources are allegedly counted in a conservative way to mitigate negative effects on 
domestic war support, the comparative study could render a clue about systematic 
discrepancies and counting methods between the US military authority and the media on 
the same political incidents. If any discrepancies are found to demonstrate US military 
authorities’ methodical undercounting of violent civilian deaths during the war, this chapter 
also considers its effects upon the ensuing development of the war.       
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 describes an 
overview of the Pentagon and the IBC dataset. Section 3 presents the comparative analysis 
of both datasets and section 4 concludes. 
 
2.2. Data Summary  
War deaths recorded in both the Pentagon and the IBC dataset are obtained from the IBC 
website.72 73 Despite both datasets reporting incident-based war-related deaths during the 
2003 Iraq war, there are significant differences between the two which hinders direct 
comparison. The IBC dataset itself is the record only for violent civilian deaths, defined as 
non-combatants. As a UK-based NGO, IBC has compiled civilian deaths since the 
beginning of the Iraq war, aiming to provide a complete number of violent civilian deaths 
as possible. The main source of the IBC dataset is international and Iraq local news media 
                                                           
72
 The Pentagon dataset originally contains GPS coordinates for the locations where violent incidents 
occurred. IBC transformed these coordinates into specific places (i.e. governorate and districts) to 
accommodate research convenience. 
73
 The IBC dataset used for this study was downloaded from the IBC searching engine at midnight on 1st July 
2011. The number of civilian deaths can vary depending on when the dataset is downloaded since IBC 
continues to update its figures. 
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although it also depends on the figures released by morgues, hospitals, governmental and 
nongovernmental organisations.74 As the IBC dataset is based on multiple sources, it 
provides both the minimum and maximum number of civilian deaths for each violent 
incident. The sum of the minimum deaths therefore represent the most conservative number 
of civilian loss provided by IBC whereas that of the maximum deaths indicate the upper 
bound of the civilian death toll during the war. Furthermore, as IBC defines civilians as 
non-combatants, police in non-paramilitary roles (i.e. local and traffic police) are included 
in the dataset. IBC also counts members of Iraqi security forces such as National Guard or 
Iraqi Army as civilians if they were executed after capture.   
The Pentagon dataset is the US military archive containing 391,832 classified 
reports from Iraq. It was released by a whistle-blowing NGO WikiLeaks titled as the “Iraq 
War Logs” in October 2010. The dataset discloses that the US military authority keeps 
details on more than 100,000 war deaths that occurred between 2004 and 2009 with two 
missing months.75 These war deaths are categorised into 4 groups in the dataset; Civilian, 
Host Nation, Enemy and Friendly. Civilian is the most relevant category with the IBC 
dataset as it mainly involves Iraqi civilians.76 Host Nation is also used for the comparative 
analysis as it contains Iraqi security forces that the IBC dataset partially includes. Enemy is 
the category for insurgents or anti-coalition forces whereas Friendly for coalition forces 
including US military members. As both Enemy and Friendly count combatants, war deaths 
recorded in these two categories are not overlapped with those in the IBC dataset in 
principle. However, whilst Friendly unambiguously involves military members, Enemy 
requires to be examined for the comparative study given the unavailability of methodology 
on how the US military authority distinguished Iraqi civilians from insurgents or anti-
coalition forces. Although it is reasonably assumed that the details on violent deaths 
recorded in the Pentagon dataset were mainly reported by the US troops in the field or 
intelligence agents working in Iraq, it is not known how the military authority categorised 
                                                           
74
 Iraq Body Count Methods.  
75
 War deaths that occurred in May 2004 and March 2009 are not available in the Pentagon dataset. 
76
 The Civilian category also includes foreign security contractors, who are not included in the IBC dataset. 
However, matching the Civilian category with the IBC dataset is fairly straightforward as the absolute 
majority recorded in Civilian is Iraqis (Iraq Body Count 2010a).  
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each death as the dataset was released in an informal way.77 Nonetheless, methods and 
principles of the US military authority in categorising the war deaths can be partially 
captured by the comparative analysis with the IBC dataset as presented in section 2.3.  
Beyond the number of war deaths, which this chapter focuses upon, both datasets 
also provide detailed information on war-related violent incidents including dates and 
locations. The Pentagon dataset contains the number of injuries from violent incidents, 
types of the incidents,78 and GPS coordinates for the locations as to where the incidents 
occurred.79 It also provides the number of detainees (i.e. insurgents or anti-coalition forces), 
totalling more than 180,000 during the period of interest. The IBC dataset supplies the 
number of injuries caused by war-related incidents that generated at least one civilian death, 
victims’ identities (i.e. name, age and gender) if available, perpetrators, types of weapons, 
locations (i.e. governorates), and the sources (i.e. local and international media). 
 IBC has counted violent civilian deaths since the beginning of the war in March 
2003 whereas war deaths recorded in the Pentagon dataset are limited to six years between 
2004 and 2009 with two missing months (May 2004 and March 2009). The comparative 
study is therefore restricted to this overlapping time period of seventy months. Table 2-1 
presents the descriptive statistics of the minimum and maximum number of civilian deaths 
recorded in the IBC dataset as well as different war death categories of the Pentagon dataset 
during this overlapping period. Amongst 4 categories of war deaths of the Pentagon dataset, 
Friendly is not included in Table 2-1 since this chapter mainly examines violent civilian 
deaths, not military fatalities. The most relevant category with the IBC dataset is Civilian 
that contains 66,081 violent deaths. The civilian death toll recorded in the Pentagon dataset 
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 The Pentagon dataset is allegedly known to be handed to WikiLeaks by Bradley Manning, an intelligence 
analyst in the US Army. He was charged with regard to the data theft in July 2010, and his court martial 
began September 2012. Furthermore, Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, was granted asylum by 
Ecuador in August 2012 to avoid possible extradition to the US. 
78
 The incidents recorded in the Pentagon dataset are categorised into 9 types; criminal event, enemy action, 
explosive hazard, friendly action (i.e. coalition forces’ military operations), friendly fire, non-combat event, 
suspicious incident, threat report and others. 
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 IBC transformed this geographic information into districts and governorates in accordance with the 
boundaries applied since 2005 when the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq changed the peripheries of 
Baghdad. This ‘post-2005’ list contains 104 districts under 18 governorates. Some districts such as Abu 
Ghraib, Mahmoudiya, Adhamiya, Mad’in, Khadamiya and Tarmia were transferred to Baghdad from the 
neighbouring governorates in 2005. 
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therefore reaches 78% of the lower bound of IBC (i.e. Minimum, 66,081/85,132), and 72% 
of the upper bound (i.e. Maximum, 66,081/92,027).80 However, when Civilian is added by 
Host Nation, a category for Iraqi security forces that the IBC dataset partially includes, the 
number of war deaths (81,277) reaches 95% of the lower bound of the IBC dataset. Whilst 
the absolute number of war deaths recorded in the Pentagon dataset is smaller than that in 
the IBC dataset, the former contains the greater number of violent incidents involving at 
least one death, suggesting that the Pentagon dataset is likely to include more small-scale 
violent events. For instance, 73% of the incidents recorded in Pentagon’s Civilian (24,721 
in 34,009) involve only 1 death whereas 53% in IBC’s Minimum (11,577 in 21,865) relate 
1 death.81 This may be because firstly, US troops in the field report small-scale violent 
events that war journalists occasionally do not. Secondly, US troops may have an 
advantage over journalist in collecting information on violent events especially when 
violence escalates. 
In spite of the substantial difference in the absolute number of civilian deaths 
recorded in the Pentagon and the IBC dataset, the monthly averages of the two may not be 
significantly different considering the overlapping confidence intervals presented in Table 
2-1.82 Furthermore, both the Pentagon and IBC dataset record that the majority of civilian 
deaths occurred in Baghdad, the capital governorate where a quarter of population reside.83 
However, 73% of insurgent deaths occurred outside of Baghdad, as suggested by the 
Enemy category of the Pentagon dataset. Together, this implies that civilian deaths are 
centred around the capital whereas military operations against insurgents or anti-coalition 
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 The number of deaths from prolonged incidents recorded in the IBC dataset is distributed following IBC’s 
distribution algorithm. Three incidents involving more than 800 deaths in the IBC dataset that occurred 
between 2004 and 2009 span the preceding year (i.e. 2003). As IBC assumes that the deaths from prolonged 
incidents occurred evenly over the periods of the incidents, I uniformly distributed these deaths throughout 
the period. If an incident, for instance, generated two deaths between 31 December 2003 and 1 January 2004, 
one is allocated to December 2003, which is outside the period of interest of this chapter, whilst the other is 
attributed to January 2004, which is within the period of interest. With this distributive algorithm, the number 
of deaths for IBC’s Minimum and Maximum is established as shown in Table 2-1. This distribution process is 
not required for the Pentagon dataset as every incident recorded in the dataset falls on a specific day. 
81
 Fifty-one percent of the incidents recorded in IBC’s Maximum (11,375 in 22,108) involve 1 civilian death. 
82
 The monthly distribution of the two datasets is further discussed in section 3. 
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 Population calculated based on the 2007 estimate. The estimated number of population in Baghdad is 
7,145,470 (UN Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit). The estimated number of population in Iraq is 
29,682,000 in 2007 (Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology).  
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forces may have spread over to the neighbouring regions of Baghdad, speculation 
corroborated in the subsequent section.   
 
2.3. Comparative Analysis 
In order to examine the probable behavioural differences between the US military 
authority and media reports in counting violent civilian deaths during the 2003 Iraq war, 
this chapter analyses war deaths recorded in the Pentagon and the IBC dataset along 
temporal, spatial and spatiotemporal dimensions. The first two subsections present the 
monthly and governorate level analysis, and the third considers the time and space together 
in accordance with the panel structure of data. Thereafter, the forth subsection presents the 
results of the non-parametric equality test of distribution with the Pentagon and the IBC 
dataset. The final subsection explores whether there is a systematic difference between the 
US military authority and the media in counting human loss that occurred in violent 
incidents involving more than 100 civilian deaths. 
2.3.1. Monthly Deaths 
Monthly deaths recorded in the Pentagon and the IBC dataset are potentially important 
indicators for the evolution of the Iraq war as both datasets consistently and 
comprehensively recorded violent deaths across all 18 governorates in Iraq during the war 
period. Furthermore, the monthly level approach may also highlight different attitudes of 
the US military authority and the media in collecting information on Iraqi civilian deaths 
from violence.  
As a starting point, monthly deaths recorded in the two datasets are plotted in Figure 
2-1. The thick and thin solid lines in Figure 2-1 respectively represent monthly deaths 
recorded in Pentagon’s Civilian and IBC’s Minimum between 2004 and 2009, the period 
when both datasets are commonly available. The thick and thin dotted line respectively 
indicate the sum of Civilian and Host Nation of the Pentagon dataset, and IBC’s Maximum, 
both of which are slightly greater than the corresponding solid lines throughout the period 
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of interest.84 Both Pentagon’s Civilian and IBC’s Minimum (solid lines) reach their peaks 
between mid-2006 and mid-2007, as a result of sectarian violence and severe insurgency 
during this period, thereafter rapidly decreasing after the ‘surge’ that brought in an 
additional dispatch of more than 20,000 US troops in the first half of 2007. There is, 
however, a considerable discrepancy between Civilian and Minimum before this surge. 
Dividing the war period into three phases may facilitate a better understanding of this 
discrepancy. During the first phase, period from January 2004 to August 2006, IBC’s 
Minimum is above Pentagon’s Civilian. However, in the following phase of the deadly 
period when the death toll soared up, Civilian substantially exceeds Minimum. The two, 
however, show an almost identical level during the final phase from June 2007 to the end of 
the period of interest.  
The difference in the monthly civilian death toll recorded in the Pentagon and the 
IBC dataset are more clearly illustrated in Figure 2-2. During the first phase between 
January 2004 and August 2006, as explained with an arrow in the figure, the difference 
between the Pentagon’s Civilian and IBC’s Minimum is consistently negative. The average 
monthly deaths of Civilian are 663 during this first phase, which is a half of those for 
Minimum (1,263). This conspicuous difference between the two may suggest either that 
media reports may have inflated the number of violent civilian deaths during the initial 
period of the war or the US military authority might have conservatively counted them. On 
the contrary, the Pentagon record exceeds the media’s one during the second phase between 
September 2006 and May 2007 as represented by another arrow in Figure 2-2. It may imply 
that the US military authority might have collected information on violent civilian deaths as 
actively as the media in this phase when sectarian violence and insurgency prevailed. The 
average monthly deaths of Pentagon’s Civilian were almost 3,000 in this phase whilst those 
of IBC’s Minimum were approximately 2,500. Finally, during the last phase of the war 
period, from June 2008 to December 2009, Civilian closely approach Minimum except in 
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 Monthly deaths recorded in Enemy, a war death category for insurgents or anti-coalition forces of the 
Pentagon dataset is illustrated in Figure 2-A-1 in appendix. 
79 
 
March 2008.85 This suggests that monthly deaths collected by the US military authority are 
almost identical to those with media reports during the final phase when the insurgency and 
sectarian violence abated after the surge in early 2007.  
 Baghdad Effect 
To find the causes of significantly different attitude between the US military authority and 
media reports in counting civilian deaths in the initial and the insurgency period of the war, 
I firstly examine deaths recorded for Baghdad. As both the US military authority and media 
reports record Baghdad as the governorate where the majority of violent civilian deaths 
occurred during the war period, it may be useful to plot monthly deaths occurring in 
Baghdad and in the rest of the governorates separately to net out a probable Baghdad effect. 
The first plot of Figure 2-3 displays monthly civilian deaths occurring in Baghdad 
governorate only whilst the second plot the rest of the governorates in Iraq.86 The solid and 
dotted line in each plot represents Pentagon’s Civilian and IBC’s Minimum respectively. 
Looking at Baghdad first, monthly civilian deaths show similar patterns to those illustrated 
in Figure 2-1. Specifically, Civilian is lower than Minimum until mid-2006, and then 
exceeds Minimum during the severe insurgency period between mid-2006 and mid-2007. 
Civilian and Minimum, however, look almost identical since then until the end of the 
period of interest. 
In the second plot excluding Baghdad, Civilian and Minimum show similar 
trajectories with an exception of 2004. Whilst Civilian is rather flat in 2004, Minimum 
displays two conspicuous peaks claiming almost 1000 death each month. These two peaks 
are mainly due to the two battles in Falluja, one of the major cities of Anbar governorate 
where the US forces launched all-out assaults to take back control of the city from 
insurgents in April and November. IBC’s Minimum records approximately 600 deaths 
including women and children in Falluja in both months. On the contrary, Pentagon’s 
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 IBC’s Minimum and Pentagon’s Civilian show a substantial difference in Diyala governorate in March. 
Minimum documented an incident involving findings of 100 bodies in Al-Khalis district in Diyala 
governorate this month, which Civilian did not report.  
86
 The 18 governorates in Iraq are listed in Table 2-2. 
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Civilian counts only one or two deaths in the same months. Instead, the Enemy category of 
the Pentagon dataset records about 400 deaths in both months. This implies that the US 
military authority might have acknowledged almost all human loss occurring during the 
two fierce battles in Falluja as lump-sum insurgent deaths without attempting to single out 
civilians from insurgents. This is further elucidated in section 2.3.3.  
Initial Discrepancy: Did the US undercount Civilian Deaths? 
A monthly level approach to war deaths recorded in the Pentagon and the IBC dataset 
provides a clue to the notable differences between the US military authority and the media 
count of Iraqi civilian deaths during the initial stage of the war. The number of deaths 
recorded in Pentagon’s Civilian is only 29% of that in IBC’s Minimum in 2004 
(2,781/9,478), and 41% in 2005 (5,746/13,913). The discrepancy between the two datasets 
during the initial period of the war derives mainly from the distribution of deaths which 
occurred in Baghdad and the neighbouring Anbar governorate where the largest scale 
military operations were carried out in 2004.  
On one hand, one can assume that even the most conservative number of war deaths 
reported by the media (i.e. IBC’s Minimum) may be substantially inflated as media 
coverage on violent events tends to be intensified in the beginning of any contemporary war 
due to the ‘rally ‘round the flag’ effect.87  On the other hand, the US military authority may 
have not established an effective system to report violent civilian deaths during the initial 
stage of the war. Moreover, it could be that the US forces’ priority had been on ensuring 
victory over their armed opponents or on decisive exit strategies rather than on the counting 
non-coalition deaths at the beginning of the war whereas war journalists’ priority lies with 
reporting violent events involving civilian loss. Given the unavailability of the Pentagon’s 
methods of collecting war-related death information, there is no concrete evidence to 
support the speculation that the US military authority did not effectively function or rather 
neglected the accurate counting of civilian deaths in the initial stage of the war. 
Nevertheless, the evolution of the intensity of violence in the subsequent phases of the war 
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 The Rally ‘round the flag effect is a political terminology devised by Mueller (1973) to explain a 
phenomenon that a war tends to enjoy comparatively high domestic support in the beginning. 
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may partially support the speculation that the initial discrepancy between the US military 
authority and media reports may be attributed to US forces’ undercount of violent civilian 
deaths due to the absence of an effective counting system rather than media’s exaggeration 
on violence.  
As illustrated with Figure 2-1, Iraq experienced acute sectarian violence and 
insurgency between mid-2006 and mid-2007 that brought about large-scale civilian deaths. 
The symptom of the sectarian civil war was already present during the previous year when 
the lowest bound of monthly civilian deaths reported by the media exceeded 1,000 for 9 
months in 2005, a signal for the onset of a sectarian war.88 However, the US military 
authority systematically understated the civilian deaths toll compared the media during the 
same year. This undercount may have hindered the US military authority from predicting 
the subsequent escalation of violence between mid-2006 and mid-2007 when the average 
civilian death toll reached almost 3,000 a month as recorded by both the Pentagon and the 
IBC dataset. The sectarian war and severe insurgency consequently led to the surge that 
brought in the additional dispatch of more than 20,000 US troops in the first half of 2007, 
and prevented the early withdrawal of US forces. This war was prolonged by more than 7 
years from the time of George Bush’s declaration of victory in May 2003. 
Discrepancy during the Insurgency Period  
In contrast to the initial stage of the war, monthly civilian deaths recorded in the Pentagon 
dataset far exceeded those in IBC’s between mid-2006 and mid-2007 when sectarian 
violence and insurgency prevailed. A probable reason for this may be due to the suspension 
of information-release regarding civilian deaths from the Baghdad city morgue. IBC 
recorded the number of civilian deaths released from the morgue since May 2003 until it 
stopped providing the list of deaths in October 2006.89 The sum of the morgue deaths 
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 For example, BBC News reports that symptoms of the sectarian war had been observed since early 2005, 
and a bombing attack on Al Askari Mosque, a holy shrine for Shia Muslims located in Samarra, in February 
2006 is largely regarded as an event that actualised the civil war between Sunni and Shia Muslims 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11107739). 
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 The Iraqi government clamped down on releasing the figures on violent civilian deaths from the Baghdad 
city morgue after the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) publicised far higher numbers 
than those admitted by the Iraqi government. Guardian (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/19/iraq).  
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during this period is not trivial, accounting for 57% of total deaths that occurred in Baghdad 
(17,191 in 30,128 deaths recorded in IBC’s Minimum). The suspension of the morgue 
release may have contributed to the cessation of the rapid increase of war deaths recorded 
by IBC as shown in Figure 2-1. Another possible reason that monthly civilian deaths 
recorded in the Pentagon dataset exceeded those in the IBC’s during the insurgency period 
may have stemmed from the limitation of media coverage amidst severe violence especially 
in Baghdad and neighbouring governorates. IBC mainly collects its data from media reports, 
and it may have been too dangerous for war journalists to comprehensively cover violent 
incidents during the deadly period between mid-2006 and mid-2007.  
2.3.2. Deaths across Governorates 
A governorate level analysis on violent civilian deaths recorded in the Pentagon and the 
IBC dataset renders a clear view of how differently or similarly the US military authority 
and the media had archived civilian losses during the war period across each governorate. 
Table 2-2 provides the number of civilian deaths recorded in Pentagon’s Civilian and IBC’s 
Minimum in each governorate arranged in order, from high to low. It also presents Host 
Nation and Enemy, war death categories of the Pentagon dataset for Iraqi security forces 
and insurgents respectively, to help identify any distinguished features from the distribution 
of civilian deaths along the governorate dimension. Looking at the governorates at the top 
in each category, Baghdad accounts for the majority of civilian deaths in both the Pentagon 
and the IBC dataset. Baghdad also claims the greatest number of civilian deaths per 1000 in 
the population,90 implying that the capital was the most volatile region in terms of civilian 
losses. Neighbouring Anbar governorate, however, is involved in the largest number of 
insurgent deaths as seen in the Enemy column, suggesting that military operations against 
insurgents or anti-coalition forces had actively been conducted in this region. 
When looking at the proportion of deaths of the governorates in each war death 
category, it is noticeable that 85% of the deaths recorded in Pentagon’s Civilian and IBC’s  
Minimum occurred in the top five governorates listed in the Table 2-2, with both datasets 
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 Deaths per 1000 in population based on 2003 estimations (World Bank).  
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sharing four governorates.91 In addition, 83 and 86% of deaths recorded in Host Nation and 
Enemy also centre upon the top five governorates, which are exactly the same as those for 
Minimum.92 Moreover, the neighbouring governorates of Baghdad such as Diyala, Anbar, 
Salah al-Din and Babylon account for a relatively large number of violent deaths, implying 
that armed violence centred on the capital and its adjacent regions during the war period. 
On the other hand, the three Kurdish governorates, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk, where 
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) autonomously rules in North Iraq, have 
experienced a comparatively smaller number of violent deaths.93 It may suggest that the 
security situation in this region had been comparatively stable during the war period under 
the control of Peshmerga.94 
Figure 2-4 visually presents the number of civilian deaths recorded in Pentagon’s 
Civilian and IBC’s Minimum, as represented by the solid and dotted lines respectively, 
across all 18 Iraqi governorates. The proportion of Civilian to Minimum for each 
governorate is also illustrated with the histograms in the figure. Looking at the governorates 
with more than 1,000 deaths in both Civilian and Minimum,95 the number of deaths 
recorded in Civilian reaches 70 to 100% of that in Minimum in every governorate except 
Anbar.96 The number of deaths recorded in Civilian for Anbar governorate is only 37% of 
that in Minimum, suggesting that the US military authority might have a significantly 
different standard towards counting civilian deaths in this region, supporting the earlier 
findings about the violent deaths predominantly occurring in Falluja, one of the main cities 
of Anbar. 
2.3.3. A Monthly-Governorate Approach 
The monthly and the governorate level analysis in the previous subsections provide an 
overview of the difference between the US military authority and the media in counting 
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 These 4 governorates are Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa and Salah al-Din. 
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 Baghdad, Ninewa, Diyala, Salah al-Din and Anbar for Host Nation, Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa and 
Salah al-Din for Enemy. 
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 Refer to Map 2.A.1 in appendix for the location of each governorate. 
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 Kurdistan military forces. 
95
 Kirkuk and the governorates are placed on the right side of Kirkuk in Figure 2-4. 
96
 Pentagon’s Civilian records 66,081 civilian deaths, which is 78% of IBC’s Minimum (85,132). 
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violent civilian deaths during the 2003 Iraq war. This subsection further facilitates 
comparisons by putting temporal and geographical information together. To compare how 
violent civilian deaths differ along the monthly-governorate dimension, I plot monthly 
deaths occurring in each governorate in Iraq except Baghdad in Figure 2-5.97 The 
spatiotemporal approach provides a clear view of the differences and similarities that exist 
between Civilian and Minimum represented by a solid and a dotted line respectively in each 
governorate. By looking at each plot, we find many of the governorates do not show 
conspicuously different trends between Civilian and Minimum over the period of interest 
except the following governorates: Anbar, Najaf, Salah al-Din, Kerbala and Basrah. 
2.3.3.1. Anbar 
As disscussed in the previous subsections (section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2), the difference between 
Pentagon’s Civilian and IBC’s Minimum in Anbar governorate mainly arises in 2004 when 
the two most intense battles between the US forces and anti-coalition forces or insurgents 
occurred in Falluja in April and November of that year, as represented by the two 
outstanding peaks of Minimum in the first row in Figure 2-5. Figure 2-6 plots monthly 
civilian deaths for Anbar governorate again as well as those for Falluja district98 in order to 
more precisely examine the differences between Civilian and Minimum. Furthermore, 
monthly deaths recorded in Enemy, a war death category of the Pentagon dataset for 
insurgents or anti-coalition forces is also included in Figure 2-6. As signified by the two 
arrows in the second plot, the two peaks of Minimum in 2004 of Anbar governorate are 
mainly due to violent deaths occurring in the first and the second battle of Falluja in April 
and November of that year. In Falluja district, Minimum records 577 and 668 deaths in 
April and November respectively whilst only 1 and 2 deaths are recorded in Civilian for 
each month. At the same time, Host Nation, a war death category for Iraqi security forces 
of the Pentagon dataset, records 0 and 7 deaths for the same months although it is not 
illustrated in Figure 2-6. Instead, Enemy records 386 and 479 deaths in both months, 
meaning that the US military authority categorised almost all violent deaths that occurred 
during the two battles in Falluja as insurgent deaths. 
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 See Figure 2-3 for Baghdad governorate. 
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 The city of Falluja is the main cities in Falluja district, one of the seven districts of Anbar governorate. 
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The US military authority claimed that civilian victimisation was minimised as most  
of the 300,000 pre-war population of Falluja fled in the fear of the largest scale assaults that 
involved in up to 15,000 US military forces and 3,000 insurgents.99 However, the record of 
the Pentagon dataset that only 3 civilians or 10 Iraqis, if counting Iraqi security forces  as 
well (i.e. Host Nation), were killed as a result of armed violence during the two major 
battles in Falluja is hardly reliable considering that even the Iraqi government official 
figures reported 271 civilian deaths including more than 50 deaths of women and children 
during the initial period of the first battle in April.100 This suggests that the US military 
authority might not have attempted to single out unarmed civilians during the major 
military operations in the city of Falluja.  
Table 2-3 present further details on war deaths in each district of Anbar governorate 
including Falluja district. As shown in the Enemy column, 27% of insurgent deaths 
occurred in Anbar governorate during the period of interest. Anbar is the largest 
governorate in Iraq, accounting for 32 percent of the territory (138,228 km2 from a total of 
435,052 km2) but sparsely populated due to a large desert in the west.101 The major cities in 
Anbar governorate, however, are included in the ‘Sunni triangle’ where the insurgency 
against the coalition forces was frequent during the war period.102 As seen in the Civilian 
and Minimum columns in Table 2-3, the majority of civilian deaths occurring in Anbar 
governorate are centred on Falluja and Ramadi, the districts that are situated in the Sunni 
triangle. Furthermore, it is noticeable that the number of deaths occurring in these two 
districts conspicuously varies across Civilian and Minimum, implying that a substantial 
disagreement between the US military authority and the media in the counting of violent 
civilian deaths. Civilian records 782 deaths in Falluja during the period of interest, which is 
only a quarter of Minimum (3,264). Civilian also records 681 deaths in Ramadi, which is 
less than a half of Minimum for the district (1,445). On the other hand, Enemy records a 
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 New York Times (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3998049.stm), BBC News 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4012005.stm, http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1999) 
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 Iraqi Health Ministry announced that 271 civilians including 52 women and children were killed due to 
armed violence in Falluja between 4 and 22 April 2004. ABC News (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2004-04-
23/Falluja-siege-civilian-death-toll-271-iraqi/174876). 
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 Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology. 
102
 Sunni Triangle is the triangular-shaped region that roughly connects Ramadi, Ba’quba and Tikrit. It also 
includes the city of Falluja and a part of Baghdad. 
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considerable number of deaths in both districts, suggesting that a careful investigation on 
whether the Enemy category absorbed some of the civilian deaths in this region is required. 
2.3.3.2. Najaf  
A significant disagreement between the US military authority and the media in classifying 
civilian and insurgent deaths is also observed in Najaf governorate. To visualise this 
discrepancy, I plot monthly deaths occurring in Najaf governorate again as well as those for 
Najaf district, which claims the majority of civilian deaths in the governorate in Figure 2-
7.103 A spike of IBC’s Minimum in 2004 in Najaf governorate is mainly due to the battles 
between the US forces and Al-Mahdi Army104 in the city of Najaf in August as explained 
with an arrow in the second plot in Figure 2-7. Whilst Minimum counts 77 deaths in Najaf 
district, where the city of Najaf is situated, Civilian counts no death during the same month. 
Instead, Enemy records 577 insurgent deaths in the same month, implying that, as in the 
two major battles in Falluja, the US military authority might have collectively classified all 
the violent deaths occurring in the city of Najaf during the battles as insurgent deaths. 
Furthermore, the US military authority seems to omit the counting of a considerable 
number of civilian deaths that occurred in the city of Najaf in 19 December 2004 due to 
suicide bombings outside the Imam Ali Shrine as indicated by in the second plot of Figure 
2-7.105 Whilst IBC’s Minimum records 53 civilian deaths caused by this single incident, 
Civilian and Enemy of the Pentagon dataset do not count any death during the whole month.  
2.3.3.3. Salah al-Din 
Salah al-Din governorate was one of the most insecure regions during the war period as 
partially explained by the relatively large size of civilian and insurgent deaths that occurred 
in this governorate.106  Furthermore, similar to the battles in Falluja and Najaf, war deaths 
generated during the intense battle in Samarra, one of the major cities of Salah al-Din 
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 Najaf governorate consists of three districts: Najaf, Kufa and Al-Manathera. 
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 The city of Najaf where Imam Ali Shrine, a holy mosque for Shia Muslims, is located in what had been 
one of the strongholds of Al-Mahdi Army, an anti-coalition force led by Shia cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr. 
105
 New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/20/international/middleeast/21CND_IRAQ.html).  
106
 See Table 2-2 for the detailed figures on civilian and insurgent deaths for Salah al-Din governorate.  
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governorate, were collectively categorised as insurgents by the US military authority. 
During the major offensive in the city of Samarra to take control back from insurgents on 1 
October 2004, Pentagon’s Civilian records no death whilst IBC’s Minimum counts 48. 
Instead, Pentagon’s Enemy records 134 insurgent deaths on the same day as illustrated in 
Figure 2-8. Moreover, the US military authority seems to have documented far smaller 
number of violent civilian deaths than the media for Salah al-Din governorate in the initial 
period of the war. As seen in Figure 2-8, Civilian is placed below Minimum in most of the 
months until mid-2006 although the two show similar trends since then with the exception 
of February 2008. The peak of Minimum in February 2008 involves a finding of 55 
executed bodies near Samarra whilst Civilian appears to omit this incident.     
2.3.3.4. Kerbala 
Pentagon’s Civilian and IBC’s Minimum display similar trends in Kerbala governorate 
over the period of interest except two months as seen in Figure 2-9. Both Civilian and 
Minimum display peaks in March 2004 although the peaks conspicuously vary. These 
peaks are mainly as a result of the Ashura bombings107 that claimed more than 100 civilian 
deaths from suicide bombs in Kerbala governorate. Civilian and Minimum record 113 and 
121 deaths respectively for this violent incidents. However, Minimum also records more 
than 200 additional deaths for March on the basis of the list of violent deaths released by 
the Kerbala provincial morgue, revealing a conspicuous difference between Civilian and 
Minimum in that month.108 Another set of spikes in 2007 as illustrated in Figure 2-9 seems 
to be a coding error in Civilian. On the 14th April 2007 there was a bomb attack near Imam 
Hussayn Shrine, one of the holy sites for Shia Muslims. Minimum records 46 deaths and 
224 injuries for this incident whilst Civilian counts 36 deaths and 158 wounded. However, 
Civilian records another 158 deaths and 34 wounded on the same day, implying that the 
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 The Ashura bombings indicate a series of violent attacks on the Day of Ashura, a religious festival 
especially for Shia Muslims. 
108
 In documenting violent civilian deaths released by Iraqi official sources including morgues and Ministry of 
Health, IBC “only uses such data when it is possible to assign some date and location specificity” to avoid 
double counting. IBC Methods.  
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second record may be a double count for the same incident by switching the numbers of the 
deaths and wounded albeit with a slight decrease in the latter.109 
2.3.3.5. Basrah and Baghdad 
Basrah governorate was an important military posting during the war period as well as 
Baghdad since UK forces were stationed in Basrah governorate from the initiation of the 
2003 Iraq war until they handed over control of Basrah International Airport to Iraqis in 
January 2009. Coincidently, the evolution of monthly civilian deaths recorded in the 
Pentagon and the IBC dataset for Basrah governorate shares similarities with that of 
Baghdad as shown in Figure 2-10.  
By looking at monthly deaths that occurred in Basrah governorate in Figure 2-10, 
we find that Civilian is lower than Minimum in the initial period of the war. Civilian, 
however, exceeds Minimum between mid-2006 and mid-2007, and the two show almost 
identical patterns in the last phase of the war period. This evolvement of Civilian and 
Minimum in Basrah governorate is similar with that in Baghdad although the total civilian 
death toll in Baghdad is 14-17 times greater than that in Basrah in both the Pentagon and 
the IBC dataset. The similarity of this trend in both governorates is noteworthy considering 
that the former had been a major post for the US forces and the latter for the British forces 
during the entire war period. It may suggest that the tendency of the US military authority 
to conservatively count civilian casualties than media reports in the initial period of the war 
was stronger in the major military postings such as Baghdad and Basrah.  
In summary,  the  monthly-governorate level approach to war deaths recorded in the 
Pentagon and the IBC dataset shows similar patterns between the two datasets in many of 
the eighteen governorates in Iraq except the following; Anbar, Najaf, Salah al-Din,  Kerbala, 
Basrah and Baghdad. In Baghdad and Basrah governorate, both of which have been major 
military postings during the war period, the US military authority seems to be less active 
than the media in collecting civilian deaths during the initial period of the war before the 
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incident (Iraq Body Count 2010b).  
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violent death toll soared in early 2006. The US military authority also show a substantial 
discrepancy with the media in distinguishing civilians’ from insurgents’ death during the 
fierce battles in Falluja, Najaf and Samarra. Finally, the US military might have miscounted 
civilian deaths due to omitting or miscoding of violent incidents in Najaf, Kerbala and 
Salah al-Din governorate, leading to a necessity of further examination of the incidents 
recorded in the Pentagon dataset. 
 2.3.4. Distribution of War-related Deaths 
The previous subsections show considerable differences between the US military authority 
and the media in counting violent civilian deaths during the initial stage of the 2003 Iraq 
war. This subsection examines how far apart is the distribution for war deaths recorded in 
the Pentagon and the IBC dataset. If both datasets render consistent results despite of the 
initial differences, this could provide some degree of assurance that the number of deaths 
recorded in both datasets is not totally arbitrary although neither one could be a true 
number of violent deaths during the Iraq war. I firstly discuss distribution of monthly deaths 
and then present the results of equality tests of distribution across the temporal, spatial, and 
spatiotemporal dimensions.  
2.3.4.1. Distribution of Monthly Deaths 
To see the overall shape and form of distribution of monthly deaths recorded in Pentagon’s 
Civilian and IBC’s Minimum, kernel density graphs are illustrated in Figure 2-11. 
Furthermore, kernel density graphs of Civilian added by Host Nation, as represented by a 
dotted line in each plot in Figure 2-11, are also included since Host Nation contains Iraqi 
security forces that the IBC dataset partially includes. The first plot shows distributions of 
monthly deaths which occurred in Iraq during the period of interest whilst the second and 
third plots are for Baghdad only, and for the rest of the governorates respectively. 
By looking at the first plot, we find that most areas of Civilian and Minimum, 
represented by a thick and thin solid line respectively, are close to the means, and the 
distributions are right skewed, indicating a low frequency for the months with a 
comparatively large number of violent deaths (i.e. more than 1,000 deaths a month). When 
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added by Host Nation, the distribution of monthly deaths recorded in the Pentagon dataset 
is more similar to that in the IBC dataset. In Baghdad governorate, as shown in the second 
plot in Figure 2-11, the distribution of the sum of Civilian and Host Nation is almost 
identical to that of IBC’s Minimum. Excluding Baghdad, however, produces to some 
degree a different form and shape as illustrated in the third graph. Together, this suggests 
that the discrepancy between Civilian and Minimum at the monthly level is observed in 
both Baghdad and the rest of the governorates. The discrepancy, however, decreases with 
regards to Baghdad governorate, who claims the majority of civilian deaths in both the 
Pentagon and the IBC dataset, when Iraqi security forces are taken into account.  
2.3.4.2. Consistency between the Pentagon and the Media 
Having discussed the monthly level distributions, I now go a step further by testing the 
equality of distribution employing the Wilcoxon signed rank-sum method. This non-
parametric procedure fits the purpose of this comparative study to test the equality of 
distribution of paired data.110 The equality tests consider distributions not only by months 
and governorates but by districts, which has not been examined in the comparative analysis 
in the previous subsections due to missing observations which are listed under ‘unknown’ 
districts. 
Whilst most deaths documented in the Pentagon’s Civilian fall into a specific 
district (i.e. known deaths),111 approximately a third recorded in IBC’s Minimum are 
categorised as occurring in unknown districts (i.e. unknown deaths)112 although 
governorates where these deaths occurred are known. These unknown deaths are allocated 
in proportion to the known categories of districts. For instance, if a district claims10 percent 
                                                           
110
 Z statistics of the Wilcoxon signed rank-sum test is computed as follows. Firstly, one obtains the 
differences of paired observations and takes the absolute values of these differences. Then one excludes the 
observations if the absolute value is zero. Secondly, the absolute values are ranked from low to high, and 
these ranked values are then divided into two groups. One group includes the positive differences from the 
paired observations of ranked values, and the other negative. Thirdly, all ranks in the positive group (W+), and 
negative group (W-) are summed up. Finally, z statistics of the Wilcoxon signed rank-sum test is calculated 
with the equation 456 (45)789: (45) ~N(0,1), where E (W+) and Var (W+) represent the expected value and the 
variance of the sum of the ranks respectively (Hogg, McKean and Craig 2005). 
111
 Only 490 deaths in 66,081 deaths recorded in Civilian occurred in unknown districts. 
112
 26,986 in 85,132 deaths recorded in Minimum (32%), and 26,986 in 92,027 in IBC’s Maximum (29%). 
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of known deaths recorded for a governorate it belongs to, then I allocate a 10 percent of 
unknown deaths of the governorate into this known district. This simple imputation makes 
it possible to conduct an equality test of distribution at the district level.  
After imputing the unknown deaths recorded in the IBC dataset, the next challenge 
is to infer how far apart the distribution is for war deaths as recorded in the Pentagon and 
the IBC dataset. Table 2-4 presents the results of the equality test of distribution of war 
deaths recorded in both datasets employing the Wilcoxon signed rank-sum method.113 As 
shown in the first column of Table 2-4, I firstly paired Pentagon’s Civilian with IBC’s 
Minimum or Maximum, then coupled the sum of Civilian and Host Nation with IBC’s 
Minimum or Maximum. By firstly looking at the results for the monthly dimension, we do 
find that war deaths recorded in Pentagon's Civilian have a significantly different 
distribution with that of Minimum or Maximum, regardless of adding Host Nation deaths. 
The distribution of the sum of Civilian and Host Nation, however, is not significantly 
different with that of the lower bound of the IBC dataset (i.e. Minimum) when excluding 
the year 2004. It ensures that the US military authority and media reports were consistent to 
some degree in counting violent deaths over the war period except the initial stage of the 
war. Furthermore, the z statistics obtained from the Wilcoxon signed rank-sum tests 
presented in Table 2-4 consistently suggest that the difference in distribution of Pentagon’s 
Civilian and IBC’s Minimum is not statistically significant along the spatial (i.e. 
governorate and district) and spatiotemporal dimensions (monthly-governorate) when 
Civilian is added with Host Nation, substantiating that the monthly death toll for each 
governorate and district provided by the US military authority and media reports are 
consistent with the count of Iraqi security forces. Furthermore, since the two datasets record 
the same political incidents, and render consistent distribution to some degree over time and 
space, it may be possible to estimate total civilian deaths by combining the two as 
attempted for the Kosovo War.114 
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 The null hypothesis of the Wilcoxon signed rank-sum test is that the distributions of war deaths recorded in 
WikiLeaks and the IBC dataset are not significantly different.  
114
 Given the two independently documented lists of war deaths, the ‘capture-recapture’ method can be used 
to estimate the total number of deaths. It firstly links the two lists, and indentifies overlaps and non-overlaps 
using the information of the deaths (i.e. name, age and gender). Given the number of deaths commonly 
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In sum, the equality tests corroborate that civilian deaths counted by the US military 
authority and the media are not entirely incompatible across the governorates and districts 
when Iraqi security forces are taken into account. Furthermore, the Pentagon and the media 
appear to have consistent attitudes in recording civilian deaths over the war period except 
the initial stage of the war if Iraqi security forces are included in the analysis. It particularly 
enhances the findings discussed in the previous subsections that the US military authority 
and the media had a significantly different attitude towards counting violent civilian deaths 
during the initial period of the war.  
2.3.5. Discrepancy on Most Lethal Events during the Iraq War 
Although this comparative analysis does not examine every incident by incident listed in 
the Pentagon and the IBC dataset, Table 2-5 presents the incidents involving in at least 100 
civilian deaths documented in IBC’s Minimum and their counterparts in Pentagon’s 
Civilian to grasp how similarly or differently the US military authority and the media 
recorded the most lethal events during the war.115 
As seen in Table 2-5, Civilian tends to record a smaller number of deaths than that 
of Minimum for the same incidents with the exception of the suicide attacks that occurred 
in Salah al-Din in July 2007 and in Babylon in February 2005. For instance, Minimum 
counted 965 deaths for a stampede which occurred in Baghdad in 31 August 2005 as seen 
in the first incident in Table 2-5 whilst the number of victims for this incident recorded in 
Civilian is only a half (436). Furthermore, the number of wounded in Civilian is also 
smaller than Minimum in most of the incidents. One can assume, on one hand, even the 
smallest numbers of civilian casualties reported by the media may be considerably 
exaggerated. It is speculated, on the other hand, the US military authority might have 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
recorded in both lists (represented by A), and in one of the lists only (B and C), the capture-recapture method 
estimates the total number of deaths, N, by assuming that the proportion of deaths recorded in both datasets to 
those in the second list (A/C) is the same to the proportion of deaths in the first list to the total number of 
population (B/N). This relationship is shown by the equation A/C=B/N. Ball and Asher (2002) estimate 
10,356 war deaths based on 4,400 recorded in four different lists of war deaths. The capture-recapture method 
may not be applicable for the Iraqi datasets used for this chapter since not all deaths were documented with 
detailed information. It may be, however, applicable to sub-groups or samples containing identifiable 
individuals only. 
115
 Deaths from prolonged incidents (e.g. morgue public statements) were excluded. The table includes all the 
incidents that generated more than 100 deaths in Pentagon’s Civilian. 
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conservatively recorded the number of civilian casualties occurring from the most lethal 
incidents during the war.  
In relation to the last two incidents in Table 2-5, the first is recorded only in the IBC 
dataset, and the second in the Pentagon dataset, engendering suspicion of how both violent 
events involving more than a hundred civilian deaths could be detected only by either the 
US military authority or the media, not both. Although the locations where the bodies were 
discovered are different (i.e. Al Khalis in Diyala governorate vs. Al Resafa in Baghdad 
governorate), the distance between the two district is only 58km,116 and the two 
governorate share the same border. Furthermore, although the number of deaths engaged in 
these two incidents conspicuously vary (i.e. 100 vs. 250), the count of the deaths may be 
not precise since the bodies found were decomposed. Moreover, a brief note tagged in the 
Pentagon dataset for the incident furthers the suspicion that the two incidents may in fact be 
identical.  
“Military Intel indicated the presence of an estimated 250x human remains in Til 
Al-Thaheeb Sector, which it falls under the responsibility of the 4/14/3 IA. Xactual grid is 
unknown.” 
Although I could not find where ‘Til Al-Thaheeb Sector’ in the note is located, it 
appears that the US military authority may not have information on the exact location for 
the discovery when the last sentence of the note is considered. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
Both the Pentagon and the IBC dataset are incomplete records to grasp the true number of 
violent civilian deaths which occurred during the 2003 Iraq war. Nonetheless, since the 
former is the official military record, and the latter is based on media reports, a comparative 
analysis with the two dataset can provide clues on the significant behavioural differences 
between the US military authority and media reports in counting civilian deaths from 
violence. Furthermore, given the unavailability of Pentagon’s methods in drafting war 
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 The distance between Al Khalis and Al Resafa district is computed using the Google distance calculator. 
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deaths, the comparative analysis enables to infer the attitude of the US military authority 
towards counting violent civilian deaths over the war period. 
Non-parametric equality tests of distribution substantiate that the Pentagon and the 
IBC dataset provide consistent figures of violent civilian deaths along the spatial and 
spatiotemporal dimensions when Iraqi security forces taken into account. Furthermore, the 
distribution tests along the temporal dimensions also support that the US military authority 
and media reports appears to have consistent attitudes in counting violent civilian deaths 
except the initial stage of the war. This could provide some degree of assurance that the 
number of deaths recorded in both datasets is not totally arbitrary although neither one 
could be a true number of violent deaths during the war.  
The substantial differences between the US military authority and the media in the 
initial stage of the war are mainly observed: i) during the intense battles between the US 
forces and insurgents or anti-coalition forces in Falluja, Najaf and Samarra in 2004; and ii) 
in the capital from 2004 to mid-2006. First, whilst the mainstream media reported 
considerable number of civilian deaths including women and children during the major 
military operations in Falluja, Najaf and Samarra in 2004, the US military authority 
collectively categorised almost all violent deaths as insurgent deaths. In particular, given 
the official figures provided by the Iraqi government on unarmed civilian deaths that 
occurred during the all-out assaults in Falluja, the Pentagon may have been less mindful in 
distinguishing civilian losses out of combatant deaths. Second, the difference in the number 
of violent civilian deaths counted by the US military authority and media reports is 
conspicuous before violence rapidly escalated in mid-2006. The civilian death toll recorded 
in the Pentagon dataset is only 29% of the lower bound of the IBC dataset in 2004, and 41% 
in 2005. The U.S military authority’s conservative attitude towards counting civilian deaths 
compared to the media was especially prominent in the Baghdad and Basrah governorate, 
which were major military postings for the US and the UK troops during the war period. 
The discrepancy between the two may suggest either that media reports may have 
inflated the number of violent civilian deaths during the initial stage of the war or the US 
military authority may have undercounted them. Assuming that media coverage on violent 
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events involving human loss was intensified especially in the beginning of the war, it is 
then likely that the most conservative number of civilian deaths reported by the media may 
have been inflated. However, one could also speculate that the US military authority may 
have not fully established an effective system to report violent events in the initial stage of 
the war. Furthermore, the US forces could have prioritised the winning of battles or exit 
strategies rather than trying to minimise collateral damage by counting non-coalition deaths. 
Given the unavailability of Pentagon’s methods in documenting war deaths, there is no 
clear evidence to support the speculations that the US military authority did not effectively 
function or neglected in counting civilian deaths in the initial stage of the war. Nonetheless, 
this speculation may be partially supported by the evolution of the intensity of violence 
during the subsequent period of the war.  
Iraq experienced the acute sectarian violence and insurgency between mid-2006 and 
mid-2007 that brought about large-scale civilian victimisation. The onset of civil war was 
already sensed during the previous year when the lowest number of monthly civilian deaths 
reported by the media exceeded 1,000 during the majority of the months in 2005. However, 
the civilian death toll recorded by the US military authority was systematically far lower 
than that of media reports during the whole year. This undercount may have restricted the 
US military authority’s ability in predicting and preparing for the subsequent escalation of 
violence between mid-2006 and mid-2007 when the average civilian death toll reaches 
almost 3,000 a month as recorded by both the Pentagon and the IBC dataset. During this 
insurgency period and thereafter, monthly civilian deaths recorded by the US military 
authority exceeded or were almost identical with those reported by the media, which may 
indicate that the capacity of the US military authority to report violent deaths was 
equivalent, if not superior, to the media once it established an effective counting system of 
war deaths.   
The political implication for these findings is clear. The accurate counting of 
civilian deaths from violence is a requisite to ensure civilian protection during any armed 
conflict, and to understand the evolution of war intensity. Furthermore, an effective system 
to collect civilian casualty information is also one of the key requirements to tackle 
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insurgent violence as the link between civilian casualties and insurgency is known to be 
strong as observed during the ongoing Afghanistan War (Contra et al. 2010). The suspicion 
that the US military authority understated the civilian death count during the initial period 
of the war is more credible in light of the evolution of the intensity of violence in the 
subsequent phases of the war. By reporting just 30-40% of the number of civilian deaths 
compared to the media during the initial, and arguably the most critical phase of the war, 
the US military authority failed to grasp the perspective of violence escalation. The 
subsequent sectarian violence and severe insurgency resulted in large-scale human loss and 
a troop surge of an additional 20,000 US troops in the first half of 2007. The escalation of 
violence also prevented the early withdrawal of US forces since the war extended more 
than 7 years. Since the Vietnam War, the US authorities have been scrupled to count 
civilian death tolls as they learned increasing human costs inevitably leads to the 
aggravation of public opinion towards war. However, the accurate counting of both military 
and civilian casualties from violence could better understanding of war evolution, promote 
accountability of the government, and contribute on minimising the civilian impact of 
conflict as attempted in the Afghanistan and Kosovo Wars.117 In addition, the norms of 
distinguishing civilians from combatants should be firmly established within the US 
military authorities as the classification of some violent deaths are not straightforward, as 
shown in the significant discrepancies between the Pentagon archives and the media-based 
record during the early phase of the Iraq War.118 Greater transparency and consistency in 
counting violent civilian deaths will help military authorities to understand the wider 
landscape and spread of violent conflict. The analysis presented in this chapter has 
demonstrated an effective counting system of war deaths is particularly critical during the 
initial stages of any war in order to prevent an unnecessary escalation. 
                                                           
117
 The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has provided the number of civilian 
deaths from violence in Afghanistan based on on-site investigations since 2007. The recently issued UNAMA 
annual report showed that civilian casualties have declined for the first time in six years (UN Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan 2013). Similarly, ‘The Kosovo Memory Book: Volume 1’ has been published in 2011 
to offer a comprehensive list of war deaths during the 1998 Kosovo War. 
118
 International Humanitarian Law (the Fourth Geneva Convention) defines civilians those who are not 
combatants. Civilians lose their status if they directly participate in hostilities. IBC records civilian deaths 
based on this international norm, but when the civilian status is unclear, the deaths are added to the higher 
IBC number but not to the lower one (Iraq Body Count Methods). In the ongoing Afghanistan War, the UN 
excludes the number of victims when their civilian status is uncertain (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
2013). 
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Table 2-1: Descriptive Statistics of War-related Deaths during the Iraq War (2004-2009) 
Data sources Pentagon Dataset IBC Dataset 
Categories Civilian Host Nation Enemy Civilian + Host Nation Minimum Maximum 
Number of Deaths 66,081 15,196 23,984 81,277 85,132 92,027 
Number of Deaths in 
Baghdad (% in total) 
36,998 
(56%) 
5,090 
(33%) 
6,526 
(27%) 
42,088 
(52%) 
46,019 
(54%) 
49,683 
(54%) 
Number of Incidents* 34,009 8064 9,417 42,073 21,865119 22,108120 
Deaths per Incident 1.94 1.88 2.55 1.93 3.89 4.16 
Monthly Average Deaths 944.01 217.09 342.63 1161.10 1216.17 1314.67 
95% Confidence Interval 
of Monthly Average 
Deaths 
711.33 to 
1176.70 
180.85 to 
253.32 
268.72 to 
416.54 
894.90 to 
1427.30 
1031.36 to 
1400.99 
1117.05 to 
1512.30 
Standard Deviation 975.84 151.95 309.97 1116.43 775.10 828.82 
Median 483.5 167.5 283 674 987.5 1064.5 
Minimum (month) 95 (Nov 2009) 
26 
(Jan 2004) 
6 
(Aug 2004) 
127 
(Nov 2009) 
176 
(Nov 2009) 
207 
(Nov 2009) 
Maximum (month) 3784 (Dec 2006) 
666 
(Oct 2006) 
1619 
(Dec 2009) 
4334 
(Dec 2006) 
2972 
(Jul 2006) 
3184 
(Jul 2006) 
Period of Interest Year 2004 to 2009 (except May 2004 and March 2009, 70 months) 
* The incidents indicate violent events involving at least 1 death. 
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 The number of incidents includes 3 events that span the period before 2004. 
120
 The number of incidents includes 3 events that span the period before 2004. 
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Table 2-2: War-related Deaths across Governorates during the Iraq War 
Order 
Pentagon Civilian IBC Minimum Pentagon Host Nation Pentagon Enemy 
Governorate Deaths % Per 1000** Governorate Deaths % 
Per 
1000** Governorate Deaths % Governorate Deaths % 
1 Baghdad 36998 55.99 1.410 Baghdad 46019 54.06 1.754 Baghdad 5090 33.50 Anbar 6602 27.53 
2 Diyala 7142 10.81 0.272 Diyala 8941 10.50 0.341 Ninewa 2520 16.58 Baghdad 6526 27.21 
3 Ninewa 6009 9.09 0.229 Ninewa 7085 8.32 0.270 Diyala 2315 15.23 Diyala 3211 13.39 
4 Salah al-Din 3197 4.84 0.122 Anbar 5864 6.89 0.224 Salah al-Din 1547 10.18 Ninewa 2615 10.90 
5 Basrah 2635 3.99 0.100 Salah al-Din 4368 5.13 0.166 Anbar 1153 7.59 Salah al-Din 1760 7.34 
6 Babylon 2251 3.41 0.086 Babylon 2860 3.36 0.109 Kirkuk 768 5.05 Najaf 1064 4.44 
7 Anbar 2191 3.32 0.084 Basrah 2635 3.10 0.100 Babylon 472 3.11 Basrah 467 1.95 
8 Kirkuk 1780 2.69 0.068 Kirkuk 2502 2.94 0.095 Basrah 366 2.41 Babylon 417 1.74 
9 Wassit 887 1.34 0.034 Wassit 1737 2.04 0.066 Wassit 245 1.61 Kirkuk 394 1.64 
10 Kerbala 819 1.24 0.031 Kerbala 1212 1.42 0.046 Qadissiya 242 1.59 Wassit 265 1.10 
11 Qadissiya 468 0.71 0.018 Najaf 527 0.62 0.020 Thi-qar 105 0.69 Qadissiya 160 0.67 
12 Najaf 335 0.51 0.013 Qadissiya 441 0.52 0.017 Erbil 66 0.43 Thi-qar 142 0.59 
13 Thi-qar 280 0.42 0.011 Erbil 296 0.35 0.011 Kerbala 62 0.41 Kerbala 120 0.50 
14 Erbil 235 0.36 0.009 Missan 245 0.29 0.009 Najaf 50 0.33 Missan 51 0.21 
15 Missan 135 0.20 0.005 Thi-qar 201 0.24 0.008 Missan 41 0.27 Erbil 28 0.12 
16 Sulaymaniyah 125 0.19 0.005 Muthanna 75 0.09 0.003 Sulaymaniyah 36 0.24 Muthanna 14 0.06 
17 Muthanna 64 0.10 0.002 Sulaymaniyah 71 0.08 0.003 Muthanna 24 0.16 Sulaymaniyah 8 0.03 
18 Dahuk 40 0.06 0.002 Dahuk 25 0.03 0.001 Dahuk 4 0.03 Dahuk 5 0.02 
 Others* 490 0.74  Others* 28 0.03  Others* 90 0.59 Others* 135 0.56 
Sum  66081 100   85132 100   15196 100  23984 100 
*Note: Deaths recorded in IBC’s Maximum are presented in Table 2-A-1 in appendix. 
Some deaths in the Pentagon dataset are categorised as ‘others’ when locations of incidents causing the deaths are not known. 
Some deaths in the IBC dataset are also categorised as ‘others’ when the locations are not known,  Furthermore deaths from incidents involving nation-widely attacks (i.e. air strike) 
or released by morgues in more than two governorates are also included in the ‘others’ category of the IBC dataset. 
**Deaths scaled by 1000 in the population based on 2003 World Bank estimates (World Development Indicators). 
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Table 2-3: War-related Deaths in Anbar Governorates during the Iraq War 
District 
Pentagon Civilian IBC Minimum Pentagon Host Nation  Pentagon Enemy 
Deaths % Deaths % Deaths % Deaths % 
Falluja 782 35.7 3264 55.7 376 32.6 1907 28.9 
Ramadi 681 31.1 1445 24.6 452 39.2 2944 44.6 
Heet 285 13.0 211 3.6 134 11.6 265 4.0 
Al-Rutba 141 6.4 87 1.5 38 3.3 76 1.2 
Haditha 127 5.8 245 4.2 52 4.5 264 4.0 
Al-Ka'im 122 5.6 392 6.7 65 5.6 1074 16.3 
Ana 53 2.4 39 0.7 36 3.1 72 1.1 
Unknown Places   181 3.1     
Anbar Governorate Total 2191 3.32% in Civilian total 5864 
6.89% in 
Minimum total 1153 
7.59% in Host 
Nation total 6602 
27.53% in 
Enemy total 
 
Table 2-4: Equality Test with the Pentagon and the IBC Dataset 
Null Hypotheses Monthly Monthly without 2004 Governorate District Monthly- Governorate 
Monthly- Governorate 
without 2004 
Pentagon Civilian 
= IBC Minimum 
-5.08** 
(.00) 
-4.14** 
(.00) 
-2.88** 
(.00) 
-2.20* 
(.03) 
-12.17** 
(.00) 
-10.06** 
(.00) 
Pentagon Civilian 
= IBC Maximum 
-6.01** 
(.00) 
-5.16** 
(.00) 
-3.20** 
(.00) 
-2.82** 
(.00) 
-14.40** 
(.00) 
-12.34** 
(.00) 
Pentagon Civilian + Host Nation 
= IBC Minimum 
-1.97* 
(.05) 
-.55 
(.58) 
.20 
(.84) 
1.15 
(.25) 
.11 
(.91) 
1.90 
(.06) 
Pentagon Civilian + Host Nation 
= IBC Maximum 
-3.47** 
(.00) 
-2.23* 
(.03) 
-1.33 
(.18) 
-.003 
(.997) 
-3.38** 
(.00) 
-1.60 
(.11) 
Number of Observations 70 59 18 104 1260 (70 months*18 governorates) 
1062 
(70 months*104 districts) 
Note: The figures are z statistics of Wilcoxon signed rank-sum test. P values in parentheses. 
* Statistically significant at the 5% level  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level 
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Table 2-5: Most Lethal Incidents Involving More than 100 Deaths during the Iraq War 
Date Incident Governorate District 
Minimum Civilian 
Killed Injured Killed %* Injured %** 
31-Aug-05 Stampede Baghdad Khadamiya 965 465 436 45% 114 25% 
14-Aug-07 Suicide bombs Ninewa Sinjar 516 1500 299 58% 402 27% 
23-Nov-06 Car bombs Baghdad Al Sadr 215 257 181 84% 247 96% 
07-Jul-07 Suicide bombs Salah al-Din Tooz 159 270 170 107% 250 93% 
27-Mar-07 Car bombs Ninewa Telafar 152 347 83 55% 140 40% 
25-Oct-09 Suicide car bombs Baghdad Karkh 150 695 93 62% 641 92% 
18-Apr-07 Car bombs and other methods Baghdad Al Resafa 140 150 115 82% 137 91% 
03-Feb-07 Suicide car bombs Baghdad Al Resafa 136 320 105 77% 251 78% 
28-Feb-05 Suicide car bombs Babylon Al-Musayab 135 124 166 123% 146 118% 
19-Aug-09 Car bombs and other methods121 Baghdad Unknown 130 1200 75 58% 749 62% 
08-Dec-09 Car bombs122 Baghdad Unknown 122 513 41 34% 90 18% 
02-Mar-04 Suicide bombs Kerbala Kerbala 121 200 113 93% 233 117% 
06-Mar-07 Suicide bombs Babylon Al-Musayab 118 200 93 79% 164 82% 
14-Sep-05 Suicide car bombs Baghdad Khadamiya 111 156 75 68% 138 88% 
01-Feb-04 Suicide bombs Erbil Erbil 107 247 65 61% 247 100% 
08-Mar-08 Decomposed bodies found Diyala Al-Khalis 100 0 
 
   
18-Jul-08 Human remains found Baghdad Al Resafa 
  
250  0 0 
* Proportion to the deaths recorded in Minimum 
** Proportion to the wounded recorded in Minimum 
Deaths from prolonged incidents (e.g. morgue public statements) were excluded. The table includes all the incidents that generated more than 100 deaths in Pentagon’s Civilian. 
                                                          
121
 Two incidents recorded in Civilian; 14 and 61 deaths each 
122
 Two incidents recorded in Civilian; 21 and 20 deaths each 
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Figure 2-1: Monthly War-related Deaths during the Iraq War (2004-2009) 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Differences in Monthly Deaths between the Pentagon and the IBC Dataset 
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Figure 2-3: Monthly Deaths in Baghdad and the Rest of the Governorates during the Iraq 
War 
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Figure 2-4: Civilian Deaths across 18 Iraqi Governorates during the Iraq War 
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Figure 2-5: Monthly Deaths across Iraqi Governorates during the Iraq War 
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Figure 2-5 continued 
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Figure 2-6: Monthly Deaths in Anbar Governorate and Falluja District during the Iraq War 
 
 
Figure 2-7: Monthly Deaths of Najaf Governorate and Najaf District during the Iraq War 
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Figure 2-8: Monthly Deaths in Salah al-Din Governorate during the Iraq War
 
 
Figure 2-9: Monthly Deaths in Kerbala Governorate during the Iraq War 
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Figure 2-10: Monthly Deaths in Baghdad and Basrah Governorate during the Iraq War
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Figure 2-11: Distribution of Monthly Deaths during the Iraq War 
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Appendix 2 
Table 2-A-1: War-related Civilian Deaths across 18 Iraqi Governorates during the Iraq War 
(2004-2009) 
Order 
IBC Minimum IBC Maximum 
Governorate Deaths % Governorate Deaths % 
1 Baghdad 46019 54.06 Baghdad 49683 53.99 
2 Diyala 8941 10.50 Diyala 9616 10.45 
3 Ninewa 7085 8.32 Ninewa 7442 8.09 
4 Anbar 5864 6.89 Anbar 6519 7.08 
5 Salah al-Din 4368 5.13 Salah al-Din 4684 5.09 
6 Babylon 2860 3.36 Babylon 3031 3.29 
7 Basrah 2635 3.10 Basrah 2936 3.19 
8 Kirkuk 2502 2.94 Kirkuk 2654 2.88 
9 Wassit 1737 2.04 Wassit 1800 1.96 
10 Kerbala 1212 1.42 Kerbala 1314 1.43 
11 Najaf 527 0.62 Najaf 863 0.94 
12 Qadissiya 441 0.52 Qadissiya 460 0.50 
13 Erbil 296 0.35 Erbil 326 0.35 
14 Missan 245 0.29 Missan 263 0.29 
15 Thi-qar 201 0.24 Thi-qar 212 0.23 
16 Muthanna 75 0.09 Muthanna 84 0.09 
17 Sulaymaniyah 71 0.08 Sulaymaniyah 82 0.09 
18 Dahuk 25 0.03 Dahuk 25 0.03 
 Others 28 0.03 Others 33 0.04 
Sum  85132 100%  92027 100% 
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Figure 2-A-1: Monthly Civilian and Insurgent Deaths during the Iraq War 
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Map 2-A-1: Distribution of Violent Civilian Deaths across 18 Iraqi Governorates 
 
 
Note: The number of civilian deaths recorded in the IBC lower bound (Minimum) in parentheses. 
          The Iraq map is based on the ‘pre-2005’ boundaries before the border of Baghdad changed. 
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Part II 
Civilian Targeting in Armed Conflict 
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Chapter 3 
Global Comparison of Warring Groups in 2002-2007:   
Fatalities from Targeting Civilians vs. Fighting Battles123 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Warring groups that compete to dominate the territory of a civilian population face 
contending behavioural options: target the population or battle the enemy. Studies of the 
intentional targeting of civilians in armed conflict have been limited primarily to datasets 
on conflicts that involve sovereign states (Downes 2008, Valentino, Huth, Croco 2006), and 
to studies of genocide or of mass killing defined as over 50,000 deaths over five years 
(Wayman 2010, Valentino, Huth, Balch-Lindsay 2004, Hultman 2007, Human Security 
Report Project 2010).  More recently developed conflict datasets such as those of the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) used in this chapter, have allowed more complete 
analyses of the behaviour of armed groups in war by encompassing combatant groups 
involved in low-to-high intensity armed conflicts and by including conflicts between non-
state clans, rebel groups and rebel factions (Hultman 2007, Human Security Report Project 
2010, Wood 2010).   
Opportunities to increase the understanding of factors affecting civilian targeting 
can potentially be multiplied by coupling studies of civilian targeting by human actors with 
informative parallels across disciplines and in nature. For example, national security 
defences against terrorism have been informed by examining: competitive adaptation 
between predator and prey; relationships with symbiotic or pathogenic bacteria; and 
immune system defences against pathogens (Sagarin et al. 2010).  Interdisciplinary studies 
have found the size, organisation, and timing of insurgency violence to show patterns 
similar to those in ecology and financial markets (Bohorquez et al. 2009, Johnson et al. 
                                                           
123
 This chapter was written in collaboration with three other researchers, and resulted in the academic 
publication: Hicks, M., Lee, U. Sundberg, R. and Spagat, M. (2011). “Global Comparison of Warring Groups 
in 2002–2007: Fatalities from Targeting Civilians vs. Fighting Battles” PLoSONE, 6 (9). 
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2006).  In the case of civilian targeting, we consider the dynamics of warring groups and 
the civilian population to be potentially comparable to the dynamics of competing parasitic 
bacteria and the parasitised host organism or population as described in a number of recent 
studies (Gardner, West and Buckling 2004, West and Gardner 2010, Inglis and Gardner 
2010, Hawlena et al. 2010, Vigneux et al. 2008, Massey, Buckling and Ffrench-Constant 
2004).  A civilian population in war can be considered analogous to a parasitised host in 
that it possesses a finite resource (i.e. the disputed territory) that warring groups are 
competing to dominate and use. Warring groups can be considered analogous to competing 
parasitic bacteria in that both can focus their limited resources either on attacking the 
competitor or on attacking the host or civilian population. In this chapter, we will discuss 
our study and its findings in the context of research from the fields of biological sciences, 
social sciences, and conflict studies, drawing on parallels between the dynamics of 
cooperation, organisation, and violent competition found in nature and dynamics of human 
armed conflict. 
Intentional targeting of civilians is a typologically important strategy for warring 
actors to secure contested territory or resources. In particular, certain characteristics of war 
and its participants are more likely to result in the intentional targeting of civilians. In an 
asymmetric conflict such as guerrilla war, incumbent governments target a civilian 
population to scale down guerrilla forces’ capacity as they often count on the local 
population for logistic support. On the other hand, guerrilla armies also have strong 
incentives to target civilians to prevent them from cooperating with the incumbent or to 
threaten them to draw further support (Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004). 
Furthermore, internal characteristics of insurgent groups such as a loose control over their 
members better explain civilian victimisation (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). In addition, 
armed conflict rooted in ethnic discrimination occasionally coincides with a systematic 
sexual abuse as observed in Darfur in Sudan and in Bosnia during the recent decades 
(Wood 2006, Olsson and Siba 2009).124 
                                                           
124
 The paragraph is added after the chapter has been published. More detailed discussion as to purposes of 
civilian targeting along the economic and geopolitical dimensions can be found in Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation.  
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Typically, studies of armed conflict report findings in terms of absolute numbers of 
casualties (e.g. counts of civilian fatalities from targeting). However, systematic analysis of 
the proportional effects of weapons and perpetrators on civilians is being increasingly used 
to expand the scope and interpretation of conflict casualty findings, with direct implications 
for human rights, public health, and civilian-protective policies in armed conflict (Coupland 
and Meddings 1999,  Coupland 2001, Taback and Coupland 2005, Hicks and Spagat 2008, 
Hicks et al 2009, Hicks et al. 2011, Cameron, Spagat and Hicks 2009). For example, 
studies of a single conflict (i.e. Iraq War) have measured the proportions of women and 
children among civilian fatalities to identify relatively indiscriminate effects from 
perpetrators’ use of various weapons (Hicks et al 2009, Hicks et al. 2011a), and to identify 
varying effects of civilian targeting by perpetrators using different forms of armed violence 
(Hicks et al. 2011a).  For studies of combatant groups across armed conflicts on an 
international scale, a common problem is that combatant groups are typically aggregated 
together at the country level, or into ‘government’ versus ‘challenger’, despite the fact that 
many conflicts involve multiple warring parties (Shellman, Hatfield and Mills 2010).  The 
disaggregation of findings to particular combatant groups, as in this chapter, allows 
examination of tactics employed at the group-specific level that could otherwise be 
obscured by dynamics at the conflict level (Shellman, Hatfield and Mills 2010, Hultman 
2007). 
Our aim in this chapter was to describe degrees to which combatant groups in 
contemporary human warfare concentrated lethal behaviour into the direct, intentional 
targeting of civilians as opposed to battling armed opponents. To do this, we analysed the 
universe of all 226 formally organised combatant groups that used lethal armed force 
during the calendar years 2002 to 2007. For brevity, we hereafter use the term ‘actor’ to 
describe a formally organised group that was actively involved in an armed conflict that 
resulted in at least 25 fatalities from armed violence in a year (a threshold that includes 
low-to-high intensity armed conflicts). 
Our study contributes new information to the field of armed conflict studies in the 
following ways:  First, we integrated three datasets so that all state (i.e. government) actors 
117 
 
and all non-state (i.e. rebel or clan) actors in armed conflicts globally could be analysed for 
fatalities they caused by targeting civilians and for fatalities from battles in which they were 
involved.  Ours is one of few studies (Wood 2010, Hultman 2007) that statistically 
examines relationships between fatalities from civilian targeting and fatalities from battles.  
Second, we measure fatalities from civilian targeting as a proportion of total direct fatalities 
from armed conflict. To do this, we use the Civilian Targeting Index (CTI), a proportional 
measure that we introduce in this chapter for efficient measurement and communication of 
degrees to which actors in armed conflict concentrate lethal behaviour into the direct, 
intentional targeting of civilians as opposed to battling armed opponents. Civilian targeting 
has been prohibited by formalised social norms on a global scale since the 1949 Fourth 
Geneva Convention, and by subsequent Associated Protocols I and II (Hicks and Spagat 
2008, International Committee of the Red Cross 2010), making CTI outcomes relevant to 
international humanitarian law and to studies of social aggression and transgression. Third, 
our data-based attribution of civilian targeting to named, combatant groups uses a 
consistent methodology to identify the degree to which specific actors exercised restraint vs. 
committed civilian targeting.  Fourth, we analyse the universe of actors participating in a 
recent period of armed conflict to reveal larger patterns of lethal behaviour in armed 
competition, specifically in regard to civilian targeting, in real-world environments of 
contemporary warfare. This addresses an identified need for more studies to use empirical 
data from real societies and natural settings to complement studies of competition, 
cooperation and conflict based on theoretical and laboratory modelling (West, Griffin and 
Gardner 2007a, Rockenback and Milinski 2009).    
 
3.2. Data Summary and Regression Results  
3.2.1. Civilian Targeting by Specific Actors 
Using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), we identified all 226 formally 
organised armed actors participating in international or civil armed conflicts in 2002-2007: 
43 state actors and 183 non-state actors. Our findings for specific actors are shown in 
Figure 3-1 and Table 3-A-1 in appendix. The x axis of Figure 3-1 shows ‘total fatalities 
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associated with an actor’ (on logarithmic scale), calculated as the number of civilians the 
actor killed by direct, intentional targeting plus the number of civilians and combatants 
killed in battles in which the actor was involved. The y axis of Figure 3-1 shows the degree 
to which an actor concentrated lethal behaviour into targeting civilians rather than battling 
opponents in terms of its Civilian Targeting Index. The Civilian Targeting Index (CTI) is 
the proportion of total fatalities that consists of civilians killed by the actor’s intentional 
targeting (the proportion of total fatalities from battles in which the actor was involved is its 
reciprocal).  In terms of global social norms formalised in laws of war, which are 
international humanitarian laws and customary standards that delineate the proper treatment 
of civilians in armed conflict (Hicks and Spagat 2008, International Committee of the Red 
Cross 2010),125 the best possible CTI value is 0 and the worst possible CTI value is 100. 
Actors whose CTI values were 100, meaning that 100% of associated fatalities were 
from their direct targeting of civilians, are found in the upper left quadrant of Figure 3-1. 
Our data indicate that actors with CTIs of 100 were all associated with cumulative total 
fatalities numbering fewer than 500 during the 2002-2007 time period. Nine percent (4/43) 
of state actors and 11% (21/183) of non-state actors used civilian targeting as their sole 
form of lethal behaviour in conflict (CTI = 100). Actors whose high rates of civilian 
targeting contributed to some of the bloodiest conflicts in 2002-2007 are found in the upper 
right quadrant of Figure 3-1. For example, the CTI of 96 generated by the non-state Front 
des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes (FNI) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
indicates that 96% of fatalities associated with the FNI were unarmed civilians killed by 
intentional FNI targeting and 4% were combatants or civilians killed in battles between the 
FNI and an armed opponent. Another non-state group, the Janjaweed, had a CTI of 93: 93% 
of its associated fatalities were unarmed civilians killed by Janjaweed targeting and 7% 
were combatants or civilians killed in battles between the Janjaweed and an armed 
opponent. The state actor Sudan had a CTI of 37 indicating that over one-third of the 
14,145 direct fatalities associated with Sudan’s government during 2002-2007 were 
unarmed civilians killed by the government’s direct, intentional targeting. 
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 The Geneva Conventions is one of the examples. 
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The overall mean CTI for all 226 actors was 18 (95% CI: 13 to 22).  Mean CTIs for 
all state actors (N=43) and all non-state actors (N=183) did not differ significantly (Mean 
state CTI=19, 95% CI 10 to 29. Mean non-state CTI=17, 95% CI 12 to 22). Mean CTIs by 
region did not differ significantly, as suggested by the heavily overlapping 95% CIs shown 
in Table 3-1.  The regions that had the greatest numbers of actors in armed conflict were 
Sub-Saharan Africa (N=105: 17 state and 88 non-state) and Asia (N=62: 11 state and 51 
non-state).   
3.2.2. Crossing the Line:  Whether Actors Used Restraint or Targeted Civilians 
Overall, 61% of actors (138/226, 95% CI 55% to 67%) refrained from killing civilians 
through intentional direct targeting (CTI=0) and 39% (88/226, 95% CI 33% to 45%) carried 
out some degree of civilian targeting (CTI>0) during 2002-2007. We used bivariate 
analysis followed by multivariate analysis of the following variables available in the UCDP 
datasets of this chapter to examine for factors associated with actors that used civilian 
targeting as opposed to restraint: type of actor (state or non-state); scale of armed conflict 
(in terms of total number of direct associated fatalities); duration of conflict in years; and 
region of actor. 
We first explored relationships between civilian targeting and explanatory variables 
using bivariate analysis. In absolute numbers, more non-state actors than state actors carried 
out civilian targeting (64 vs. 24, respectively, with CTI>0). However, a higher proportion 
of state actors carried out civilian targeting than non-state actors: 56% (24/43) of state 
actors targeted civilians compared to 35% (64/183) of non-state actors. We considered it 
possible that the association of state actors with a higher likelihood of targeting civilians 
was confounded by state involvement in conflicts of greater scale, if scale itself was a 
factor in whether or not actors targeted civilians, because state actors were associated with 
a greater mean number of total associated fatalities than non-state actors (State mean=2,809; 
95% CI 1,495 to 4,123. Non-state mean=708; 95% CI 452 to 963). Table 3-2 shows the 
distribution of state and non-state actors across varying ranges of total associated fatalities:  
The largest proportion of state actors (42%, 18/43) was associated with 1,000-4,999 total 
direct fatalities and the largest proportion of non-state actors (42%, 76/183) was associated 
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with less than 100 total direct fatalities. We also considered it possible that the association 
of state actors with a higher likelihood of targeting civilians was confounded by state 
involvement in conflicts of greater duration, if duration was a factor in whether or not 
actors targeted civilians. For example, proportionally more state actors than non-state actors 
were engaged in armed conflict for a total of six years: 11/43 (26%) of state actors vs. 
17/183 (9%) of non-state actors. Table 3-3 shows the distribution of actors across different 
durations of armed conflict.  Among the total of 226 actors, 47% participated in armed 
conflict for one year or less, and 13% participated in armed conflict for the full six years of 
the study. Regional distributions of actors with no civilian targeting (CTI=0) and civilian 
targeting (CTI>0) are shown in Table 3-1. The region that had the greatest number of actors 
that targeted civilians was Sub-Saharan Africa (N=36). However, the proportion of actors 
that targeted civilians in Sub-Saharan Africa (36/105, 34%) did not differ significantly from 
proportions of actors of other regions that targeted civilians at the 5% level of significance. 
We then carried out multivariate analysis to analyse for independent contributions 
to the binary actor outcome of restraint from targeting civilians (CTI=0) vs. targeting 
civilians (CTI>0) using combinations of the following explanatory variables: total number 
of fatalities associated with the actor in 2002-2007 (indicating scale of armed conflict in 
which the actor was involved); dummy variables for duration of conflict in years (e.g. the 
variable ‘2 years’ is coded 1 if the actor was involved in conflict for 2 years, 0 otherwise); 
dummy variables for region of actor; and the dummy variable ‘state’ (equals 1 if state, 0 if 
non-state).  Table 3-4 shows our logistic regression results.  Values in the columns indicate 
the odds ratio of each explanatory variable. If the odds ratio is greater than 1, the effect on 
the dependent variable is positive. If the odds ratio is between 0 and 1, the effect on the 
dependent variable is negative. When duration of conflict dummies were absent (column 1 
and 4), the variable for total fatalities was statistically significant, indicating that additional 
fatalities were associated with increased odds of an actor having targeted civilians.  
However, with the addition of duration of conflict dummies (column 2, 3, 5 and 6), the 
effect of total fatalities became insignificant, with significance dropping from the 99.9% 
confidence level to the 90% confidence level, while coefficients for the duration of conflict 
had a positive, significant effect on the odds that an actor targeted civilians at some point 
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during armed conflict. For example, in column 2, the odds that an actor targeted civilians 
was 3.16 times higher ((3.16-1)x100=216%) for an actor involved in 3 years of conflict 
than for an actor involved in one year of conflict (the comparator duration). The odds that 
an actor targeted civilians at some point was 7.92 times higher ((7.92-1)x100=692%) for an 
actor involved in 4 years of conflict than for an actor involved in one year of conflict. The 
significant effect of conflict duration in these models may be because most actors in the 
one-year duration group (79%, 84/107) had a CTI of 0. The state vs. non-state dummy and 
the regional dummies never approached statistical significance in these models, suggesting 
that these actor characteristics had no effect on whether or not actors targeted civilians 
when other factors were taken into account. 
In summary, the majority of warring groups (61%, 95% CI 55% to 67%) refrained 
from intentional, direct civilian targeting during the period of our study. When possible 
contributors to civilian targeting were examined together in multivariate analysis, a group’s 
involvement in armed conflict for three years or more was associated with an increase in its 
likelihood of having targeted civilians at some point. These findings do not, however, 
provide information on factors that may have affected how much civilian targeting was 
carried out by armed groups once they targeted civilians.  
3.2.3. Once the Line is Crossed:  Intensity of Civilian Targeting 
We examined degrees of civilian targeting by the 88 actors that targeted civilians during 
2002-2007, and factors that may have affected how much these actors concentrated lethal 
force onto targeting civilians as opposed to battling opponents. The mean CTI for all 88 
actors that targeted civilians (CTI>0) was 45 (95% CI 37 to 54). There was no statistically 
significant difference between the mean CTIs of state actors that targeted civilians (N=24) 
and non-state actors that targeted civilians (N=64) (State mean CTI = 35, 95% CI 20 to 49.  
Non-state mean CTI = 49, 95% CI 39 to 60, p=0.12). Regional analysis of mean CTIs for 
actors that targeted civilians showed no statistically significant difference by region, as 
suggested by the overlapping 95% CIs shown in Table 3-5. 
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We fit ordinary least squares linear regressions to actors that targeted civilians to 
examine whether proportionate levels of civilian targeting (i.e. concentration on civilian 
targeting) changed with total numbers of associated war fatalities. The total fatalities 
associated with an actor consisted of civilian fatalities from the actor’s direct, deliberate 
targeting plus civilian and combatant fatalities from battles in which the actor was involved.   
A linear regression for all 88 actors that targeted civilians showed a statistically 
significant correlation for actors associated with greater total numbers of fatalities (i.e. 
involved in a greater scale of armed conflict) to have caused lower proportions of these 
fatalities by civilian targeting, with a slope coefficient of -39.1 (95% CI -46.1 to -32.2, t=-
11.2, p < 0.001). We fit separate linear regressions, shown in Figure 3-1, to state actors and 
non-state actors that carried out civilian targeting to determine whether they differed in 
relationships between their degree of civilian targeting and their total associated fatalities.  
The 24 state actors that targeted civilians had a statistically significant slope coefficient of -
35.8 (95% CI -47.0 to -24.5, t=-6.6, p<0.001). The 64 non-state actors that targeted 
civilians had a statistically significant slope coefficient of -40.2 (95% CI -49.3 to -31.2, t=-
8.9, p < 0.001). The difference between the slope coefficients of state actors and non-state 
actors was not statistically significant, indicating that among actors that targeted civilians, 
state and non-state actors shared the same quantified dynamic for causing decreasing 
proportions of civilian-targeted fatalities as they were involved in increasing scales of total 
armed conflict fatalities. To put it another way, actors that were associated with lower 
numbers of battle fatalities tended to focus a greater proportion of their lethal behaviour 
onto targeting civilians, with no difference between rebel and government actors. 
We then tested whether the finding of decreased concentration on civilian targeting 
by actors involved in greater scales of conflict held when other explanatory variables were 
added. Simple linear regressions for the explanatory variable of the log of total fatalities are 
shown in column 1 (for all actors with CTI>0), column 5 (for state actors with CTI>0), and 
column 8 (for non-state actors with CTI>0) of Table 3-6. Table 3-6 also shows the effect of 
adding combinations of the following independent variables in ordinary least squares 
multiple regressions: dummy variables for duration of conflict in years; dummy variables 
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for region of actor; and the dummy variable ‘state’ (equals 1 if state, 0 if non-state).  
Inclusion of the dummy variables did not improve the goodness of fit of the regression 
model, as seen by the adjusted r-square values. In all specifications for actors that carried 
out some degree of civilian targeting, the intensity of civilian targeting was unaffected by 
actors’ region or by actors being state vs. non-state. In specifications for all actors that 
carried out civilian targeting, duration of conflict in years was a significant factor: actors 
involved in conflict for three or more years had lower CTI values than actors involved in 
conflict for one year (the comparator). This was because actors participating in one year of 
conflict tended to be involved with smaller total numbers of fatalities and to have higher 
CTI values than actors participating in longer periods of conflict. Finally, and importantly, 
although the magnitude of the coefficient of logged total fatalities was somewhat decreased 
when duration of conflict was accounted for, the effect of total fatalities on actors’ CTI 
values remained robust, with a negative direction and high statistical significance.   
3.2.4. Civilian Targeting by Actors in Prolonged Armed Conflict 
We analysed civilian targeting by actors that were involved in prolonged armed conflict for 
the maximum duration covered by our dataset: six years. Figure 3-2 shows annual CTI 
values for the 29 actors in prolonged armed conflict. We included the U.S. because it was 
involved in armed conflict for six years in total: as a joint actor with the U.K. and Australia 
against Iraq in 2003, and as an individual actor during the five years of 2002 and 2004-
2007 in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan (involving U.S. drone attacks), and Saudi Arabia (in 
attacks on, and by, representatives of the U.S.). As shown in Figure 3-2, eight actors 
refrained from any intentional, direct targeting of civilians throughout prolonged conflict, 
maintaining a CTI of 0. Twenty-one actors targeted civilians in at least one of the six years. 
We analysed for factors that influenced whether or not actors crossed the line into 
civilian targeting over the course of prolonged conflict. Because our data included actors’ 
CTIs over a series of six years, we transformed the data into a panel structure for panel data 
analysis, which confers regression analysis with the capacity to examine cross-sectional 
data (e.g. on actors’ behaviour) over time. Table 3-7 shows our random effect logit 
regressions for independent contributions to the binary dependent variable of an actor 
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targeting civilians (CTI>0), as opposed to exercising restraint from targeting civilians 
(CTI=0). We analysed using combinations of the following explanatory variables: ‘year’ to 
identify the time trend; total fatalities associated with the actor within the year (indicating 
scale of armed conflict within the year); dummy variables for region; and the dummy 
variable ‘state’ (equals 1 if state, 0 if non-state). We confirmed our random effect logit 
regression results using random effect probit regressions for robustness checks and 
confirmed that the direction and the significance of coefficients for each variable remained 
the same (available upon request). 
Specification 1 to 3 of Table 3-7 show results for all 29 actors involved in 
prolonged armed conflict. Specification 1 is a simple regression model that contains the 
time variable (year) as a single explanatory variable. The odds ratio (.7595) implies that 
each additional year was associated with a decrease in the odds of targeting civilians of 
24.05% ((1-.7595)*100=24.05%).  For specification 2 and 3, we extended specification 1 
by including total fatalities within the year, the 4 region dummies, and the state dummy. 
The following variables had no significant effect on whether an actor targeted civilians vs. 
exercised restraint: total fatalities within a year, the actor’s region, or being a state vs. non-
state actor.  The time variable, however, remained significant. Holding all other factors 
fixed, each additional year was associated with a decrease in the odds of targeting civilians 
of about 24%.  Specification 4 to 6 of Table 3-7 focus on the 21 actors in prolonged conflict 
that targeted civilians in at least one year: for these actors, the time effect continued to be 
robust, with similarly decreased odds of targeting civilians with each additional year. 
However, regional effects of actors from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Americas became 
significantly associated with increased odds of targeting civilians in this subgroup of actors. 
We next analysed for factors that affected the degree to which actors in prolonged 
conflict targeted civilians. Figure 3-2 gives the impression that there was no prevailing 
pattern for increased or decreased civilian targeting over time.  We used the random effects 
model of panel regression because Hausman test results (unreported) indicated that this was 
a consistent, more efficient model for our data. Table 3-8 shows panel regressions for 
relationships between the continuous, dependent variable of an actor’s CTI and explanatory 
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variables of: the common log of total fatalities within a given year; time dummy variables 
D2003 to D2007 to identify a specific year effect (e.g. D2003 equals 1 if the observation is 
from 2003, 0 if otherwise); dummy variables for region; and the dummy variable ‘state’.   
The only statistically significant variable was the SSA dummy, indicating that the CTI 
values of actors fighting prolonged conflicts in Sub-Saharan African countries were higher 
than those fighting prolonged conflicts in Europe (the comparator region). We found no 
statistically significant tendency for actors in prolonged conflict to increase or decrease 
their degree of civilian targeting over time, with total fatalities within a given year, or with 
state vs. non-state classification of the actor, even when actors that never targeted civilians 
were excluded from the analysis. 
In summary, our findings on the 29 actors involved in prolonged conflict indicate 
that these actors were more likely to completely refrain from civilian targeting (i.e. to have 
CTI=0) in later years of conflict than in earlier years. However, their degree of 
concentration of lethal behaviour into targeting civilians as opposed to battling opponents 
(i.e. their actual CTI value) showed no overall pattern of decrease or increase over time, 
due to high variability in the behaviour of specific actors over the course of prolonged 
conflict.  
 
3.3. Discussion 
Our study shows the degree to which specific, formally organised actors in armed conflict 
concentrated their lethal behaviour into intentionally targeting civilians as opposed to 
engaging in battles during 2002-2007. We found four significant behavioural patterns in 
contemporary warfare. First, the majority (61%) of all formally organised actors in armed 
conflict during 2002-2007 refrained from killing civilians in deliberate, direct targeting.  
Compared to our finding, a study of actors in interstate wars during 1900-2003 found that 
just under half refrained from killing civilians in targeting (Valentino, Huth and Croco 
2006). This study’s methodology differed from ours by excluding actors in intrastate 
conflicts (e.g. civil wars), by including indirect (nonviolent) deaths and by requiring at least 
1,000 fatalities per year for inclusion (we require at least 25 fatalities per year for inclusion).  
126 
 
We expect that if the study included low-intensity conflicts and intrastate conflicts 
involving non-state actors, the percentage of actors refraining from civilian targeting would 
be closer to ours, as we show (in Table 3-3) that state actors tend to be involved in conflicts 
of longer duration, which is itself associated with a greater likelihood of carrying out some 
degree of civilian targeting. This takes us to our next point. 
Second, controlling for other variables, actors were more likely to have carried out 
some degree of civilian targeting, as opposed to none, if they participated in armed conflict 
for three or more years rather than for one year. In regard to this finding, we speculate that 
the longer the duration, the more likely that at least some combatants in an actor’s armed 
forces will at some point carry out civilian targeting, which would move the actor from the 
‘restraint’ (CTI=0) to the ‘targeting’ (CTI>0) category. Three possible reasons for an 
actor’s movement from ‘restraint’ to ‘targeting’ categories include: i) The actor does not 
control troops adequately for complete enforcement of a culture of restraint from targeting 
civilians – complete enforcement requires an increasing expenditure of resources to prevent 
civilian targeting as the actor has more troops to control for a longer time; ii) The actor has 
a combat culture of disregard for civilians and expends no resources on preventing civilian 
targeting; and iii) The actor channels resources into a strategy of targeting civilians.  
Because of the multiple, in some cases nonspecific, factors that can contribute to an actor 
carrying out some degree of civilian targeting as opposed to none, use in quantitative 
conflict studies of a binary outcome of civilian targeting vs. no civilian targeting might not 
be highly productive in examining contributors to civilian targeting. However, because 
maintaining a CTI of 0 indicates ongoing resource expenditure, and a more specific, 
nonrandom element of choice, concentrating quantitative and qualitative research on actors 
that refrain from civilian targeting in war may identify promising avenues for increasing or 
supporting civilian-protective behaviour in war. 
Our third main finding focuses on the actors that targeted civilians rather than 
maintaining restraint from civilian targeting. Once actors targeted civilians, what were the 
factors that affected the degree to which they concentrated lethal behaviour into 
intentionally targeting civilians? In both simple and multiple regressions, we found that 
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among actors that targeted civilians, those that engaged in greater scales of armed conflict 
concentrated less of their lethal behaviour into civilian targeting and more into involvement 
with battle fatalities. Conversely, those that engaged in lesser scales of armed conflict 
concentrated more of their lethal behaviour into civilian targeting and less into involvement 
with battle fatalities. Also, among actors that targeted civilians, those that were involved in 
conflict for total durations of three or more years concentrated less of their lethal behaviour 
into civilian targeting than those involved in conflict for one year or less. This was because 
the actors that targeted civilians during one year or less of conflict tended to be involved 
with smaller total numbers of fatalities and to have higher CTI values than actors 
participating in longer periods of conflict. These findings suggest that warring groups that 
targeted civilians during small-scale conflicts of brief duration tended to concentrate more 
of their lethal behaviour into targeting civilians than warring groups that targeted civilians 
during larger-scale conflicts of moderate or long duration. 
Fourth, when factors of scale of conflict and duration of conflict were accounted for, 
an actor’s likelihood and degree of targeting civilians was unaffected by whether it was a 
state or a non-state group. The absolute number of non-state (rebel) actors that targeted 
civilians (N=64) was higher than the number of state actors that targeted civilians (N=24) 
only because more non-state actors than state actors participated in armed conflict (183 vs. 
43, respectively). 
We also examined civilian targeting over the course of consecutive years in the 
subset of 29 actors that were involved in prolonged conflict of six years duration in 2002-
2007. Controlling for other variables in panel data analysis to examine cross-sectional data 
on actors’ CTIs over time, we found that actors in prolonged conflict were more likely to 
refrain from civilian targeting (with a CTI=0) in later years of conflict than in early years.  
Nevertheless, for actors in protracted conflict, their degree of concentration on targeting 
civilians as opposed to battling opponents (i.e. their actual CTI value) showed no overall 
pattern of decrease or increase over time, due to high variability in the behaviour of specific 
actors over the course of prolonged conflict. The only clear association was that CTI values 
for sub-Saharan African actors tended to be higher than for other regions. In earlier 
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analyses of all 226 actors, we analysed for the variable of ‘total fatalities summed for all 
years of conflict’. This variable was not examined for association with actors’ CTI values 
tracked over consecutive years of prolonged conflict, since it lacks the time-specific 
element. Our analyses for ‘all actors’ and for ‘actors in prolonged conflict’ examine 
different ‘total fatality-time’ dynamics. For actors in prolonged conflict we used the fatality 
measure of ‘total fatalities within the given year’. There was no evidence for this subset of 
29 actors in prolonged conflict that there was any association between high total fatalities 
within a given year of conflict and their CTI value for that year, although our failure to find 
this could be a consequence of small sample size and numerous explanatory variables.  
Analysis for longer, or different, periods of time than our study could show different results. 
As our findings show, combatants’ adherence to global social norms against 
targeting civilians can be quantified to identify the worst offenders in contemporary warfare, 
to show variance between actors, and to identify broad patterns of human behaviour in 
armed conflict. Civilian Targeting Index (CTI) outcomes that measure the proportional 
degree to which actors concentrate lethal behaviour into targeting civilians may be more 
informative than binary outcomes that indicate targeting vs. restraint for indicating probable 
cases of systematic, strategic civilian targeting. Actors whose total fatalities from armed 
conflict were caused in large part by their intentional targeting of civilians, as indicated by 
high CTI values in this chapter, can be considered more likely to have used civilian 
targeting as a deliberate, systematic strategy in armed conflict, especially if associated with 
high absolute numbers of fatalities (Hicks and Spagat 2008, Hicks et al. 2009). 
Although we refer to a variety of studies across disciplines to discuss our findings, a 
particular, though rough, analogy can be made between a form of microbial warfare and our 
findings on human warfare. Many types of bacteria use chemical weapons when fighting in 
competition against other bacteria to parasitise a host, some releasing their bacteriocins 
(bacteriocidal toxins) by suicidal self-explosion to kill competitors (Gardner, West and 
Buckling 2004, West and Gardner 2010, Inglis et al. 2009, Hawlena et al. 2010, Vigneux et 
al. 2008, Massey, Buckling and Ffrench-Constant 2004). This is an example of ‘spiteful 
behaviour’ in nature, which is harmful to both the actor (e.g. the bacterial suicide attacker) 
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and the recipient (e.g. the targeted bacterial opponent) (Gardner, West and Buckling 2004, 
West and Gardner 2010, Inglis et al. 2009, Hawlena et al. 2010). A parasitic bacteria’s 
harm to the host is ‘selfish behaviour’, being beneficial to the actor (e.g. the parasite) and 
harmful to the recipient (e.g. the weakened or killed host) (West and Gardner 2010). A 
civilian population in war is comparable to a parasitised host in that it possesses a finite 
resource - the disputed territory - that opposing actors are competing to dominate and use.  
Warring actors can attempt to shift the dynamics of this competition in their favour by 
focusing their energies onto controlling or eliminating the civilian population, or on 
controlling or eliminating their opponent, by lethal force. In addition to competing for 
territory, armed groups compete, sometimes using lethal coercion, to gain other resources 
of the civilian population: food, information, logistical support and political support. We 
believe that our study’s finding that warring actors concentrate less on killing civilians if 
they are involved in more lethal battles against armed opponents is analogous to the 
decreasing virulence to host organisms found as competing parasitic bacteria kill each other 
more in direct battles using bacteriocins (Gardner, West and Buckling 2004, West and 
Gardner 2010, Inglis et al. 2009, Vigneux et al. 2008, Massey, Buckling and Ffrench-
Constant 2004). 
Cooperative behaviour exists at many levels in nature (West, Griffin and Gardner 
2007a) and has been shown to be increased by enforcement through punishment, policing 
and sanctions in humans, meerkats, fish, social insects, bacteria and plants (West, Griffin 
and Gardner 2007a, Rockenback and Milinski 2009, Fehr and Gachter 2002, Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2004, West, Griffin and Gardner 2007b, Herrmann, Thoni and Gachter 2008).  
One of the best-known examples of cooperation in humans is warfare, in which soldiers 
place themselves at risk of injury or death in an activity that benefits others126 (analogous to 
the ‘spiteful’ behaviour of bacteriocin-producing bacteria).127 Once actors are at war, the 
exercise of restraint to comply with global social norms (e.g. laws of war) requires an 
additional level of cooperation. For example, in an asymmetric, irregularly-fought war in 
which Side A soldiers disguise themselves as civilians, a Side B soldier could likely 
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decrease his or her individual risk by killing all those encountered who look like civilians.  
Not only do Side B soldiers place themselves at risk by directly battling Side A soldiers, 
they accept additional risk when they do not target the civilian population that could 
include or support hidden Side A soldiers. In our study, it is probable that higher levels of 
cooperation, resources and maintenance of discipline (i.e. enforcement) were required to 
ensure that all soldiers of a combatant group refrained from targeting civilians to result in 
actors with CTIs of 0. 
On a social level, it may be that actors that refrain from civilian targeting are 
responding to historically recent global social norms that prohibit the targeting of civilians, 
formalised in treaties and customary standards that constitute contemporary laws of war 
(Hicks and Spagat 2008, Slim 2007, Walzer 1977), whereas the regression lines in Figure 
3-1 represent trends in lethal behaviour of actors that operate according to cost-benefit 
considerations in which cooperation with, or punishments against breaching, global norms 
against civilian targeting have, or are considered to have, little effect on the actor’s success.  
It would be of interest to examine whether the percentage of actors that refrain from 
civilian targeting, and the regression slope for actors that carry out civilian targeting (Figure 
3-1), are different for conflicts fought before and after the creation of international norms 
against civilian targeting such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Replication studies 
using comparable inclusion criteria and extending beyond our study’s timeframe will be 
valuable to test our findings, as we only show actors’ civilian targeting during 2002-2007, 
based on the UCDP data available at the time of our study. 
The proportion of fatalities caused by civilian targeting may be affected by different 
factors and dynamics than those affecting the absolute number of civilians killed in 
targeting.  For example, although studies of state actors have suggested that longer duration 
of conflict is associated with actors killing greater absolute numbers of civilians (Downes 
2008, Valentino, Huth and Croco 2006), this is compatible with findings from our study, 
which differs by focusing on the proportion of total fatalities caused by civilian targeting in 
order to quantify an actor’s concentration of its efforts into civilian targeting as opposed to 
engaging in battles. Absolute numbers of civilians killed by targeting can be calculated 
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from our data by applying the actor’s CTI value (a proportion) to the total fatalities 
associated with the actor. However, we believe that a distinctive value of our study is its 
exposure of behavioural patterns of targeting civilians in war through a focus on 
proportional analyses. 
Other studies in the fields of social sciences, natural sciences, and conflict studies 
suggest that the following additional variables will be important to examine in future 
research on the dynamics of groups’ concentration on civilian targeting vs. battling 
opponents:  regime type (Downes 2008, Hultman 2007, Wood 2010); spatial distribution 
(Gardner, West and Buckling 2004, Inglis et al. 2009, Massey, Buckling and Ffrench-
Constant 2004); actors’ reasons, costs and resources for war (Downes 2008, Valentino, 
Huth and Croco 2006, Wood 2010, Hultman 2007, Hultman 2009, Vargas 2009, Kalyvas 
2006); degree of relatedness between opposing actors and between actors and civilians 
(Villarreal 2008, Gardner, West and Buckling 2004, West and Gardner 2010, Vigneux et al. 
2008, Hultman 2009); and behaviour of the civilian population (Sagarin et al. 2010, 
Villarreal 2008, Kalyvas 2006). Civilian populations may tolerate or mount resistance 
against use of their resources or territory by warring actors and may do so in complex ways 
that vary with actors and their circumstances (Kalyvas 2006), similar to a parasitised host 
immune system interacting with, or reacting against, pathogens (Sagarin et al. 2010, 
Villarreal 2008). 
Eck and Hultman (2007), who also use the UCDP one-sided violence dataset, find 
that the regime type of the country in which actors target civilians is associated with 
numbers of civilians killed by targeting, with higher numbers of targeted civilian fatalities 
in autocratic and democratic countries and lower numbers in semi-democracies. This 
pattern is driven by autocratic state actors killing greater numbers of civilians by targeting 
within their countries and by non-state actors killing greater numbers of civilians by 
targeting in democratic countries (Eck and Hultman 2007, Wood 2010). Findings from 
studies that are limited to mass killings and genocide (e.g. Wayman and Tago 2010, 
Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004); that exclude actors involved in non-state 
conflicts (e.g. Downes 2008, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004); that combine direct and 
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indirect deaths (e.g. Downes 2008, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004); or that combine civilian 
fatalities from both targeted and indiscriminate violence (e.g. Downes 2008) may be 
suggestive but are not directly applicable to this and other studies that examine direct, 
targeted fatalities from violence of low-to-high intensity involving all conflict actors (Eck 
and Hultman 2007, Human Security Report Project 2010, Wood 2010). 
Actors’ reasons, costs or resources for war can affect civilian targeting (Downes 
2008, Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004, Wood 2010, Hultman 2007, Hultman 2009, 
Vargas 2009, Kalyvas 2006). Actors’ resources in war can include numbers and effective 
capacity of soldiers; numbers and effective capacity of weapons; financial resources; 
political power; control of territory; and civilian support. The dynamics of civilian targeting 
can be affected by both absolute and relative resources of actors in a conflict. For example, 
Vargas (2009) finds empirical support from data on the Colombian civil war for his model 
predicting that an actor that comes into power kills more civilians in territories where its 
enemy is powerful, possibly to coerce a shift in civilian support. Vargas’s study is one of 
many that address the proposal by Kalyvas (2006) that actors in civil wars target civilians 
as a group (which he calls ‘indiscriminate’ violence) more in territories that are controlled 
solidly by their opponent and that actors use personalised targeting of individual civilians 
(called ‘selective’ violence) more in territories where they have partial but not complete 
control, in order to shift civilian support from opponents. 
Rather than focusing on where actors target civilians based on relative control over 
territory (Kalyvas 2006), Hultman (2007) focuses on when actors target civilians, and how 
many they kill, based on their strength relative to armed opponents on the battlefield. Her 
study of civilian targeting by 60 rebel (non-state) actors over 2002-2004, showed that rebels 
killed greater numbers of civilians in targeting after losing more rebel fighters in battles, 
and after killing fewer government (state) fighters in battles. In a similar study of 212 non-
state groups in conflict with state actors in 1989-2004, Wood (2010) measured relative 
strength of opposing actors as the ratio of numbers of rebel troops to government troops 
and found that weaker rebel actors, relative to their government opponents, killed higher 
numbers of civilians by targeting, with an additional effect that weaker rebels further 
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increased civilian targeting if the state actor also targeted civilians. Although civilian 
targeting by state actors was not measured as an outcome in these studies (Wood 2010, 
Hultman 2007),  their primary finding, which Hultman summarises as “rebel violence 
against civilians is, like terrorism, the weapon of the weak” (Hultman 2007, pp. 218), 
relates closely to our finding that the less that actors were associated with battlefield 
fatalities, and the shorter they fought, the more that they concentrated lethal force onto 
targeting civilians; a finding that could be consistent with the explanation of battlefield 
weakness of actors. Although our findings show that state and non-state actors had the 
same statistical relationship between concentration on civilian targeting and total conflict 
fatalities, further research is needed to determine whether battlefield weakness can explain 
high concentrations of civilian targeting by state actors. 
Hultman (2007, 2009) speculates that weak rebels target civilians as an alternative 
strategy to fighting battles because it is a relatively cheap and easy way to impose extra 
political and military costs on its state opponent, and in order to signal the rebel’s power 
and the state’s impotence in settings off the battlefield. The signalling function of civilian 
targeting by weak rebel actors has been described in anthropological research on civilian 
targeting by rebels in Sierra Leone and Liberia (Hoffman 2004). As a Sierra Leonean 
commander summarised: 
That (targeting civilians) is one of the major tools in guerrilla warfare. Because when 
the guerrilla is fighting, he is less equipped, he has less manpower. He’s going to use 
tactics to put fear into the civilian populace and send the signal to the government 
that it can’t protect its people…It is one of the tools the guerrilla uses. Fear and 
intimidation. (Hoffman 2004, pp. 222) 
Human actors are particularly able to fine-tune cooperative behaviours (e.g. warfare) 
quickly in response to proximate factors affecting the direct benefit of cooperation during 
competition at local and global levels (West, Griffin and Gardner 2007b). Local cultural 
constructions regarding the nature of political power have been described as predominant 
factors in non-state actors’ civilian targeting, even while simultaneously these actors vie for 
political and symbolic power in the global context of armed conflicts by using the global 
media (Hoffman 2004). International research shows wide variation in local social norms 
for cooperation, punishment and response to punishment across societies with different 
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cultures, social histories and strength of rule of law (Herrmann, Thoni, Gachter 2008).  
Although much of the research we describe, including our own, points to broad patterns of 
behaviour regarding targeting civilians, local contexts of meaning (e.g. what is ‘power’ or 
‘success’ in a conflict) may interact with global social norms to affect the behaviour of 
specific human actors (Herrmann, Thoni, Gachter 2008, Hoffman 2004); affecting social 
norms, costs and benefits within the context where tactics are used, and affecting whether 
actors depart from general trends to become outliers with unusually low or unusually high 
levels of concentrating lethal behaviour into the deliberate targeting of civilians during 
armed conflict.    
 
3.4. Materials and Methods 
To create the dataset used for our study, in which all formally organised state and non-state 
actors participating in international and civil armed conflicts are represented, we combined 
three datasets compiled by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) for their 
overlapping periods of 2002-2007: the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset v. 1.3 1989-
2007128 for civilian targeting by state and non-state actors, the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths 
Dataset v. 5 2002-2007129 for fatalities from battles involving at least one state actor, and 
the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v. 2.1 2002-2007130 for battle-related deaths from 
battles between two non-state actors. Our data describe actors that were associated with at 
least 25 fatalities, as UCDP requires a minimum of 25 fatalities in a year for an actor to be 
included in a UCDP dataset; a low threshold that allow inclusion of the low-intensity 
conflicts in our data.  In regard to civilian targeting specifically, the inclusion of low-
intensity conflict is in contrast to datasets that predated the UCDP one-sided violence 
dataset and included only mass killings or genocide (Eck and Hultman 2007).  
UCDP produces ‘Best’, ‘Low’ and ‘High’ estimates of deaths based on assessment 
by human coders of data from a wide range of open-source, independent sources: the media, 
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NGOs (non-governmental organisations), governments, international agencies, truth 
commissions, and academic reports. Best estimates are based on UCDP coders’ evaluation 
of the sources’ credibility and tend to be conservative (Eck and Hultman 2007, Sundberg 
2009). We used UCDP Best estimates to provide a systematically derived baseline estimate 
of fatalities. This baseline is expected to undercount deaths to some degree because some 
deaths will always go unreported (Eck and Hultman 2007, Sundberg 2009). To date, 
systematic studies have not been done to determine if civilians killed by targeting are any 
more, or less, likely to have their fatalities included in the UCDP data than fatalities of 
civilians and combatants killed in battles, which would be the kind of bias that could affect 
our proportional CTI analysis.  We chose to use UCDP Best estimates because they are 
considered to provide a confident lower bound for the analysis of trends (Eck and Hultman 
2007, Sundberg 2009), for which conservative and consistent coding practices are critical, 
and because they are used in key, relevant UCDP data analyses in the literature (Eck and 
Hultman 2007, Human Security Report Project 2010). 
What we call ‘civilian targeting’ in this chapter is termed ‘one-sided violence’ by 
UCDP,131  and is defined as the direct and intentional (also called deliberate) killing of 
civilians by use of armed force (Eck and Hultman 2007). UCDP’s one-sided violence 
includes acts such as genocide, terrorist attacks on civilians (but not on government or 
military targets), mass executions and individual extrajudicial executions (except for 
extrajudicial killings in a government prison or facility). One-sided violence does not 
include indirect deaths from conflict, unintentional (also called ‘collateral’) civilian deaths, 
or deaths from disregard for civilians when actors attack each other (e.g. in indiscriminate 
violence during battles). Our analysis includes only formally organised armed groups 
because the available version of the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset excluded violence 
by loosely organised groups such as some clans, tribes and ethnic groups.132 
We calculated ‘total fatalities associated with an actor’ as all UCDP’s ‘one-sided 
violence’ fatalities by the actor,133 plus all UCDP ‘battle-deaths’ from battles involving a 
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state actor in which the actor was involved134 plus all battle deaths from battles involving 
only non-state actors in which the actor was involved.135 In simpler terms, we calculated 
‘total fatalities associated with an actor’ as the number of civilians the actor killed by direct, 
deliberate targeting plus the number of civilians and combatants killed in battles involving 
the actor.  UCDP ‘battle-deaths’ are associated with each actor involved in the battle and 
combine civilian and military fatalities in battle because many battle data do not attribute 
deaths to specific actors or distinguish civilian from combatant deaths. UCDP battle-related 
deaths are all fatalities – military and civilian – directly related to combat between two 
military actors (UCDP 2009c, Sundberg 2009). Battle-related deaths include fatalities from 
traditional battlefield fighting; from guerrilla activities such as hit-and-run attacks or 
ambushes; and from bombardments of military bases, cities or villages: as long as the 
intended targets are either military actors or representatives of the actors. 
UCDP battle-related deaths include both indiscriminate and unintentional 
(‘collateral’) deaths of civilians. The killing of civilians in indiscriminate warfare, in which 
actors do not distinguish between civilians and opponent combatants, is a form of lethal 
behaviour which is distinct from the targeting of civilians, but which is also prohibited 
under international humanitarian laws and customary standards (Hicks and Spagat 2008, 
International Committee of the Red Cross 2010). Both indiscriminate and unintentional 
deaths of civilians are important on moral and social grounds, and can have substantial 
quantitative impact in terms of fatalities. An actor could refrain from intentionally targeting 
civilians, yet exact an unacceptably high toll on civilians in terms of the absolute number or 
proportion of civilian deaths among battle deaths. Other studies would be needed to 
examine the dynamics of actors inflicting indiscriminate or unintentional civilian fatalities, 
which are difficult to distinguish in practice in compiling conflict data, and which may 
differ from the dynamics we find for civilian targeting. 
We calculated the ‘Civilian Targeting Index’ as a proportion:  the number of 
civilians killed in direct targeting by the actor, divided by the total fatalities associated with 
the actor. To the extent that battle-deaths constitute the total associated fatalities of an actor, 
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total associated fatalities of an actor overlap with total associated fatalities of other actors 
involved in those battles. This does not, however, confound our CTI findings, which are 
civilians killed by targeting as a proportion of the total fatalities associated with an actor. 
We show the following data for each of the 226 specific actors in Table 3-A-1: 
Actor name; Civilian Targeting Index (CTI); rank by CTI from worst (highest CTI=100) to 
best (lowest CTI = 0), total associated fatalities, and rank by total associated fatalities.   
Actors are identified in the dataset more than once if they acted alone and jointly. For 
example, the US is shown as a sole actor and as a joint actor with the UK and Australia in 
Iraq in 2003. Due to UCDP coding procedures established before the period of this chapter, 
there are three actors whose involvement in fatalities is recorded under partner actors when 
acting in cooperation: ‘Janjaweed’ results are for the Janjaweed acting alone, while the 
Janjaweed acting with the Sudanese government is coded under ‘Sudan’. ‘US’ results are 
for the US acting alone, while the US acting with Iraq or Afghanistan governments is coded 
under ‘Iraq’ or ‘Afghanistan’, respectively. ‘US/UK/Australia’ results are for 
US/UK/Australia acting alone, while US/UK/Australia acting with Iraq’s government is 
coded under ‘Iraq’. 
Fatalities are not included in the UCDP conflict dataset if they cannot be associated 
with any actor (e.g. dead bodies recovered on a street). This stringent requirement of the 
UCDP coding process means that civilian targeting findings from our dataset can be 
understood to reflect civilian targeting by combatant groups only, without inclusion of 
fatalities resulting from criminal activity from noncombatants in the conflict environment.  
Because the perpetrator of civilian targeting must be identified in order for the fatality to be 
included in the UCDP one-sided violence dataset (Human Security Report Project 2010), 
specific counts of numbers of fatalities from civilian targeting derived from our data should 
be considered with caution, as they lack the robustness of the broad, proportional trends 
that we present in our findings. Our data describe actors associated with conflict fatalities 
during 2002-2007 only: Civilian targeting findings for specific actors could differ 
substantially depending on the time period covered. 
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The UCDP’s data collection methodology of relying on secondary sources (the 
media, NGOs, governments, international agencies, and academic reports) for information 
on violent fatalities has the potential to introduce biases arising from how these sources 
gather and publish their information. Kalyvas (2006) has described how partisan bias and 
various forms of urban bias can affect fatality reporting by all these types of sources.  
However, studies that examine conflict coverage bias using substantial datasets have been 
few, and older studies of media coverage of violence cannot reflect technological advances 
that have changed data-gathering capacities for recent armed conflicts. One study found 
that international news articles covering civil wars in 1992-1999 very slightly increased as 
conflict intensity increased, but at the most extreme intensity of conflict (over 20,000 
casualties per month), such as was only present in the Rwandan civil war during the study, 
the number of news articles covering the conflict started to decrease, possibly due to the 
poor quality of information filtering out of Rwanda at the height of the genocide (Urlacher 
2009). A study that compared UCDP battle-death data for 1989-2002 to fatality data from 
other sources suggested that the predominance of English-language sources in UCDP 
searches led to good coverage of fatalities in the Northern Ireland conflict, but 
undercounted fatalities in Spanish-speaking Colombia’s civil war (although UCDP trends 
over time generally matched well) (Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas 2006). An exceptionally 
wide gap occurred between UCDP fatality numbers and locally-sourced Colombian fatality 
numbers in a year that was marked by particularly intense conflict coupled with Colombia’s 
pivotal presidential election. The authors speculated that in an overload of internationally 
newsworthy stories from Colombia, many smaller conflict events (and their associated 
fatalities) were not picked up by international news agencies (Restrepo, Spagat M and 
Vargas 2006). 
UCDP spends almost equal time collecting data from news media and from NGO 
reports, monographs, and other sources. UCDP then triangulates between multiple sources 
to estimate actors’ fatality figures (e.g. witness reports to a truth commission may 
supplement or be compared to media reported data and NGO reports on a massacre). 
Reports are traced back to their primary source, when possible, in order to determine 
reliability, and potential biases of sources are taken into consideration when determining 
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UCDP Best estimates (Eck and Hultman 2007). UCDP includes local news reports in its 
searches to some extent (Eck and Hultman 2007), but is limited to reports published or 
translated into the English language. Journalistic coverage of some areas, such as sub-
Saharan Africa, may be lower, making it difficult to establish exact numbers of fatalities 
(Eck and Hultman 2007, Urlacher 2009). Although UCDP fatality numbers can be viewed 
as being “too low”, i.e. not perfectly representing the actual number of fatalities from a 
conflict or from one-sided violence, UCDP does not claim to provide a perfect mirror-
image of reality, but instead stresses that its Best estimates provide a systematically 
derived, reliable baseline, useful for cross-country and temporal comparison (Eck and 
Hultman 2007, Sundberg 2009). 
Although we have described here the limitations and possible biases that can affect 
UCDP estimates of absolute numbers of fatalities, it is important to emphasise that no 
published critique has questioned or tested civilian targeting to battle-death fatality ratios of 
the kind we use in this chapter. Plausible critiques that are relevant to our study could 
include that some actors are better at hiding their hand in massacres than are others (thus 
lowering their CTI), or that there are large undercounts for total deaths specifically for 
actors with high CTI scores. To date these possible biases have not been systematically 
studied. Although these potential biases should be kept in mind by the reader, especially 
when viewing findings for specific actors, we know of no clear reason to believe that these 
possible problems are of a magnitude and consistency that would compromise the global 
trends we find in this chapter. 
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Table 3-1: Regional Civilian Targeting Index Results: All Actors in Armed Conflict 
Region Europe Middle East & North Africa Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Americas 
Actor All State Non-state All State Non-state All State Non-state All State Non-state All State Non-state 
N 9 3 6 30 6 24 62 11 51 105 17 88 20 6 14 
Mean CTI 23.35 1.85 34.10 22.39 18.74 23.30 17.29 17.67 17.21 16.99 22.97 15.84 12.89 21.41 9.24 
95% CI -10.1 to 56.8 
-6.1 to  
9.8 
-19.5 to 
87.7 
8.6 to 
36.2 
-23.3 to 
60.8 
7.7 to 
38.9 
9.1 to 
25.5 
-3.2 to 
38.5 
7.9 to 
26.5 
10.8 to 
23.2 
7.6 to 
38.4 
8.9 to 
22.8 
-1.4 to 
27.1 
-19.7 to 
62.5 
-6.2 to 
24.7 
SD 43.51 3.21 51.08 36.94 40.04 36.99 32.37 31.06 32.95 32.22 29.96 32.67 30.43 39.13 26.77 
Min CTI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max CTI 100 6 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
No. of actors with 
CTI>0 (%) 4 (44) 1 (33) 3 (50) 16 (53) 3 (50) 13 (54) 26 (42) 7 (64) 19 (37) 36 (34) 10 (59) 26 (30) 6 (30) 3 (50) 3 (21) 
No. of actors with 
CTI=0 (%) 5 (56) 2 (67) 3 (50) 14 (47) 3 (50) 11 (46) 36 (58) 4 (36) 32 (63) 69 (66) 7 (41) 62 (70) 14 (70) 3 (50) 11 (79) 
Note: CTI = Civilian Targeting Index. 226 actors: 43 states and 183 non-states. 
 
Table 3-2: Distribution of Actors across Ranges of Total Associated Fatalities in 2002-2007 
Range of Total Fatalities 
Associated with Actor All Actors (%) State Actors (%) Non-state Actors (%) 
Over 10,000 5 (2.2) 3 (7.0) 2 (1.1) 
5,000 - 9,999 8 (3.5) 4 (9.3) 4 (2.2) 
1,000 - 4,999 40 (17.7) 18 (41.9) 22 (12.0) 
500 - 999 16 (7.1) 2 (4.7) 14 (7.7) 
100 - 499 69 (30.5) 4 (9.3) 65 (35.5) 
Less than 100 88 (38.9) 12 (27.9) 76 (41.5) 
Total Actors 226 (100) 43 (100) 183 (100) 
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Table 3-3: Distribution of Actors across Durations of Armed Conflict in 2002-2007 
Duration of Conflict All Actors (%) State Actors (%) Non-state Actors (%) 
1 year 107 (47.3) 13 (30.2) 94 (51.4) 
2 years 37 (16.4) 2 (4.7) 35 (19.1) 
3 years 27 (11.9) 5 (11.6) 22 (12.0) 
4 years 12 (5.3) 5 (11.6) 7 (3.8) 
5 years 14 (6.2) 7 (16.3) 8 (4.4) 
6 years 29 (12.8) 11 (25.6) 17 (9.3) 
Total 226 (100) 43 (100) 183 (100) 
 
Table 3-4: Logistic Regression for Independent Contributors to Actors Targeting Civilians 
(CTI>0) as Opposed to Exercising Restraint (CTI=0) 
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: 1 if actor CTI>0, 0 if actor CTI=0 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total Fatalities 1.000405**** 1.00015 1.000176* 1.000376*** 1.000166 1.000188* 
2 years  1.70   1.72  
3 years  3.16**   3.12**  
4 years  7.92***   8.59***  
5 years  6.01***   7.25***  
6 years  5.67***   5.17***  
3-4 years   3.41***   3.41*** 
5-6 years   4.65***   4.63*** 
MENA    1.41 .72 .81 
ASIA    .83 .43 .52 
SSA    .74 .56 .65 
AMERICAS    .44 .35 .42 
State  1.11 1.12 1.48 1.08 1.12 
Number of Actors 226 226 226 226 226 226 
Pseudo R-square .09 .15 .14 .10 .16 .15 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 **** p<0.001 
Values are odds ratios. 
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Table 3-5: Regional Civilian Targeting Index Results for Actors that Targeted Civilians 
 Europe Middle East & North Africa Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Americas 
 All State Non-state All State Non-state All State Non-state All State Non-state All State Non-state 
N 4 1 3 16 3 13 26 7 19 36 10 26 6 3 3 
Mean CTI 52.5 5.6 68.2 42.0 37.5 43.0 41.2 27.8 46.2 49.6 39.1 53.6 43.0 42.8 43.1 
95% CI -34.7 to 139.7 - 
-68.6 to 
205.0 
19.6 to 
64.3 
-97.5 to 
172.5 
18.1 to 
68.0 
25.4 to 
57.0 
-5.3 to 
60.9 
26.9 to 
65.5 
36.8 to 
62.3 
17.6 to 
60.5 
37.4 to 
69.8 
-3.6 to 
89.5 
-80.2 to 
165.8 
-80.3 to 
166.5 
SD 54.8 - 55.1 42.0 54.3 41.3 39.1 35.8 40.0 37.7 30.0 40.1 44.4 49.5 49.7 
Min CTI 4.6 5.6 4.6 1.5 1.5 5.1 0.7 .7 2.7 1.2 1.2 1.4 8.4 14.1 8.4 
Max CTI 100 5.6 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
CTI > 0 for 88 actors:  24 states and 64 non-states 
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Table 3-6: Simple and Multiple Regressions for Independent Contributors to the Degree of Civilian Targeting (CTI Value) of Actors that 
Targeted Civilians 
Explanatory variables All Actors with CTI>0 State Actors with CTI>0 Non-state actors with CTI>0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Log of total fatalities -39.14**** (3.49) 
-25.53**** 
(6.52) 
-39.48**** 
(3.71) 
-26.01**** 
(6.66) 
-35.76**** 
(5.43) 
-26.99** 
(9.66) 
-37.59**** 
(6.15) 
-40.24**** 
(4.52) 
-25.93*** 
(8.51) 
-40.37**** 
(4.70) 
2 years  -13.04 (9.63)  
-11.64 
(10.00)  
-57.86** 
(19.70)   
-4.52 
(11.83)  
3 years  -28.84** (11.05)  
-28.62** 
(11.43)  
-45.65** 
(17.85)   
-24.10 
(14.63)  
4 years  -36.98** (13.55)  
-37.18** 
(13.98)  
-50.56** 
(19.05)   
-33.05* 
(19.23)  
5 years  -30.32** (13.95)  
-31.63** 
(14.56)  
-33.30 
(20.54)   
-33.32* 
(19.19)  
6 years  -26.70** (12.92)  
-26.30* 
(13.29)  
-19.19 
(22.71)   
-28.42* 
(16.38)  
MENA   -8.40 (14.42) 
-2.21 
(14.39)  
17.86 
(19.70) 
14.68 
(25.45)  
-9.73 
(18.32) 
-14.75 
(17.74) 
ASIA   -3.46 (13.87) 
3.62 
(14.00)  
26.21 
(18.92) 
10.70 
(23.49)  
-1.52 
(17.72) 
-7.65 
(17.25) 
SSA   -7.02 (13.60) 
-.93 
(13.76)  
32.95* 
(18.30) 
9.96 
(23.30)  
-10.92 
(17.34) 
-12.32 
(16.85) 
AMERICAS   -15.35 (16.74) 
-9.34 
(16.69)  
17.14 
(21.91) 
-6.36 
(26.29)  
-5.94 
(23.12) 
-12.41 
(22.61) 
STATE  .57 (6.26) 
-1.02 
(6.39) 
1.75 
(6.48)       
Intercept 153.87**** (10.05) 
135.68**** 
(12.99) 
161.57**** 
(16.32) 
136.92**** 
(18.54) 
142.42**** 
(16.92) 
121.01**** 
(24.84) 
139.65**** 
(31.00) 
157.30**** 
(12.56) 
142.09**** 
(23.39) 
168.52**** 
(19.78) 
Number of Actors 88 88 88 88 24 24 24 64 64 64 
Adjusted R-square .59 .60 .57 .59 .65 .79 .60 .55 .53 53 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 **** p<0.001 
Includes actors with CTI>0. Actors with CTI=0 are excluded. Standard errors in parentheses. 
144 
 
Table 3-7: Random Effect Logit Regression for Independent Contributors to Actors in 
Prolonged Conflict Targeting Civilians (CTI>0) as Opposed to Exercising Restraint (CTI=0) 
during Six Years 
Explanatory variables All Actors in Prolonged Conflict Actors in Prolonged Conflict with CTI>0 in 
at least one year 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Year .7595* .7528* .7563* .7603* .7625* .7637* 
Total Fatalities  .9999 1.0000  1.0000 1.0000 
MENA   .6961   2.8033 
ASIA   1.5726   4.0489 
SSA   9.1012   27.9962** 
AMERICAS   4.4404   11.2273* 
State   .1699   1.1829 
Number of Observations 
(actors x 6 years) 174 174 174 126 126 126 
Number of Actors 29 29 29 21 21 21 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 
Dependent variable is 1 if actor CTI>0, 0 if actor CTI=0. 
Values are odds ratios. 
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Table 3-8: Panel Regression for Independent Contributors to the Degree Of Civilian 
Targeting (CTI Value) by Actors in Prolonged Conflict for Six Years 
Explanatory variables All Actors in Prolonged Conflict Actors in Prolonged Conflict with CTI>0 in at least one year 
Log of total fatalities 1.19 (3.45) 
-2.12 
(4.66) 
Y2003 2.43 (4.27) 
3.52 
(5.89) 
Y2004 4.93 (4.28) 
7.24 
(5.92) 
Y2005 -1.04 (4.29) 
-1.98 
(5.94) 
Y2006 -2.52 (4.30) 
-4.10 
(5.95) 
Y2007 -.57 (4.36) 
-1.97 
(6.13) 
MENA 2.86 (14.43) 
5.07 
(14.38) 
ASIA 4.86 (14.52) 
7.24 
(14.29) 
SSA 30.58* (14.72) 
44.11** 
(14.36) 
AMERICAS 6.18 (16.77) 
9.40 
(17.14) 
STATE 8.42 (7.09) 
4.19 
(8.78) 
Intercept -4.54 (16.89) 
6.56 
(19.04) 
Number of Actors 29 21 
Number of Observations(Actors x 6 years) 174 126 
Wald chi-square 17.17 23.47 
P-value of Wald chi-square .10 .02 
 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 
 Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 3-1: Global Comparison of Fatalities Associated with Actors in Armed Conflict during 2002-2007  
 
Note: Total number of direct fatalities associated with an actor (from battle-deaths and civilian targeting) is plotted against the proportion of total fatalities that was from the actor’s 
civilian targeting, termed the Civilian Targeting Index (CTI).  Lines show fitted linear regressions for state actors (in red) and non-state actors (in black) that carried out civilian 
targeting (actor’s CTI > 0). 
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Figure 3-2: Annual Civilian Targeting Index Values for the 29 Actors inn Prolonged Armed Conflict during 2002-2007  
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Appendix 3 
Table 3-A-1: Actors, Their Civilian Targeting Index (CTI), and Their Total Associated Fatalities during 2002-2007 
Range of 
Fatalities 
State Actors Non-state Actors 
Actors CTI 
(%) 
Rank 
(CTI) 
Total 
Fatalities 
Rank 
(Fatalities) 
Actors Location of 
Incompatibility 
CTI 
(%) 
Rank 
(CTI) 
Total 
Fatalities 
Rank 
(Fatalities) 
Over 10,000 
States: 3.   Non-
states: 2. 
Sudan 36.5 39 14,145 2 Islamic State of Iraq (ISI or Dawlat al-’Iraq al-
Islamiyya) 
Iraq, Jordan 21.6 50 11,748 3 
Iraq 1.5 84 19,956 1 Taleban Afghanistan 2.7 82 11,524 4 
Afghanistan 0 89 11,214 5       
1,000 to 9,999    
States: 22. Non-
states: 26. 
Ethiopia 70.8 28 1,357 46 Front for National Integration (FNI or Forces 
Nationalistes et Integrationistes) 
Congo 96.1 26 1,314 49 
 Myanmar 48.9 33 1,398 42 Janjaweed   (Janjaweed only. Janjaweed with 
Sudan is coded under Sudan.) 
CAR, Chad, 
Sudan 
93.5 27 3,298 20 
 Cote D’Ivoire 31.8 44 1,080 52 Patani insurgents Thailand 57.2 31 1,886 30 
 DRC (Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo) 
31.4 45 1,132 51 Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) Sudan, Uganda 40.9 36 7,439 11 
 Indonesia 15.6 57 1,826 33 Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) India 30.3 46 1,391 43 
 US (US only.  US 
with Iraq or 
Afghanistan 
coded under those 
actors)* 
14.4 59 1,721 35 United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC 
or Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) 
Colombia 20.9 51 1,428 40 
 Burundi 11.3 64 2,688 23 Kashmir Insurgents India 20.2  7,745  
 Israel* 11.0 65 2,944 22 Hamas Israel 18.3 55 1,362 45 
 Nepal 8.4 71 9,531 7 Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People-
Forces for National Liberation (Palipehutu-FNL 
or Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu-
Forces Nationales de Liberation) 
Burundi 15.5 58 2,295 26 
 Russia 5.6 75 3,692 18 Free Aceh Movement (GAM or Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka) 
Indonesia 13.0 61 1,771 34 
 India* 1.5 85 9,413 8 Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) Nepal 10.7 66 9,815 6 
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 Somalia 1.2 87 2,061 29 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Philippines 10.7 67 1,060 53 
1,000 to 9,999    
States: 22. Non-
states: 26 
Sri Lanka 0.7 88 3,995 17 Ansar al-Islam Iraq 8.6 70 1,374 44 
US/UK/Australia 
(US/UK/Australia 
only.  With Iraq is 
coded under 
Iraq)* 
0 89 8,202 9 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC or Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
Colombianas) 
Colombia 8.4 72 6,219 12 
Colombia 0 89 5,142 13 Al-Mahdi Army Iraq 6.9 73 1,685 37 
 Uganda* 0 89 4,352 15 Al-Qaida Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) 
Algeria 6.0 74 1,712 36 
 Philippines 0 89 3,159 21 Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Sudan 5.2 76 1,323 48 
 Liberia 0 89 2,116 27 Al-Qaida   (2002-2007 data do not include 
September 11, 2001 attack) 
US, Saudi 
Arabia 
5.1 77 1,554 38 
 Algeria 0 89 1,846 31 Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Russia 4.6 79 3,624 19 
 Chad 0 89 1,837 32 Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) Philippines 3.6 80 1,401 41 
 Pakistan* 0 89 1,518 39 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or 
Thamil Eelam Viduthalai Puligal) 
Sri Lanka 3.2 81 4,311 16 
 Turkey 0 89 1,342 47 Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A) 
Sudan 2.2 83 2,600 24 
      Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) Sudan 1.4 86 4,457 14 
      Alliance for the Re-liberation of 
Somalia/Islamic Courts Union (ARS/UIC) 
Somalia 0 89 2,502 25 
      Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy ( LURD) 
Liberia 0 89 2,089 28 
      Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK or Partiya 
Karkerên Kurdistan) 
Turkey 0 89 1,313 50 
100 to 999 
States: 6.   Non-
states: 79. 
Nigeria 50.6 32 261 96 Congolese Democratic Rally-Goma (RCD-
Goma or Rassemblement Congolaises pour la 
Démocratie-Goma) 
Congo 100 1 465 75 
 Central African 
Republic (CAR) 
47 35 283 95 World Hindu Council (VHP or Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad) 
India 100 1 401 82 
 Thailand 19.2 54 999 54 Jemaah Islamiya Indonesia 100 1 202 107 
 Haiti 14.1 60 284 94 Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) Spain 100 1 191 109 
 Angola 10 69 590 64 Jamaat Jund al-Sahaba Iraq 100 1 156 121 
 Iran* 0 89 157 119 Mayi Mayi-Chinja Chinja Congo 100 1 137 125 
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      Tawhid wal Jihad Egypt 100 1 122 133 
      Rastas Rwanda 100 1 121 134 
      Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Pakistan 100 1 110 136 
100 to 999 
States: 6.   Non-
states: 79. 
     Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda 
(FDLR or Forces Démocratiques de Libération 
du Rwanda) 
Congo, Rwanda 69.9 29 196 108 
      Congolese Rally for Democracy-National/ 
Movement for the Liberation of Congo (RCD-N 
or Rassemblement Congolaises pour la 
Démocratie-National/MLC or Mouvement de 
Libération Congolais) 
Congo 67.7 30 446 78 
      Armed Islamic Group (GIA or Groupe 
Islamique Armé) 
Algeria 48.2 34 456 76 
      United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) India 40.6 37 665 60 
      National Democratic Front for Bodoland 
(NDFB) 
India 40.2 38 291 93 
      Ntsiloulous Congo 35.6 40 163 117 
      Ivorian Movement for the Greater West 
(MPIGO or Mouvement Populaire Ivorian du 
Grand Ouest) 
Cote D’Ivoire 34.0 42 191 109 
      al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (AMB or Kataeb al-
Shaheed al-Aqsa) 
Israel 32.0 43 387 83 
      National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) India 28.4 47 296 92 
      Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) Ethiopia 25.0 48 328 85 
      Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast (MPCI or 
Mouvement patriotique de la Côte d’Ivoire) 
Cote D’Ivoire 23.5 49 650 61 
      National Council for the Defence of 
Democracy-Forces for the Defence of 
Democracy (CNDD-FDD or Conseil National 
pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la 
Défense de la Démocratie) 
Burundi, Congo 19.9 53 860 57 
      Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Philippines 17.0 56 946 56 
      Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ or Harakat al-
Jihad al-Islami fi Filastin) 
Israel 12.4 62 492 70 
      National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA or União Nacional para a 
Angola 12.1 63 471 73 
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Independência Total de Angola) 
      Mayi Mayi Congo 10.6 68 479 71 
100 to 999 
States: 6.   Non-
states: 79. 
     National Congress for the Defence of the People 
(CNDP or Congrès National pour la Défense du 
Peuple) 
Congo 5.0 78 585 65 
      United Front for Democratic Change (FUCD) Chad 0 89 979 55 
      Hezbollah Israel 0 89 821 58 
      National Redemption Front (NRF) Sudan 0 89 810 59 
      Congolese Democratic Rally  (RCD or 
Rassemblement Congolaises pour la 
Démocratie) 
Congo 0 89 649 62 
      Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Iraq 0 89 626 63 
      Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws 
(TNSM or Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-
Mohammadi) 
Pakistan 0 89 578 66 
      Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and 
Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT or Isbaheysiga 
Ladagaalanka Argagaxisadda) 
Somalia 0 89 562 67 
      National Liberation Army (ELN or Ejército de 
Liberatión Nacional) 
Colombia 0 89 546 68 
      People's Democratic Party (PDP) Nigeria 0 89 513 69 
      All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) Nigeria 0 89 478 72 
      Shan State Army-South command (SSA-S) Myanmar 0 89 469 74 
      Fatah Israel 0 89 452 77 
      Karen National Union (KNU) Myanmar 0 89 425 79 
      Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad 
(MDJT or Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la 
Justice au Tchad) 
Chad 0 89 418 80 
      Union Force for Democracy and Development 
(UFDD or Union des Forces pour la Démocratie 
et le Développement) 
Chad 0 89 408 81 
      National Socialist Council of Nagaland-
Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) 
India 0 89 360 84 
      Reformation and Jihad Front  (RJF) Iraq 0 89 324 86 
      Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Pakistan 0 89 319 87 
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      Lashkha of Wazir tribe Pakistan 0 89 319 88 
      Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) Somalia 0 89 310 89 
100 to 999 
States: 6.   Non-
states: 79. 
     Rahanweyn Resistance Army-Madobe and 
Habsade faction (RRA-MH) 
Somalia 0 89 310 89 
     National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Sudan 0 89 300 91 
      Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Minni 
Minawi faction (SLM/A-MM) 
Sudan 0 89 236 97 
      Forces of Rashid Abdul Dostum Afghanistan 0 89 225 98 
      Forces of Ustad Mohammad Atta Afghanistan 0 89 225 98 
      People’s War Group (PWG) India 0 89 224 100 
      Congolese Rally for Democracy-Patrick 
Masunzu faction (RCD-PM or Rassemblement 
Congolaise pour la Démocratie-Patrick Mazunsu 
faction) 
Congo 0 89 221 101 
      Gulf Cartel Mexico 0 89 218 102 
      Sinaloa Cartel Mexico 0 89 218 102 
      New Forces (FN or Forces Nouvelles) Cote D’Ivoire 0 89 217 104 
      Baluch Ittehad Pakistan 0 89 214 105 
      Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam-Karuna 
faction (LTTE-K) 
Sri Lanka 0 89 208 106 
      National Front for the Liberation of Haiti 
(FLRN or Front pour la Liberación et la 
Reconstruction Nationales) 
Haiti 0 89 183 111 
      United Wa State Army (UWSA) Myanmar 0 89 182 112 
      National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac-
Muivah faction (NSCN-IM) 
India 0 89 175 113 
      United National Liberation Front (UNLF) India 0 89 175 113 
      Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) Uganda 0 89 167 115 
      Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) Pakistan 0 89 165 116 
      Forces of Amanullah Khan Afghanistan 0 89 158 118 
      Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) Somalia, Sudan 0 89 157 119 
      Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) Ethiopia 0 89 150 122 
      Congolese Democratic Rally-Liberation 
Movement (RCD-ML or Rassemblement 
Congo 0 89 144 123 
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Congolaises pour la Démocratie-Mouvement de 
Liberation) 
100 to 999 
States: 6.   Non-
states: 79. 
     Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) Nigeria 0 89 140 124 
     New Forces-Ibrahim Coulibaly faction (FN-IC 
or Forces Nouvelles-Ibrahim Coulibaly faction) 
Cote D’Ivoire 0 89 134 126 
     Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) India 0 89 134 126 
      United Somali Congress/Somali Salvation 
Alliance (USC/SSA) 
Somalia 0 89 134 126 
      United Somalia Congress/Somali Salvation 
Alliance-Omar Mohamed Mohamud-Finish 
faction (USC/SSA-F) 
Somalia 0 89 134 126 
      Forces of Ismail Khan Afghanistan 0 89 128 130 
      Movement of the Democratic Forces of the 
Casamance-Northern Front Magne Diémé 
faction (MFDC Front Nord-MD or Mouvement 
des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance-Front 
Nord Magne Diémé) 
Senegal 0 89 124 131 
      Movement of the Democratic Forces of the 
Casamance-Salif Sadio faction (MFDC-S or 
Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de 
Casamance-Sadio) 
Senegal 0 89 124 131 
      Kingdom of Kongo (BDK or Bundu dia Kongo) Congo 0 89 116 135 
      The Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK or Parti 
Jiyani Azadi Kurdistan) 
Iran 0 89 106 137 
      Forces of Francois Bozize Central African 
Republic 
0 89 105 138 
Under 100 
States: 12. Non-
states: 76. 
Laos 100 1 73 145 Abu-Hafs al-Masri Brigades Turkey 100 1 62 151 
 Guinea 100 1 45 167 Taleban Movement of Pakistan (TTP or Tehrik-
i-Taliban Pakistan) 
Pakistan 100 1 54 158 
 Egypt 100 1 36 184 Salafia Jihadia Morocco 100 1 45 167 
 Brazil 100 1 34 189 All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) India 100 1 43 175 
 Niger 0 89 81 142 Gazotan Murdash Russia 100 1 41 176 
 Rwanda 0 89 59 154 Mungiki Kenya 100 1 38 181 
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 Eritrea 0 89 57 156 Bakassi boys Nigeria 100 1 32 195 
Senegal 0 89 40 177 Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) India 100 1 31 200 
Under 100 
States: 12. Non-
states: 76. 
Uzbekistan 0 89 35 185 Congolese Rally for Democracy-Mutineer 
faction (RCD-Mutineer faction or 
Rassemblement Congolaise pour la Democratie-
Mutineer) 
Congo 100 1 30 201 
 Peru 0 89 32 195 Mara Salvatrucha (Honduras) Honduras 100 1 28 207 
 Georgia 0 89 27 212 Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF or Sabaot 
Land Defence Force) 
Kenya 100 1 28 207 
 Azerbaijan 0 89 26 217 Movement of the Democratic Forces of the 
Casamance-Northern Front (MFDC-FN or 
Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de 
Casamance-Front Nord) 
Senegal 100 1 25 220 
      People's Armed Forces of Congo (FAPC or 
Forces Armées du Peuple Congolais) 
Congo 35.4 41 79 144 
      Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council 
(SRRC) 
Somalia 0 89 96 139 
      Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of 
Cabinda-Armed Forces of Cabinda (FLEC-FAC 
or Frente da Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda-
Forças Armadas de Cabinda) 
Angola 0 89 92 140 
      Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Unity 
(SLM/A-Unity) 
Sudan 0 89 86 141 
      Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ or 
Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice) 
Niger 0 89 81 142 
      Arrow Boys Uganda 0 89 71 146 
      Somali National Front-Ali Dheere and Rer 
Ahmad subclans (SNF-ADRA) 
Somalia 0 89 69 147 
      Somali National Front-Hawarsame Rer Hasan 
and Habar Ya'qub subclans (SNF-HRHHY) 
Somalia 0 89 69 147 
      People's Liberation Army (PLA) India 0 89 67 149 
      Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV) Nigeria 0 89 63 150 
      Jubba Valley Alliance (JVA) Somalia 0 89 62 151 
      OP Lavalas Haiti 0 89 61 153 
      Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP or Cote D’Ivoire 0 89 59 154 
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Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix) 
Under 100 
States: 12. Non-
states: 76. 
     Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement-Abu Suhail 
faction (EIJM-AS or Harakat al Jihad al Islami-
Abu Suhail faction) 
Eritrea 0 89 57 156 
      Mara 18 Guatemala 0 89 54 158 
      Mara Salvatrucha (Guatemala) Guatemala 0 89 54 158 
      Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa Nigeria 0 89 52 161 
      Forces of Abdullahi Yusuf Somalia 0 89 52 161 
      Forces of Jama Ali Jama Somalia 0 89 52 161 
      Moro National Liberation Front-Nur Misauri 
faction (MNLF-NM) 
Philippines 0 89 52 161 
      Jondullah Iran 0 89 51 165 
      Palipehutu-FNL-LP Burundi 0 89 50 166 
      Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) Israel 0 89 45 167 
      Congolese Democratic Rally-Kisangani-
Liberation Movement (RCD-K-ML or 
Rassemblement Congolaises pour la 
Démocratie-Kisangani-Mouvement de 
Liberation) 
Congo 0 89 45 167 
      Congolese Rally for Democracy-National 
(RCD-N or Rassemblement Congolaises pour la 
Démocratie-National) 
Congo 0 89 45 167 
      Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR 
or Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le 
Rassemblement) 
Central African 
Republic 
0 89 45 167 
      Janjaweed-Bin Kulaib faction Sudan 0 89 44 173 
      Janjaweed-Moro faction Sudan 0 89 44 173 
      Movement of the Democratic Forces of the 
Casamance (MFDC or Mouvement des Forces 
Démocratiques de Casamance) 
Senegal 0 89 40 177 
      May 23 Democratic Alliance for Change-
Ibrahim Bahanga faction (ATNMC or Alliance 
Démocratique du 23 Mai pour le Changement-
Ibrahim Bahanga faction) 
Mali 0 89 39 179 
      Mali Mali 0 89 39 179 
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      Popular Defence Force (PDF) Sudan 0 89 38 181 
Under 100 
States: 12. Non-
states: 76. 
     Palestinian National Authority (PNA) Israel 0 89 38 181 
     Alliance for Democracy (AD) Nigeria 0 89 35 185 
     Jihad Islamic Group (JIG) Uzbekistan 0 89 35 185 
      Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) Myanmar 0 89 35 185 
      Ansaar ul-Islam Pakistan 0 89 34 189 
      Lashkar-e-Islam Pakistan 0 89 34 189 
      Puntland state of Somalia Somalia 0 89 34 189 
      Republic of Somaliland Somalia 0 89 34 189 
      Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA or 
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army) 
Myanmar 0 89 33 194 
      Madhesi People's Rights Forum (MJF or 
Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum) 
Nepal 0 89 32 195 
      Rally of Democratic Forces (RAFD or 
Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques) 
Chad 0 89 32 195 
      Sendero Luminoso Peru 0 89 32 195 
      Comando Vermelho Brazil 0 89 30 201 
      Forces of Arbab Basir Afghanistan 0 89 30 201 
      Forces of the Caucasus Emirate Russia 0 89 30 201 
      Tercer Comando Brazil 0 89 30 201 
      Maoist Communist Party (MKP or Maoist 
Komünist Partisi) 
Turkey 0 89 29 206 
      Movement for the Liberation of Western Ivory 
Coast (MILOCI or Mouvement pour la 
Liberation de l'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire) 
Cote D’Ivoire 0 89 28 207 
      Southern Somalia National Movement (SSNM) Somalia 0 89 28 207 
      United Somali Congress/Somali National 
Alliance (USC/SNA) 
Somalia 0 89 28 207 
      14-party Alliance Bangladesh 0 89 27 212 
      Bangladesh National Party Alliance (BNP Party 
Alliance) 
Bangladesh 0 89 27 212 
      Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) Liberia 0 89 27 212 
      Republic of South Ossetia Georgia 0 89 27 212 
      People’s Liberation Army (EPL or Ejército Colombia 0 89 26 217 
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Popular de Liberación) 
Under 100 
States: 12. Non-
states: 76. 
     Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijan 0 89 26 217 
     1920 Revolution Brigades Iraq 0 89 25 220 
     Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of 
Cabinda-Renewed (FLEC-R or Frente da 
Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda-Renovada) 
Angola 0 89 25 220 
      Forces of Abdul Rahman Khan Afghanistan 0 89 25 220 
      Forces of Amanullah Afghanistan 0 89 25 220 
      Jubba Valley Alliance faction (JVA faction) Somalia 0 89 25 220 
      Moro National Liberation Front-Habier Malik 
faction (MNLF-HM) 
Philippines 0 89 25 220 
Average States: 
43.     Non-
states: 183. 
 19.3 
(95% 
CI: 10 
to 29) 
 2809  
(95% CI: 
1495 to 
4123) 
   17.3 
(95% 
CI: 12 
to 22) 
 708    
(95% CI: 
452 to 
963) 
 
* Locations of armed conflicts involving state actors (whether attacker or attacked) are their own territories except the US (Afghanistan/Iraq/Pakistan/Saudi Arabia), Israel 
(Israel/Lebanon), India (India/Pakistan/Myanmar), US/UK/Australia (US/UK/Australia/Iraq), Uganda (Uganda/Congo/Sudan), Pakistan (Pakistan/India) and Iran (Iran/Iraq). 
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Chapter 4 
Hysteresis of Targeting Civilians in Armed Conflicts136 
 
4.1. Introduction 
International norms strictly prohibit intentional targeting of civilians in any armed 
conflict,137 but it is not an infrequent phenomenon nonetheless. As an alternative war 
strategy to fighting armed combatants, civilian targeting has been often carried out in 
contemporary armed conflict. According to the data compiled by the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP), almost 700,000 civilians, defined as non-combatants, were killed due to 
intentional and direct attacks by sovereign states or formally organised non-state groups in 
armed conflicts between 1989 and 2010.138 Intentional targeting of civilians is regarded as a 
typologically important strategy for a stronger actor in asymmetric conflict to scale down 
opponents’ military capacity (Arreguín-Toft 2001, Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 
2004).139 However, this ‘barbaric’ act140 against civilians is not restricted to stronger actors, 
commonly being sovereign states. Weaker actors, occasionally non-state armed groups, 
often deliberately target civilians to prevent them from cooperating with incumbent 
governments, or to threaten them to draw further support towards rebels (Zahar 2007, 
Vargas 2009, Wood 2010, Butler and Gates 2010). 
                                                           
136
 Chapter 3 is an additive study of chapter 3 with updated datasets. 
137
 The Fourth Geneva Convention and its Associated Protocols I and II (International Committee of the Red 
Cross 2010). 
138
 The figure comes from the ‘one-sided violence’ dataset documented by the UCDP (UCDP 2011a). It only 
includes civilian deaths by intentional and direct attacks by warring actors. Intentional killings of civilians are 
defined as actions deliberately taken to kill civilians, and direct killings refer to civilian deaths by actors’ 
direct attacks such as bombings and gun shots. The one-sided violence dataset does not include civilian deaths 
that occurred during battles in armed conflict since it is ambiguous whether attacks in battles are directed 
towards civilians. These battle deaths, both combatants and civilians, were recorded in two other UCDP 
datasets, the ‘battle-related’ and ‘non-state conflict’ datasets (Eck & Hultman 2007). 
139
 Given the assumptions that a stronger actor in asymmetric conflict is an attacker, and an ideal strategy in 
conflict is to ensure victory, not a cessation of war, Arreguín-Toft (2001) argues that a stronger actor could 
either directly attack opponents or take commit the barbaric act including attacks on civilian populations. 
140
 Arreguín-Toft 2001. 
159 
 
The existing literature on intentional targeting of civilians in armed conflict has 
focused on causes of civilian victimisation or its correlation with war outcomes. In relation 
to the former, substantial variation in the causes of intentional targeting of civilians is found 
across political, economic, geographical and temporal circumstances under which warring 
actors operate. For instance, Zahar (2007) approaches intentional targeting of civilians 
within a civil-militia relation framework to analyse degrees of external intervention for 
humanitarian assistance on civil populations. Humphreys and Weinstein (2006), however, 
argues that civil-militia relations are not significant determinants of civilian abuse. Instead, 
internal characteristics of insurgent groups such as a loose control over their members 
better explain civilian victimisation. Moreover, Vargas (2009) models a power shift 
between two armed groups contending for a strategic territory as a factor of intentional 
targeting of civilians utilising the Colombian Civil War data during the 1988-2005 time 
period. On the other hand, Wood (2010) views resource mobilisation as a determinant of 
civilian victimisation by rebel groups. Warring actors motivated by these various reasons 
choose civilian targeting rather than battling combatants as the former is an appealing 
strategy to attain victory in armed conflict. For instance, Valentino, Huth and Balch-
Lindsay (2004) argue that incumbent governments battling with strong, well-organised 
guerrilla groups are attracted to mass killing of civilians regardless of regime type or ethnic 
difference. Moreover, Butler and Gates (2010) analyse civilian victimisation as a strategic 
factor that led weaker actors to defeat stronger ones. 
Although ample studies explore causes and consequences of the intentional 
targeting of civilians with absolute numbers of civilian deaths that occurred during armed 
conflict, there have been fewer attempts to examine the intensity of civilian targeting in the 
context of total fatalities associated with warring actors. Only recently Hicks et al. (2011), 
presented as chapter 3 in this thesis, developed a Civilian Targeting Index (CTI) to describe 
the proportion of civilian deaths resulted from a warring actor’s intentional and direct 
attacks among total fatalities associated with the actor. In doing so, chapter 3 demonstrates 
under what conditions warring actors intentionally used their lethal force against civilians 
as opposed to battling with combatants. Building upon chapter 3, this chapter further 
explores behavioural patterns of warring actors in the intentional targeting of civilians in 
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global conflict with the updated datasets documented by the same source, the UCDP, and 
with the same compiling methods. The UCDP datasets available for chapter 3 contains 226 
actors who were involved in armed conflict at least one year between 2002 and 2007 whilst 
the updated datasets used for this chapter embraces 536 actors during the 1989-2010 time 
period. The number of actors therefore doubles and the maximum duration of conflict 
quadruples. 
Apart from replicating the testing methods used in chapter 3, this chapter 
additionally employs a dynamic panel approach to examine determinants of the intensity of 
civilian targeting for the actors involved in uniquely long duration of armed conflict, 
covering more than 20 years. In chapter 3, analysis on duration of conflict was rather 
restricted as the maximum duration available for the dataset was 6 years. However, the 
updated UCDP dataset enables one to examine hysteresis of warring actors’ behaviour in 
terms of the intentional targeting of civilians when they are involved in prolonged conflict 
as the longest duration covered in the dataset is 22 years. The term hysteresis was coined to 
denote a persistence of previous states in describing the magnetisation of ferric materials by 
a physicist Ewing (1885), and has been often used in economics to explain the degree of 
persistence in unemployment rates. The dynamic panel method adopted for this chapter is 
expected to measure to what extent, if any, warring actors adjust their civilian targeting 
behaviour over time. If warring actors engaged in prolonged armed conflict increase the 
degree of the intentional targeting of civilians over time despite of the strict prohibition by 
the international norms, it is required to eliminate incentives or factors facilitating their 
lethal behaviour into civilians. This chapter, therefore, attempts to find plausible factors 
promoting the intentional targeting of civilians by including economic and demographic 
indices such as inflation rates and population growth rates in the dynamic panel analysis. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section presents the summary 
and description statistics of the updated datasets. The following sections describe testing 
approaches and empirical results respectively. The final section concludes. 
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4.2. Data Analysis 
4.2.1. Data Construction 
Given the procedure employed in chapter 3, chapter 4 constructs a dataset by aggregating 
three datasets compiled by UCDP; the One-Sided Violence Dataset, the Battle-Related 
Deaths Dataset, and the Non-State Conflict Dataset.141 These three datasets contain violent 
death information associated with warring actors participating in international conflict and 
civil war. In particular, the one-sided violence dataset only includes the direct and 
intentional killing of civilians by warring actors, either sovereign states or formally 
organised non-state armed groups. The battle-related deaths dataset, on the other hand, 
contains both civilians and combatants killed in battles involving at least one state actor. As 
the battle-related deaths dataset records deaths only if intended targets are combatants in 
battles (i.e. military members), civilian deaths included in this dataset are collateral damage, 
not as intentionally targeted victims, which are counted in the one-sided violence dataset. 
Finally, the non-state conflict dataset only includes deaths from battles between organised 
non-state actors. The violent war deaths recorded in these three datasets, therefore, are 
independent (i.e. not overlapping). The three datasets encompass warring actors and their 
associated fatalities when violent deaths were a minimum of 25 a year.142 UCDP 
documented these datasets based on various sources including the media, governmental and 
non-governmental organisations.143 144 
Given the theory of war strategies that warring actors choose between either 
targeting civilians or battling combatants in armed conflict (Arreguín-Toft 2001), one can 
compute the proportion of war deaths attributable to either strategy by combining the three 
UCDP datasets. When combining the datasets, loosely organised groups contained in the 
non-state conflict dataset are excluded as the one-sided violence dataset does not include 
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 UCDP 2011a, UCDP 2011b, UCDP 2011d. 
142
 Twenty five is the minimum requirement of the number of fatalities to be recorded in the three UCDP 
datasets. 
143
 Refer to chapter 3 for detailed sources and methods of the UCDP datasets. 
144
 The UCDP datasets present three different estimates of violent deaths: ‘best’, ‘low’, and ‘high’ estimates. 
Along the lines of chapter 3, this chapter utilises the ‘best’ estimates, which are derived from the most reliable 
sources.    
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them. The combined dataset, therefore, include 536 warring actors, both sovereign states 
and formally organised armed groups, and fatalities associated with them during the 
overlapping periods of the three UCDP datasets between 1989 and 2010. With this newly 
constructed dataset, one can compute the Civilian Targeting Index (CTI), a measure to 
identify to what extent global warring actors were involved in the intentional killing of 
civilians while they were engaged in armed conflict. Each actor’s CTI value is defined as 
the proportion of the number of deaths recorded in the one-sided violence dataset to the 
sum of deaths recorded in all three UCDC datasets; the one-sided violence, the battle-
related deaths and the non-state conflict dataset. In extenso, the number of deaths recorded 
in the three UCDP datasets for an actor is added to give ‘total fatalities associated with the 
actor’.145 CTI value for the actor is calculated as the proportion of the number of civilian 
deaths caused by the actor’s intentional and direct attacks among total fatalities associated 
with the actor. For instance, an actor with the CTI of 100 indicates that it completely 
concentrated lethal force on targeting civilians, rather than on battles with combatants in 
armed conflict. On the other hand, CTI values of 0 imply that actors refrained from 
targeting civilians and completely concentrated their lethal force on fighting armed 
combatants.  
4.2.2. Data Summary 
The dataset for this chapter, constructed based on the three UCDP datasets, contains 536 
warring actors, 87 states and 449 formally organised non-state armed groups.146 In order to 
provide an overview of the actors’ CTI values and associated total fatalities, this subsection 
                                                           
145
 As discussed in chapter 3, as many deaths from battles between two sides of actors are hard to be 
attributed to one of them, the battle-related deaths and the non-state conflict dataset do not identify which side 
of the actors caused the deaths. Total fatalities associated with an actor, therefore, overlap with total fatalities 
associated with its opponents. For brevity, total associated fatalities of an actor overlap with total associated 
fatalities of other actors involved in the same battles. Thus, total fatalities associated with an actor indicate 
scale of armed conflict in which the actor involved.   
146
 There are 16 joint actors which consist of two or more actors who jointly participated in intentional 
targeting of civilians or in battles. A joint actor is classified as a state actor if it comprises only state actors, 
and as a non-state actor if only non-state armed groups. Only one joint actor is composed of a state and a non-
state armed group (Serbia and Republic of Krajina in the Yugoslav Wars), and it is arbitrarily categorised as a 
state actor. Classifying the actor as a non-state, however, does not make a statistically significant difference in 
regression analyses due to its comparatively small stake in the dataset in terms of total fatalities associated 
with this joint actor (466, CTI=0).    
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firstly presents descriptive statistics of the dataset across different dimensions including 
regions and actors’ status (i.e. states or non-states). Then it examines distribution of the 
actors across duration of armed conflict in which they were involved, total fatalities 
associated with the actors, and CTI values. Table 4-1 presents descriptive statistics of CTI 
values and total fatalities associated with warring actors, divided into a state and non-state 
groups. The mean CTI value of all 536 actors is 17, indicating that 17% of associated 
fatalities with the actors were, on average, from their direct and intentional targeting of 
civilians during 1989-2010, and 83% from battlefields. The mean CTI value of the state 
actor group is greater than that of the non-state group (21 vs. 16) although the overlapping 
confidence intervals indicate that the difference is not statistically significant. The average 
of the total fatalities associated with all actors is 4,425 whilst the mean of the state group is 
9 times higher than that of the non-state group (17,196 vs. 1,950), implying that on average 
state actors were involved in a much larger size of bloodshed during armed conflicts. The 
figures in parentheses in Table 4-1 are the statistics excluding Rwanda, whose leverage is 
the highest amongst all actors due to a half million of civilian deaths intentionally targeted 
by the country.147 The average of total fatalities associated with state actors decreased to 
11,355 when excluding Rwanda, but still shows a conspicuous difference with that of non-
state actors.  
Table 4-2 presents descriptive statistics of two groups of actors; those that crossed 
the line into civilian targeting (CTI>0), and those that did not (CTI=0) while they were 
involved in armed conflict during 1989-2010. Thirty-seven percent (197 in 536) crossed the 
line by carrying out some degree of civilian targeting. The mean CTI of these actors is 45, 
indicating that almost a half of total fatalities associated with the actors who crossed the 
line were intentionally and directly targeted civilians. Furthermore, the average of total 
fatalities associated with these actors is 6 times greater than those with CTIs of 0 (9,474 vs. 
1,494), implying that the actors who carried out some degree of civilian targeting appear to 
be engaged in larger-scale conflict than those who refrained from it. In addition, state actors, 
regardless of crossing the line or not, seem to have been engaged in larger-scale conflict 
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 The number of deaths recorded for Rwanda in the UCDP one-sided violent dataset during the periods of 
1989-2010 accounts for 73% (511,491 in 699,837) of all deaths recorded in the dataset. 
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than non-state armed groups as suggested by the mean fatalities presented in Table 4-2. 
This may suggest a positive relation between state military involvement and scale of armed 
conflict.  
Table 4-3 shows descriptive statistics across 5 regional groups of warring actors.148 
Two thirds of all 536 actors are from either Sub-Saharan Africa (n=228, 43%) or Asia 
(n=143, 27%). The mean CTI of the actors from Sub-Saharan Africa is the greatest amongst 
the five regional groups although the differences are not statistically significant considering 
the heavily overlapping 95% confidence interval as shown in Table 4-3. Furthermore, the 
mean fatalities associated with the actors from Sub-Saharan Africa (6,176) are the greatest 
amongst the five regional groups. 
Figure 4-1, illustrating distribution of the actors across a range of CTI values, shows 
most actors are distributed at the extreme; 63% (339 in 536) have CTI values of 0, 
suggesting that they refrained from intentional and direct targeting of civilians and solely 
concentrated their lethal force in battles with combatants. On the other hand, 10% of the 
actors (56 in 536) recorded CTI values of 100, meaning that they completely used their 
lethal force in targeting civilians as opposed to battling with combatants in armed conflict 
during 1989-2010. Kernel density estimates in Figure 4-2 further verifies the concentration 
on CTI values of 0 or 100. Moreover, Table 4-4 shows detailed information on distribution 
of the actors in terms of CTI values. The mean of total fatalities associated with the actors 
with CTI values of 100 is comparatively small, implying that those actors that solely 
concentrated their lethal force onto the intentional and direct civilian targeting were 
involved in smaller-size of conflict. 
  Table 4-5 shows the distribution of varying ranges of total fatalities associated 
with the actors. Whilst 75% of non-state actors are associated with less than 1,000 fatalities, 
the majority of state actors are party to more than 1,000 fatalities, substantiating the 
                                                           
148
 I allocate warring actors to the following five regions: Europe, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Americas. State actors are allocated to the regional groups where their 
territories are located whilst non-state groups to their locations of incompatibility (over territories or political 
power). Al-Qaida is the only actor whose location of compatibility spans more than one region including the 
Middle East, Asia and America. Al-Qaida is allocated to the Americas regional group as most civilian deaths 
intentionally targeted by the actor occurred in the region (2668 in 2731). 
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findings from descriptive statistics that state actors on average were involved in larger-scale 
conflict than non-state actors. Table 4-6 and Figure 4-3 display the distribution of armed 
conflict in which actors are involved, varying from 1 to 22 years. About 40% of all (218 in 
536) were engaged in armed conflict for one year during 1989-2010. In contrast, 9 actors (6 
states and 3 non-states) were involved in conflict for 22 years, the longest period in the 
dataset used for this chapter.  
The two plots in Figure 4-4 display all 536 warring actors’ CTI values (y axis) and 
total fatalities associated with them on logarithmic scale (x axis). The two plots are the 
same but the upper one shows labels of all 87 state actors whereas the lower one of non-
state actors with positive CTI values (CTI>0). The plots elucidate which warring actors 
concentrated their lethal force on civilian targeting as opposed to battling combatants in 
armed conflicts during 1989-2010 by putting information on CTIs and fatalities associated 
with warring actors together. Most actors with CTI values of 100, meaning that 100% of 
their associated fatalities were intentionally and directly targeted civilians, are found in the 
upper left quadrant of the plots. These actors who used civilian targeting as their sole form 
of lethal force account for 10% of state actors (9 in 87)149 and 10% of non-state actors (47 
in 449). A significant number of these actors (51 in 56) are involved in fewer than 500 total 
fatalities although a joint actor that consists of Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Serbian Irregulars massacred more than 12,000 civilians during the Yugoslav Wars. 
Almost 80% of non-state actors with CTI values of 100 are based on either Sub-Saharan 
Africa (22 in 47) or Asia (15 in 47). Actors found in the upper right quadrant in the plots in 
Figure 4-4 are attributed to the bloodiest conflicts as well as high rates of civilian targeting 
during the period of interest between 1989 and 2010. For instance, Rwanda is associated 
with the greatest number of violent deaths, of which 98% are intentionally targeted civilians 
(511,491 in 519,513) as shown in the upper plot in Figure 4-4. Amongst non-state actors, 
Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Kinshasa (AFDL)150 in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) records the CTI of 86, indicating that 86% of 
                                                           
149
 The nine state actors with CTI values of 100 are China, Togo, Kenya, Libya, Brazil, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, 
South Africa and Madagascar, which are exhibited in the upper left quadrant in Figure 4-4. 
150
 The original name is Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Kinshasa. 
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fatalities associated with this armed group (35,116 in 40,868) are intentionally targeted 
civilians as shown in the lower plot. 
On the other hand, actors who were engaged in the bloodiest conflicts but who 
concentrated their lethal force in battles with combatants, rather than targeting civilians are 
presented in the lower right quadrant in the plots in Figure 4-4. For example, Eritrea is 
associated with almost 100,000 violent deaths but refrained from targeting civilians, as 
suggested by its CTI value of 0. Only five out of twenty three state actors, including Eritrea, 
who are associated with more than 10,000 violent deaths record the CTI of 0, meaning that 
they completely concentrated their lethal force into battling with combatants rather than 
targeting civilians.151 Other actors with CTI values of 0 are located in the lowest part of the 
plots in Figure 4-4. These actors who refrained from the intentional targeting of civilians 
account for 63% of all actors (339 in 536) as shown in the descriptive statistics. 
 
4.3. Testing Strategies 
To examine the determinants affecting the intensity of civilian targeting of warring actors 
indicated by CTI values, this chapter employs the same regression models used in chapter 3. 
Furthermore, this chapter adopts dynamic panel regression models, which are not attempted 
in the previous chapter, to explore persistence of warring actors’ lethal behaviour on 
civilians in prolonged armed conflict. The available duration of conflict for chapter 3 is 
limited to 6 years whereas the longest duration covered in the updated dataset used for this 
chapter is 22 years. The availability of the actors engaged in uniquely long duration of 
armed conflict enables to examine how and to what extent warring actors adjust their lethal 
behaviour on civilians over time.    
The basic regression model derived from chapter 3 uses the following variables 
available in the UCDP datasets; duration of conflict in which actors involved, scale of 
armed conflict, actors’ status (i.e. state or non-state), and regional variation. A formal 
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 These five state actors are Eritrea (98,340 associated fatalities), Turkey (25,280), Kuwait (22,848), Algeria 
(19,556), and Pakistan (17,385). 
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regression model to capture the effect of these political and geopolitical factors associated 
with warring actors is given by,  
=> =  + ?%+' + #@"+ ∑ ,ABAC1 DA + .  (4.1) 
where CTIi is CTI values of a warring actor indicated by the subscript i. Durationi is a 
length of conflict in years in which an actor i was engaged during the period of interest 
between 1989 and 2010. It is included to examine whether the intensity of civilian targeting 
of warring actors is affected by duration of armed conflict. Fatalityi is total fatalities 
associated with the actor i on common logarithmic scale to capture the scale effect of armed 
conflict. The coefficient # is expected to describe degrees to which actors concentrated 
their lethal force on civilian targeting as opposed to battling with combatants as violence 
escalated. Furthermore a set of dummy variables, Zki (k=1,…, n) are included in Model 4.1 
to control various features associated with the actors. For instance, state, coded as 1 if state 
actors, 0 if non-state actors, is to examine whether both groups behave differently in terms 
of civilian targeting in armed conflict. Furthermore, short-term is a dummy variable to 
isolate the actors involved in conflict for a year or two. These actors account for the 
majority in the dataset used for this chapter (305 in 536), and most of them are distributed 
at the extreme in terms of CTI values; 75% (230 in 305) did not carry out civilian targeting 
(CTI=0) whilst 16% (42 in 305) used civilian targeting as a sole form of their lethal 
behaviour (CTI=100). Short-term is therefore expected to capture different behavioural 
patterns, if any, of these actors from the ones engaged in conflict for longer duration (i.e. 3-
22 years). Moreover, four dummy variables to control regions of actors are also included in 
Model 4.1. MENA is coded as 1 if location of incompatibility of actors is in the Middle East 
or North Africa, 0 otherwise, Asia is 1 if Asia, 0 otherwise, SSA is 1 if Sub-Saharan Africa, 
0 otherwise, and finally Americas is 1 if North and South Americas, 0 otherwise. The base 
region, therefore, is Europe. Finally, . indicates the error term.  
Model 4.1 can be modified to be a qualitative response model to examine the 
determinants affecting warring actors to cross the line into carrying out some degree of 
civilian targeting (CTI>0) as opposed to refraining from it (CTI=0). The explanatory 
variables are used without modification but the dependent variable is now a binary variable 
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that takes 1 if an actor were involved in some degree of civilian targeting, 0 otherwise. This 
qualitative response model can be estimated with logit and probit methods.  
Estimations with Model 4.1 provides how and to what extent factors associated with 
warring actors affect their lethal behaviour on civilians as opposed to battling with 
combatants. This cross-sectional approach, however, does not render how the actors adjust 
their lethal behaviour against civilians over time when they were engaged in prolonged 
armed conflict covering 20 years or more. To examine whether persistence in the 
intentional targeting of civilians is present in prolonged armed conflict, this chapter utilises 
a dynamic panel model as follows. 
=>=  + =>1 + #@" + (E+*+'+F>'G+' + HI?E +  + . 
   (4.2) 
where the dependent variable, CTIit, is CTI value of actor i at time t. The explanatory 
variable of interest is the lagged dependent variable to explore a short-term memory of 
warring actors’ lethal behaviour onto civilians in prolonged armed conflict. Fatalityit 
indicates total fatalities associated with actor i at time t on common logarithmic scale. As in 
the cross-sectional analysis with Model 4.1, fatalityit is included to measure the scale effect 
of armed conflict on the intensity of civilian targeting proxied by CTI values.152 
Furthermore, macroeconomic and demographic variables are newly included in the 
dynamic panel model to investigate whether these non-political factors influence the 
intensity of civilian targeting in prolonged armed conflict. Populationit is the annual growth 
rate of population of a country where actor i contended to dominate territories or population 
(i.e. location of incompatibility). Inflationit and GDPit are the annual inflation rates and 
annual GDP growth rates of a location of incompatibility to control the economic 
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 In regression analysis using model 4.2 in section 4.4., I also present the results excluding fatalityit in 
consideration of the simultaneity issue arising from this explanatory variable used as a proxy of scale of 
armed conflict. As a CTI value of an actor is defined as the number of civilian deaths by direct, intentional 
attacks divided by total fatalities associated with the actor, and fatalityit indicates total fatalities associated 
with actor, the presence of fatalityit in model 4.2 brings about the simultaneity problem. To lessen this 
econometrics concern, I present the regression results with and without the variable in dynamic panel analysis.  
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circumstances under which warring actors may have faced during armed conflict.153 These 
demographic and macroeconomic indices are obtained from the World Bank and the 
IMF.154 155 Finally,  is an unobserved actor-specific time-invariant effect which may be 
correlated with other explanatory variables and . is the disturbance.  
Estimating Model 4.2 requires different econometric methods from static panel 
analyses due to the endogeneity of lagged dependent variable. A basic model for a dynamic 
panel analysis to highlight the econometric concerns is given by, 
 " =  + #"1 + J +  + . 
where ui is an unobserved heterogeneity and . is a random disturbance assumed to be 
normal, independent and identically distributed (i.e. .~
(0, KLM)). As the equation 
includes a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable, static panel estimation 
methods such as fixed effect or random effect are not applicable. Assuming that the 
heterogeneity, ui, is a fixed effect, the within transformation of the equation above gives 
" − "NOOOO = #("1 − "NP) + (J − JNP ) + (. − .NP) 
where "NP = =1 ∑ "QC1  and similarly for JNP  and .NP  . Although the unobserved 
heterogeneity is eliminated with the within transformation, the explanatory variable 
"1 − "NP  is now correlated with the compound disturbance . − .NP ,156 leading to a bias in 
the estimates of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. First-differencing is also 
not a solution to address the correlation between the explanatory variable and the 
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 The correlation coefficient between inflation rates and GDP growth rates in the dataset for this study is -
.09 (p=.07) which lessens the concern on the high correlation between the two macroeconomic indices.  
154
 IMF (World Economic Outlook Database), World Bank (World Development Indicators). Although 
frequently referenced macroeconomic indices such as unemployment rates are not available for some 
countries involved in prolonged conflict, GDP growth rates and inflation rates are available in the World 
Bank and IMF datasets for most of the countries used for the dynamic panel analysis.    
Annual population growth rates are the exponential rate of growth of mid-year population from year t-1 to t. 
Inflation rates are computed based on the consumer price index (annual %) using the Laspeyres formula. 
Annual percentage growth rates of GDP are calculated based on constant local currency.  
155
 Time-invariant variables (i.e. regional variation) are not included in the dynamic panel model as these 
actor specific variables are eliminated in the estimation procedure. 
156
 As .NP includes .1, the explanatory variable, "1 − "NP , is consequently correlated with the compound 
error term . − .NP  (i.e. R+("1 − "NP , . − .NP) ≠ 0). 
170 
 
disturbance. The basic dynamic panel model above can be rewritten to give the first-
differenced equation as follows. 
" − "1 = #("1 − "M) + (J − J1) + (. − .1) 
Given the explanatory variable, ∆"1 = "1 − "M, and the first order moving average 
disturbance ∆. = . − .1 in the first-differenced equation, ∆"1 is correlated with 
∆. as R+("1, .1) ≠ 0. Moreover, assuming the random effect model that treats the 
unobserved heterogeneity, ui, as a part of the disturbance, this error component enters every 
value of the dependent variable by assumption, so that the lagged dependent variable 
cannot be independent of the error component. 
To address these econometrics concerns arising from dynamic panel estimations, 
this chapter employs the GMM difference and GMM system methods which replace lagged 
dependent variable with instruments. The GMM difference method was initially introduced 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) who argue that the use of instrument variables produces 
consistent estimators if the error term is not serially correlated. The GMM difference 
settings firstly require the first-differencing transformation to eliminate the unobserved 
heterogeneity. Then one can use lagged dependent variables in levels (i.e. "M) as 
instruments to avoid correlation between the explanatory variables and the compound error 
term.157 This method is called GMM difference estimation as it is based on first-
differencing. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), however, state that 
the use of lagged dependent variables in levels as instruments may cause a small sample 
bias when the time periods is not long and the dependent variable is highly persistent.158 
They suggest the alternative GMM system method that takes both first-differenced 
instruments for the equation in levels, and instruments in levels for the first-differenced 
equation. This chapter further employs bias-corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable 
(LSDV) methods for the robustness of the estimates of dynamic panel regression. As Bruno 
(2005a, 2005b, Lokshin 2009) indicates, the bias corrected LSDV estimators often 
outperform GMM estimators in dynamic unbalanced panel with a small sample size, which 
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 As the error term in the first-differenced equation is ∆. = . − .1, lagged dependent variables in 
levels (i.e. "M, "T … ) are not correlated with the error.  
158
 A random walk process " = "1 +  where   is white noise. 
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applies for this chapter as the number of warring actors involved in armed conflict for 20 
years or more is not numerous in the dataset used for this chapter.  
 
4.4. Regression Analysis 
This section presents regression results estimated with the models described in the previous 
section. Table 4-7 contains the two set of regression results estimated based on Model 4.1; 
the left panel (column 1-4) shows the OLS regression results and the right panel (column 5-
8) probit and logit estimates. Looking at the OLS results first, column 1 presents the 
estimates when all actors in the dataset used for this chapter are taken into account whilst 
column 2 only considers the actors who carried out some degree of civilian targeting 
(CTI>0). The regression results excluding Rwanda are also presented in column 3 and 4  in 
consideration of the leverage of this country due to its half a million of associated fatalities. 
The factors associated with warring actors appear to poorly explain the intensity of 
intentional, direct civilian targeting when all actors are taken into account (column 1). With 
regard to the variables concerning duration of armed conflict, neither duration nor short-
term does have a statistically significant effect on the intensity of civilian targeting. It 
implies that the length of armed conflict in which warring actors involved is not correlated 
with actors’ lethal behaviour against civilians. Furthermore, the scale of armed conflict is 
also not a significant determinant of the intensity of civilian targeting, as suggested by 
fatality. Holding sovereignty, however, is a significant factor influencing the intensity of 
civilian targeting, suggesting that state actors recorded significantly higher CTI values than 
non-state actors by 9 percentage points. Amongst regional dummies, Asia and SSA suggest 
that actors whose location of incompatibility is in Asia or Sub-Saharan Africa have 
significantly higher CTI values than the actors in the base region, Europe.  
Excluding the actors that refrained from civilian targeting renders a substantial 
change in regression results as shown in column 2 in Table 4-7. Although duration remains 
as an insignificant determinant on the intensity of civilian targeting, short-term and fatality 
turn to be significant when only the actors who carried out some degree of civilian targeting 
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(CTI>0) are taken into account. Short-term can be interpreted that the actors involved in 
armed conflict for a year or two have significantly higher CTI values than actors involved 
in conflict for three years or more. It implies that degrees to which actors concentrated their 
lethal force into targeting civilians were substantially higher when they were engaged in a 
very short-term period of conflict than those in a longer-term conflict. This may be because 
actors engaged in one or two years of conflict were associated with a smaller number of 
fatalities, and were likely to concentrate on less costly war strategy by targeting unarmed 
civilians rather than battling with combatants. The scale effect of armed conflict is also 
significant and its magnitude is strong for the actors who crossed the line into targeting 
civilians (CTI>0). The negative sign of fatality in column 2 implies that these actors 
decreased their concentration into civilian targeting as opposed to battling with combatants 
as violence escalated. Specifically, holding other factors constant, CTI values decreased by 
approximately 14 percentage points whenever total fatalities associated with actors 
increased by a factor of ten (i.e. 100 to 1,000 or 1,000 to 10,000). Holding sovereignty, 
however, is not a significant factor influencing the intensity of civilian targeting any more, 
suggesting that state and non-state actors do not differently behave once they crossed the 
line into civilian targeting. Moreover, the intensity of civilian targeting is unaffected by 
actors’ location of incompatibility, implying that there is no regional idiosyncrasy for the 
actors who carried out some degree of civilian targeting. An exclusion of Rwanda does not 
make a great difference in magnitude or significance of each explanatory variable. 
The right panel of Table 4-7 presents the probit and logit estimates from the binary 
response model described in section 4.3. As anticipated, duration of armed conflict has 
positive effect on crossing the line into civilian targeting (CTI>0). Regardless of the 
presence of Rwanda, the probability that an actor on the mean value (4.17 years) carries out 
some degree of civilian targeting increases by about 3% when the actor is involved in 
conflict one more year. Furthermore, the scale of armed conflict is also a determinant for 
actors to cross the line into targeting civilians, as suggested by the direction of fatality. The 
marginal effect of total fatalities on its mean value159 is .11, meaning that the probability 
that an actor carries out some degree of civilian targeting increases by 11% if total fatalities 
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 The mean of total fatalities is 2.574 on common logarithmic scale, which indicate 375 total fatalities. 
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associated with the actor increases by 10 times.160 Moreover, the actors involved in armed 
conflict for a year or two do not behave differently in crossing the line into civilian 
targeting compared to the actors engaged in conflict for longer years (i.e. 3-22 years). 
Holding sovereignty and regional variation is also not a significant determinant for the 
actors in carrying out some degree of civilian targeting unless they are from Sub-Saharan 
Africa. SSA indicates that actors whose territories or location of incompatibility are in this 
region are about 20% more likely to carry out some degree of civilian targeting as opposed 
to none than actors from the base region (i.e. Europe). Together, the probit and logit 
estimators obtained from the binary response model suggest that the likelihood of crossing 
the line into civilian targeting is rather affected by endogenous features of war such as 
duration or scale of armed conflict, not by exogenous factors including actors’ status (i.e. 
sovereign state or armed groups) and location of incompatibility with the exception of the 
actors from Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Whilst duration of armed conflict in the dataset varies from 1 to 22 years, the 
majority of all actors (305 in 536) were involved in conflict for one year or two. On the 
other hand, 19 actors (12 states and 7 non-states) were engaged in conflict for 20-22 years, 
the longest time periods in the dataset used for this chapter. As shown in Figure 4-5 
illustrating these 19 actors’ annual CTI values, four of them refrained from intentional, 
direct targeting of civilians, maintaining a CTI of 0 while they were involved in armed 
conflict.161 The rest of the actors carried out some degree of civilian targeting for at least a 
couple of years during armed conflicts. Although the number of actors engaged in 
prolonged armed conflict covering 20 years or more is not numerous in the dataset used for 
this chapter, it is worth exploring persistence of actors’ lethal behaviour against civilians. A 
dynamic panel approach is suited to test this hypothesis of persistence as it enables to 
capture dynamic effects of CTI values by including lagged CTI values as explanatory 
variables in regression models.  
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 From 375 to 3750 total fatalities. 
161
 All of these 4 actors are states; Turkey, Philippines, Algeria and Pakistan. 
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Table 4-8 presents the results from dynamic panel regressions using 3 different 
estimation methods as described in section 4.3. Looking at the GMM estimators first, the 
lagged dependent variable is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance, 
suggesting that a 1% increase in CTI values in the previous year led approximately a 0.2-
0.3 % increase in the current year’s CTI values. The effect of the lagged dependent variable 
is stable in most of the specifications regardless of the presence of the economic and 
demographic indices (i.e. population, inflation, GDP) 162 as well as year dummies.163 
Estimations based on the bias-corrected LSDV method also provide consistent results that 
the previous year’s CTI values positively affect the current years’ by about 0.3%, implying 
that warring actors who carried out some degree of civilian targeting in the previous year 
tend to increase their concentration on civilian targeting as opposed to battling with 
combatants in the current year. This may suggest the presence of a short-term memory that 
warring actors’ lethal behaviour against civilians are likely to be intensified if they repeat 
the civilian targeting in prolonged armed conflict although this hysteresis effect persists 
only a year.164 However, the scale of armed conflict, as indicated by fatality, does not 
appear to be a significant determinant of the intensity of civilian targeting for the actors 
involved in prolonged armed conflicts as shown in most of the specifications in Table 4-
8.165 Furthermore, macroeconomic and demographic factors do not have an immediate 
effect on warring actors’ CTI values except inflation rates. Inflation is significant at the 5% 
level of significance in many of the specifications, suggesting that an increase in the overall 
price of goods and services may positively influence actors’ lethal behaviour against 
civilians although the magnitude is small. 
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 An inclusion of economic and demographic variables requires a loss of degrees of freedom since 
macroeconomic indices such as GDP growth rates for Afghanistan is not available most of the years during 
the period of interest. 
163
 Although the validity of instruments is weakened by the Sargan test, the Sargan test is not reliable in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity (Allelano and Bond, 1991), and when the number of instruments is greater than 
panel groups (Hansen et al., 1996), which applies for this chapter. However, the Allelano-Bond AR test 
suggesting the error term is not serially correlated. 
164
 Although it is not reported in Table 4-8, lags of the dependent variable of a higher order than one are not 
statistically significant at the 5% level.. 
165
 The presence of fatality in regression model involves econometrics concerns on simultaneity bias as it also 
related with the dependent variable. Table 4-8 presents the results excluding fatality as well (column 3, 6, 11 
and 12) which does not influence other estimates’ significance.  
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4.5. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter measures degrees to which 536 global warring actors intentionally used their 
lethal force against civilians as opposed to battling with combatants in contemporary armed 
conflict during 1989-2010. The analysis with the Civilian Targeting Index (CTI), defined as 
the proportion of civilian deaths intentionally and directly targeted by an actor to all violent 
deaths associated with the actor, shows that three quarters of all 536 actors are distributed at 
the extreme in terms of civilian targeting; 63% (339 in 536) recorded CTI values of 0, 
meaning that they refrained from targeting civilians whereas 10% (56 in 536) used civilian 
targeting as their sole form of lethal force, indicated by CTI values of 100. 
A cross-sectional data analysis presents the determinants of warring actors’ lethal 
behaviour in civilian targeting in the recent period of armed conflict. Duration and scale of 
conflict do not appear to be significant factors influencing the intensity of civilian targeting 
when all actors are taken into account. However, once the actors crossed the line into 
civilian targeting (CTI>0), scale of conflict negatively affect actors’ lethal behaviour 
against civilians as opposed to battling with combatants, implying that they decreased their 
concentration on civilian targeting as violence escalated. Furthermore, the estimates 
obtained from the binary response model suggest that the probability of crossing the line 
into civilian targeting increased as armed conflict prolonged, and as violence escalated. 
The findings from the cross-section data analysis in this chapter conforms largely to 
the ones suggested in chapter 3. This chapter goes a step further by employing a dynamic 
panel framework to examine to what extent warring actors adjust their lethal behaviour in 
civilian targeting over time. A dynamic panel data analysis with the actors involved in a 
uniquely long duration of armed conflict that covers 20-22 years shows that a 1% increase 
in CTI values in the previous year increases the current year’s CTI values by about 0.2-
0.3%. This may imply that actors’ lethal behaviour against civilians is likely to be 
intensified if they repeat the civilian targeting in prolonged armed conflict. However, the 
scale of conflict does not appear to be correlated with the intensity of civilian targeting of 
warring actors involved in conflict for more than 20 years.  
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The finding from the dynamic panel analysis, which showed the presence of a short-
term memory of the prohibited war strategy according to international norms, demonstrates 
an important political implication. Warring actors, either sovereign states or organised 
armed groups, engaged in prolonged conflict should be more carefully scrutinised by 
international civil society to prevent further violence against civilians. The causes of the 
persistence of actors’ lethal behaviour on civilians remain as an important subject for future 
research. This chapter showed that an increase in overall price of goods and services may 
have positively affected the intensity of civilian targeting. Examination on macroeconomic 
circumstances under which warring actors operate could be the starting point to find the 
causes of the persistence of actors’ lethal behaviour on civilians.  
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Table 4-1: Descriptive Statistics: States vs. Non-states 
 
CTI Total Fatalities Associated with Actors 
 
All States Non-states All States Non-states 
Mean 16.66 (16.51) 
20.99 
(20.09) 15.83 
4424.86 
(3462.08) 
17195.93 
(11355.03) 1950.29 
Confidence 
Intervals for 
Means (95%) 
13.91 to 19.42 
(13.77 to 
19.26) 
13.93 to 28.05 
(13.18 to 
27.00) 
12.83 to 18.83 
2265.62 to 
6584.11 
(2418.33 to 
4505.84) 
4330.28 to 
30061.59 
(5748.31 to 
16961.76) 
1393.57 to 
2507.01 
Standard 
Deviation 
32.48 
(32.32) 
33.12 
(32.23) 32.32 
25447.97 
(12289.71) 
60365.60 
(26150.70) 6002.57 
Number of Actors 536 (535) 
87 
(86) 449 
536 
(535) 
87 
(86) 449 
* Figures in parentheses indicate descriptive statistics when excluding Rwanda. 
 
Table 4-2: Descriptive Statistics: CTI>0 vs. CTI=0 
 CTI>0 CTI=0 
 All Actors States Non-states All Actors States Non-states 
Mean 45.29 (45.02) 
35.11 
(33.87) 49.01 0 0 0 
Confidence Intervals 
for Means (95%) 
39.71 to 50.87 
(39.44 to 
50.60) 
24.90 to 45.32 
(23.77 to 
43.97) 
42.42 to 55.60 0 0 0 
Standard Deviation 39.69 (39.61) 
36.67 
(35.91) 40.16 0 0 0 
Mean Fatalities 9474.30 (6872.07) 
24094.92 
(14380.84) 4222.54 1494.17 6946 866.49 
Number of Actors 197 (196) 
52 
(51) 145 339 35 304 
* Figures in parentheses indicate descriptive statistics when excluding Rwanda. 
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Table 4-3: Descriptive Statistics of Five Regional Groups of Warring Actors 
CTI 
 
Europe Middle East and North Africa ASIA Sub-Saharan Africa Americas 
 
All State Non-state All State Non-state All State Non-state All State Non-state All State Non-state 
Mean 7.86 6.78 8.20 9.83 1.68 11.74 16.40 16.03 16.47 21.28 (20.94)* 
35.95 
(34.05)* 18.70 13.64 17.65 12.30 
Confidence 
Interval (95%) 
1.02 to 
14.70 
-1.97 to 
15.54 
-.52 to 
16.91 
3.08 to 
16.59 
-.40 to 
3.76 
3.46 to 
20.02 
11.05 to 
21.76 
1.66 to 
30.40 
10.63 to 
22.26 
16.63 to 
25.93 
22.09 to 
49.81 
13.83 to 
23.56 
5.77 to 
21.50 
-1.63 to 
36.94 
3.51 to 
21.09 
Standard 
Deviation 24.32 13.78 26.89 25.69 3.10 28.21 32.39 26.97 33.11 35.66 39.73 34.37 29.37 33.40 28.21 
Total Fatalities Associated with Actors 
 
Europe Middle East and North Africa ASIA Sub-Saharan Africa Americas 
 
All State Non-state All State Non-state All State Non-state All State Non-state All State Non-state 
Mean 2456 4795 1736 3997 12565 1992 3581 15659 2059 6176 (3915)* 
29716 
(14873)* 2052 1683 2816 1305 
Confidence 
Interval (95%) 
1078 to 
3833 
154 to 
9437 
530 to 
2943 
1616 to 
6379 
1811 to 
23319 
546 to 
3438 
1750 to 
5412 
2671 to 
28646 
859 to 
3260 
1269 to 
11084 
-3033 to 
62464 
1129 to 
2973 
735 to 
2630 
193 to 
5438 
337 to 
2273 
Standard 
Deviation 4898 7305 3722 9056 16008 4925 11079 24373 6838 37607 93859 6514 3537 4543 3107 
Number of 
Actors 51 12 39 58 11 47 143 16 127 228 34 194 56 14 42 
* Note: Statistics without Rwanda in parentheses 
179 
 
Table 4-4: Distribution of Warring Actors across CTI values 
 All actors State actors Non-state actors 
Range of CTI N % (in total) Mean CTI 
Mean 
Fatalities N 
% 
(in state) Mean CTI 
Mean 
Fatalities N 
% 
(in non-
state) 
Mean CTI Mean Fatalities 
0% 339 63.25 0 1,494 35 40.23 0 6,946 304 67.71 0 866 
0<CTI<10% 55 10.26 4.24 16,728 19 21.84 3.51 29,909 36 8.02 4.63 9,771 
10≤CTI<20% 23 4.29 14.11 7,524 7 8.05 14.38 15,003 16 3.56 13.99 4,252 
20≤CTI<30% 18 3.36 25.11 3,994 5 5.75 25.07 4,170 13 2.90 25.13 3,927 
30≤CTI<40% 15 2.80 34.24 2,674 3 3.45 36.42 8,390 12 2.67 33.69 1,245 
40≤CTI<50% 14 2.61 46.34 3,750 5 5.75 46.52 1,174 9 2.00 46.25 5,181 
50≤CTI<60% 5 0.93 55.00 1,775 2 2.30 54.09 925 3 0.67 55.61 2,342 
60≤CTI<70% 3 0.56 66.87 1,324 0 0 - 0 3 0.67 66.87 1,324 
70≤CTI<80% 2 0.37 74.93 1,659 0 0 - 0 2 0.45 74.93 1,659 
80≤CTI<90% 4 0.75 85.54 11,084 1 1.15 84.57 2,592 3 0.67 85.87 13,915 
90≤CTI<100% 2 0.37 96.24 261,562 1 1.15 98.46 519,513 1 0.22 94.02 3,611 
100% 56 10.45 100 428 9 10.34 100 422 47 10.47 100 429 
Total 536 100 16.66 4,425 87 100 20.99 17,196 449 100 15.83 1,950 
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Table 4-5: Distribution of Total Fatalities Associated with Warring Actors 
Range of Fatalities All Actors (State + Non-state) State Non-state 
 
N % Mean Fatalities Mean CTI N % Mean Fatalities Mean CTI N % Mean Fatalities Mean CTI 
Less than 100 173 32.28 51 19.20 11 12.64 51 45.45 162 36.08 51 17.42 
100 - 999 203 37.87 339 16.29 26 29.89 404 23.90 177 39.42 329 15.18 
1000 - 9,999 116 21.64 3539 14.13 27 31.03 4243 17.33 89 19.82 3326 13.16 
10,000 - 49,999 36 6.72 21327 14.69 16 18.39 19654 6.58 20 4.45 22665 21.17 
Over 50,000 
(without Rwanda) 
8 
(7) 1.49 
139484 
(85194) 
16.88 
(5.23) 
7 
(6) 8.05 
150853 
(89410) 
18.75 
(5.47) 1 0.22 59901 3.76 
Sum 
(without Rwanda) 
536 
(535) 100 
4425 
(3462) 
16.66 
(16.51) 
87 
(86) 100 
17196 
(11355) 
20.99 
(20.09) 449 100 1950 15.83 
 
 
Table 4-6: Distribution of Duration of Armed Conflict during 1989-2010 
Duration All Actors State Non-state % in total Duration All Actors State Non-state % in total 
1 year 218 16 202 40.67 12 years 7 0 6 1.31 
2 years 87 13 74 16.23 13 years 2 0 2 0.37 
3 years 57 7 50 10.63 14 years 5 1 4 0.93 
4 years 36 6 30 6.72 15 years 7 4 3 1.31 
5 years 15 1 14 2.80 16 years 3 1 2 0.56 
6 years 22 7 15 4.10 17 years 1 1 0 0.19 
7 years 16 5 11 2.99 18 years 5 3 2 0.93 
8 years 9 1 8 1.68 19 years 3 2 1 0.56 
9 years 9 3 6 1.68 20 years 6 2 4 1.12 
10 years 9 3 6 1.68 21 years 4 4 0 0.75 
11 years 6 1 5 1.12 22 years 9 6 3 1.68 
     Total 536 87 449 100 
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Table 4-7: Cross-section Data Analysis on the Intensity of Civilian Targeting in Armed Conflict 
Dependent variable CTI values Outcome: 1 if CTI>0, 0 if CTI=0 
Actors CTI≥0  CTI>0 CTI≥0 except  Rwanda 
CTI≥0 except  
Rwanda All Actors All Actors 
Excluding  
Rwanda 
Excluding  
Rwanda 
Estimation Methods OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit Logit Probit Logit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Duration 
(1-22 years) 
-.15 
(.29) 
-.51 
(.44) 
-.14 
(.29) 
-.38 
(.43) 
.027** 
(.009) 
.030** 
(.010) 
.027** 
(.008) 
.030** 
(.010) 
Fatality (Log10) -.82 (2.60) 
-13.83** 
(4.78) 
-1.64 
(2.52) 
-16.95** 
(4.97) 
.115** 
(.040) 
.118** 
(.040) 
.114** 
(.039) 
.117** 
(.040) 
Short-term 6.34 (3.58) 
31.54** 
(7.48) 
5.66 
(3.53) 
28.98** 
(7.19) 
.027 
(.064) 
.038 
(.066) 
.026 
(.064) 
.037 
(.066) 
State 9.47* (4.10) 
3.29 
(4.41) 
8.95* 
(4.08) 
-1.69 
(4.19) 
.118 
(.068) 
.135 
(.073) 
.118 
(.068) 
.134 
(.073) 
MENA 3.98 (5.02) 
-.27 
(9.55) 
3.92 
(5.01) 
-1.98 
(9.48) 
-.025 
(.103) 
-.036 
(.109) 
-.025 
(.103) 
-.036 
(.108) 
Asia 10.60* (4.64) 
7.80 
(9.16) 
10.35* 
(4.64) 
6.13 
(9.01) 
.109 
(.089) 
.110 
(.093) 
.109 
(088) 
.110 
(.093) 
SSA 14.51** (4.27) 
7.19 
(8.99) 
14.03** 
(4.26) 
5.01 
(8.76) 
.196* 
(.078) 
.198* 
(.080) 
.195* 
(.078) 
.198* 
(.081) 
Americas 5.71 (5.24) 
2.68 
(11.29) 
5.57 
(5.23) 
1.05 
(11.13) 
.046 
(.103) 
.037 
(.108) 
.046 
(.103) 
.037 
(.108) 
Constants 4.24 (8.29) 
71.78** 
(17.86) 
6.92 
(8.00) 
82.91** 
(15.16)     
Number of actors 536 197 535 196 536 536 535 535 
RM .04 .54 .04 .58     
pseudo RM     .16 .16 .15 .17 
Note: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The estimates for probit and logit results are marginal effects estimated at sample mean. 
 ** p<.01, *p<.0.05 
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Table 4-8: Dynamic Effects of Civilian Targeting in Prolonged Armed Conflict 
 
Difference 
GMM 
Difference 
GMM 
Difference 
GMM 
System 
GMM  
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
Bias-
corrected 
LSDV 
(BB) 
Bias-
corrected 
LSDV 
(AB) 
Bias-
corrected 
LSDV 
(BB) 
Bias-
corrected 
LSDV 
(AB) 
Bias-
corrected 
LSDV 
(BB) 
Bias-
corrected 
LSDV 
(AB) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
CTIt-1 
.25** 
(.05) 
.20** 
(.03) 
.21** 
(.03) 
.36** 
(.05) 
.29** 
(.04) 
.29** 
(.04) 
.38** 
(.06) 
.36** 
(.06) 
.34** 
(.07) 
.32** 
(.07) 
.34** 
(.07) 
.32** 
(.07) 
Fatality (Log10) -.17 (2.85) 
-.97 
(2.60)  
3.36* 
(3.23) 
.47 
(2.79)  
-.51 
(2.21) 
-.49 
(2.01) 
-1.13 
(2.02) 
-1.11 
(1.91) 
 
 
 
Population  2.64 (3.25) 
2.80 
(3.18)  
7.67 
(4.88) 
7.59 
(5.24)   
-.59 
(3.54) 
-.27 
(3.29) 
-.29 
(3.46) 
.04 
(3.22) 
Inflation  .14** (.05) 
.14** 
(.05)  
.15* 
(.07) 
.15* 
(.07)   
.13 
(.07) 
.13* 
(.06) 
.12 
(.06) 
.12* 
(.06) 
GDP  -.21 (.29) 
-.20 
(.30)  
.18 
(.39) 
.17 
(.42)   
.07 
(.27) 
.08 
(.25) 
.09 
(.25) 
.11 
(.24) 
Year Dummies - Included Included - Included Included   Included Included Included Included 
Number of Observations 345 328 328 372 353 353       
Number of Actors 19 18 18 19 18 18 19 19 18 18 18 18 
Sargan Test 
 (p-value) 
278.70 
(.000) 
277.73 
(.000) 
278.16 
(.000) 
343.36 
(.000) 
323.66 
(.000) 
324.61 
(.000)       
Arellano-Bond AR(1) Test  
(p-value) 
-2.49 
(.013) 
-2.37 
(.018) 
-2.32 
(.020) 
-2.34 
(.019) 
-2.45 
(.014) 
-2.43 
(.015)       
Arellano-Bond AR(2) Test  
(p-value) 
.74 
(.461) 
.44 
(.662) 
.50 
(.616) 
1.30 
(.195) 
.77 
(.44) 
.66 
(.51)       
Note: ** p<.01, *p<.0.05 
Robust standard errors in parentheses for the GMM estimators. Bootstrapped standard errors for bias-corrected LSDV estimators. 
GMM estimators are one-step estimators without an intercept. 
Bias-corrected LSDV-AB indicate one-step Arellano-Bond estimators without an intercept whereas bias-corrected LSDV- BB Blundell-Bond estimators without an intercept. 
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Figure 4-1: Distribution of Warring Actors across CTI Values 
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Figure 4-2: Kernel Density Estimates of Actors’ CTI Value 
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Figure 4-3: Distribution of Duration of Armed Conflict during 1989-2010 
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Figure 4-4: Global Comparison of Warring Actors’ War Strategies between Targeting 
Civilians and Battling Combatants in Armed Conflict during 1989–2010 
 
 
Note: Only state actors are labelled. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The red and black lines indicate the point estimates for state and non-state actors respectively 
from a bivariate regression analysis when CIT values are regressed with total fatalities associated 
with actors. The estimates for both state and non-state actors are statistically significant at the 1% 
level, suggesting an inverse correlation between the intensity of civilian targeting and scale of armed 
conflict. 
* A state actor associated with a non-state actor 
** Comprising US as a sole actor as well as a joint actor (i.e. US associated with UK and Australia) 
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Figure 4-4 continued 
 
 
 
Note: All non-state actors with CTIs greater than 0 are labelled. Among the actors with CTIs of 0, 
only the ones with more than 10,000 total fatalities are labelled. The red and black lines indicate the 
point estimates for state and non-state actors respectively from a bivariate regression analysis when 
CIT values are regressed with total fatalities associated with actors. The estimates for both state and 
non-state actors are statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting an inverse correlation between 
the intensity of civilian targeting and scale of armed conflict. 
* The actors with CTIs of 100, presented in the box below the plot, are categorised under each 
number that are bounded by red dots. 
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Figure 4-5: Annual CTI Values for the Actors Involved in Prolonged Armed Conflict for 20-22 Years 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has been devoted to an empirical analysis of human cost during contemporary 
armed conflict. The first two chapters sought to better our understanding of the 2003 Iraq 
War, one of the major political phenomena in recent decades, by examining military and 
civilian fatalities that occurred during the war. The final two chapters explored the 
significant behavioural patterns of warring actors, both sovereign states and organised 
armed groups, with respect to the intentional targeting of civilians during the contemporary 
warfare.  
Chapter 1 showed an unconventional relation between military fatalities and public 
support towards war using the 2003 Iraq war dataset. Having addressed irregular 
frequencies of poll data that restrict most time series application, the chapter suggested that 
American poll respondents were not affected by contemporaneous casualty information in 
forming their opinion over military withdrawal; arguably the most directly and substantially 
connected issue with the continuance of the US military operation in Iraq. Instead, the poll 
respondents were influenced by marginal casualty information from the previous time 
period, implying a slow adjustment in forming opinion through the error correction process. 
Although military casualty information did not have an immediate effect on poll 
respondents’ prospective judgement on the prolongation of military operations, it strongly 
affected respondents’ retrospective evaluation on the war. For instance, general war support, 
presidential job approval ratings and public conviction on war success captured in various 
poll question types were severely aggravated as military casualties accumulated, 
conforming to conventional wisdom. This difference in attitudes of poll respondents 
implies that although Americans believe the war in Iraq is not justifiable in consideration of 
its unexpectedly tremendous human costs, they deem the withdrawal of the troops should 
be approached on the basis of the other issues, including, for example, the level of security 
in Iraq. 
Given these findings, the chapter suggest that the decision to terminate military 
operations should be made from a wider perspective than from entirely being impelled by 
public war support or presidential approval ratings, which are easily affected by national 
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fatality information in armed conflict. That public support towards war and incumbent 
leaders decline in accordance with the accumulation of military fatalities does not 
necessarily indicate that public prefers troops to withdraw, ending state military 
involvement, as shown in the time series analysis with the Iraq war dataset in the chapter. 
Rather, poll responses that the US troops should stay in Iraq were significantly higher when 
insurgency was acute than during the initial stage of the war when public security was less 
vulnerable. This may imply that poll respondents are likely to be more cautious in 
prospective judgement since the withdrawal of the troops from Iraq in the midst of 
uncertainty could bring about severe instability to the country. Finding more detailed 
reasons as to why poll respondents are not affected by contemporaneous military fatality 
information in forming their opinion over military withdrawal remains as an important area 
for future research.  
Chapter 2’s principal concern was to ascertain whether there is any significant 
difference in counting violent civilian deaths during the 2003 Iraq war between the US 
Department of Defense and the media employing the Pentagon archive and media-based 
record compiled by Iraq Body Count (IBC). Non-parametric equality tests showed that 
violent civilian deaths recorded in the Pentagon and the IBC dataset are consistent across 
18 Iraqi governorates. This provides some degree of certainty that the number of deaths 
recorded in both datasets is not totally arbitrary although neither one could be a true 
number of violent deaths that occurred during the war. However, the comparative study 
also found that a substantial difference between the two datasets arose during the initial 
stage of the war. The difference was mainly observed during the intense battles between the 
US forces and insurgents or anti-coalition forces in Falluja, Najaf, and Samarra in 2004. 
Whilst the IBC dataset records a considerable number of violent civilian deaths during the 
battles in these cities, the US military authority collectively categorised almost all violent 
deaths as insurgent deaths. Given Iraqi government official figures on violent civilian 
deaths including women and children occurring in Falluja, the Pentagon in particular 
appears to have been less mindful in distinguishing civilian loss from insurgent deaths 
during the all-out assaults in the city. Furthermore, a conspicuous difference in the counting 
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of deaths between the Pentagon and the IBC dataset is systematically and consistently 
observed mainly in Baghdad and Basrah, during the initial period of the war. 
Although it cannot be conclusively established which dataset is close to the actual 
number of civilian deaths that occurred during the war, the chapter suggested that the 
undercount by the US military authority regarding violent civilian deaths compared to 
media reports impeded US forces’ ability to grasp the long term implications of war 
evolution. Given the sectarian violence and severe insurgency between mid-2006 and mid-
2007, the media which consistently warned the onset of sectarian civil war by reporting a 
substantial number of violent civilian deaths during the preceding period, had a sharper 
understanding of the intensity of violence and its evolution than the US military authority 
would have had. This conclusion inevitably leads to the necessity of an effective counting 
system of war deaths, both combatants and civilians, in any armed conflict to better our 
understanding of the nature of violence, and to prevent unnecessary hostilities that increase 
human cost and damage social capital. Finally, although the chapter analysed war death 
information contained in the datasets available across various dimensions, it lacked a 
regression analysis to find factors that may have affected the intensity of violence during 
the war. This calls for further research on the relations between the occurrence of violent 
incidents involving human loss and the political or economic circumstances which a 
country is beset by the time of these incidents. Furthermore, the availability of war deaths 
information across 104 Iraqi districts contained in the Pentagon dataset leaves open the 
possibility to examine the spatial characteristics of the spread of violence, which would 
enhance our understanding on the geographic idiosyncrasies of violence.  
Chapter 3 and 4 attempted to decipher the degree to which formally organised 
actors in armed conflict intentionally employed lethal force against civilian targets as 
opposed to armed combatants in battles. The chapters utilised the Civilian Targeting Index 
(CTI), defined as the proportion of intentional civilian deaths by an actor to all violent 
deaths associated with the same actor, and found that approximately 60% of warring actors 
participating in armed conflict during 1989-2010 refrained from the intentional targeting of 
civilians (CTI=0) whereas 10% used civilian targeting as their sole form of lethal force 
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(CTI=100). The chapters further tried to deepen our understanding of what factors 
determine an actor’s use of lethal force against civilians. Scale of armed conflict does not 
appear to be a significant factor in influencing the intensity of civilian targeting. However, 
once an actor crossed the line into civilian targeting (CTI>0), the scale of conflict 
negatively affects the intensity of civilian targeting, implying that as armed conflict 
escalated the intentional targeting of civilians as opposed to battling with armed combatants 
declined. Chapter 4 analysed the persistence of warring actors’ lethal behaviour against 
civilians within a dynamic panel framework. A dynamic panel data analysis with a uniquely 
long duration of armed conflict that covers 20-22 years showed that a 1% increase in CTI 
values in the previous year increases the current year’s CTI values by about 0.2-0.3%. It 
may suggest that warring actors who carried out some degree of civilian targeting in the 
previous year tend to increase their concentration on civilian targeting in the current year. 
The presence of persistency of actors’ intentional targeting behaviour against civilians 
implies that there is a short-term memory in this prohibited war strategy.  
Based on these findings, chapter 4 conveyed that warring actors, either sovereign 
states or formally organised armed groups, engaged in prolonged armed conflict should be 
more scrutinised by international civil society to prevent further violence against civilians. 
Although the chapter captured the dynamic effect of civilian targeting behaviour by warring 
actors participating in prolonged armed conflict, the number of actors available for the 
dynamic panel analysis was limited to an examination of only 19 warring actors, who were 
engaged in conflict for more than 20 years. Since further updated datasets were recently 
released,166 additional studies on these datasets are required to examine whether the short-
term memory of warring actors’ intentional targeting behaviour against civilians is a valid 
determinant in the extended datasets. Furthermore, the reasons why intentional use of lethal 
force against civilians tends to intensify over time remain another interesting field for 
future research.   
  
                                                           
166
 UCDP released the updated datasets in August 2012, which contain war death information in armed 
conflict during 1989-2011. 
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